現(xiàn)代壟斷將為競爭下新定義

現(xiàn)代壟斷將為競爭下新定義

互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)的“四巨頭”：蘋果、臉書、亞馬遜和谷歌幾乎壟斷了整個行業(yè)。雖然這樣的壟斷讓我們略感不安，但不可否認“四巨頭”的存在使絕大多數(shù)人受益。

測試中可能遇到的詞匯和知識：

gouge鑿；亂要價[ga?d?]

stifling令人窒息的['sta?f(?)l??]

incremental增加的，增值的[,?nkr?'ment?l]

adjacent鄰近的，毗連的[?'d?e?s(?)nt]

aghast嚇呆的，驚駭?shù)腫?'gɑ?st]

predatory pricing掠奪性訂價；掠奪性價格

Modern monopolists are redefining competition（576 words）

By FT View

It is odd to accuse a company of price gouging when its product is free, or to allege that a company is unfairly stifling competitors when its products are obviously superior. So while the dominance of the “four horsemen” of internet technology — Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and Google — can feel unsettling, it is not easy to pin down why.

It has been understood for decades that technology companies often enjoy increasing rather than diminishing returns over time. Initial investment requirements are high but incremental costs are minimal. Once a software company reaches scale, its product becomes a standard that adjacent products must build around. Even with better products, new competitors struggle.

Internet companies have another source of increasing returns: network effects. Search engines, social networks, and retail websites get better as their user bases grow. Customers want to be where the others customers are. One might argue, then, that the horsemen — and eventually aspirants from Netflix to Uber — are to varying degrees natural monopolies. The industrial-era response to this would be regulation of returns or even nationalisation. But who would benefit if Facebook or Google were treated this way?

Still, there are risks to competition. One is that the companies with the biggest customer networks can simply copy their rivals' ideas, and depend on their existing customer base to win the ensuing battle. This would decrease the incentive to innovate. At Facebook's developer conference this week, the company talked up camera-based products and strategies that were strikingly similar to those of upstart rival Snap. Many observers were aghast.

Next, it may be that suppliers or advertisers, rather than customers, are the ones getting gouged. This would decrease the incentive to invest in adjacent industries. As a producer of journalism that appears across social networks, this newspaper is of course one of those suppliers and is keen to capture as much of its content's value as possible. But a dominant social network like Facebook, or dominant mobile device/software maker such as Apple, could extract painful rents not just in journalism but in music, film, and elsewhere. That Amazon has arrived at an uneasy peace with book publishers, or that music streaming has helped music publishers to see past iTunes, does not resolve the issue.

Google is considering including an ad-blocker in its popular Chrome web browser. Depending on how it, it could tilt the field in favour of Google's own advertising efforts. Facebook often talks about limiting the advertisements that appear on its users' timelines. Could this turn into an effort to raise prices and profits by limiting supply — a standard monopolists' gambit?

Finally, there is the question of predatory pricing. Traditionally, undercutting less-capitalised rivals with price has been an unstable strategy because it harms profits. But investors in internet ventures care little for profit if growth is strong. Amazon, which flirts with losses two decades into its life, is just the most famous example of this. Amazon's low prices are great for customers. Those customers may be less happy if they are living in a retail monoculture a decade or two hence.

Keeping customers happy is how all of the big four got where they are. They will not stop trying to do so. It may be, however, that the identification of healthy markets with satisfied customers needs to be reconsidered. What we stand to lose is all the excellent products we will never enjoy, if trying to knock the four horsemen off their mounts becomes pointless.