演講MP3+雙語文稿:關(guān)于核武器，我們應(yīng)該問這3個問題

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【演講者及介紹】Emma Belcher

艾瑪·貝爾徹——核安全專家。Emma Belcher制定并實施了減少核武器威脅的戰(zhàn)略。

【演講主題】關(guān)于核武器，我們應(yīng)該問這三個問題

【中英文字幕】

翻譯者 Saanman Fong，校對者 Lipeng Chen

00:14

So you know when you're doubled over inpain and you're wondering, is it your appendix or maybe you ate somethingfunny? Well, when that happens to me, I call my friend Sasha -- Sasha is adoctor -- and I say, "Should I rush to the nearest emergency room in apanic? Or am I OK to relax and just wait it out?" Yes, I am that annoyingfriend.

你們有沒有過身體特別的難受的時候，你在想是不是得了闌尾炎，或者是吃壞了肚子？我碰上這種事，我會給我的朋友薩莎打電話——薩莎是個醫(yī)生——我說“我是不是得火急火燎得跑去最近的急救中心？”還是我可以放輕松，等它自己好就行？”沒錯，我就是那個煩人的朋友。

00:39

But in September 2017, friends of mine weresuddenly calling me for my professional opinion. And no, I'm not a doctor, butthey were asking me questions of life and death.

不過在 2017 年的九月份，我的一些朋友突然打電話找我，來征求我專業(yè)的看法。而且不，我并不是個醫(yī)生，不過他們問我的是關(guān)于生與死的問題。

00:54

So what was going on in September of 2017?Well, was suddenly and scarily all over the news. had tested missilespotentially capable of hitting major US cities, and President had respondedwith tweets of "fire and fury." And there was real concern thattensions would escalate to a potential war or even nuclear weapons use. So whatmy friends were calling and asking was: Should they panic or were the OK torelax? But really, they were asking me a fundamental question: "Am Isafe?"

那么 2017 年九月發(fā)生了什么呢？在一夜之間，遍布各大新聞媒體，引得人心惶惶。他們進(jìn)行了導(dǎo)彈的試射試驗，而這些導(dǎo)彈具有打擊美國主要城市的潛力，總統(tǒng)在推特中以“炮火與怒火”回?fù)?。人們非常?dān)憂目前緊張的局勢有可能惡化，升級成一場潛在的戰(zhàn)爭，或甚至要使用核武器。所以我的朋友打電話來問的是：他們是否要開始恐慌，還是說他們可以放心？其實他們都在問一個基本問題：“我現(xiàn)在安全嗎？”

01:41

While I was reassuring them that, no, theydidn't need to worry just yet, the irony of their question dawned on me. Whatthey hadn't really thought about is that we've all been living under a muchlarger cloud for decades -- potentially a mushroom cloud -- without giving itmuch thought.

在我勸他們放輕松，沒事的，他們還不必為此擔(dān)心的時候，我意識到他們問題中很諷刺的一點。他們沒有想到的是，我們在這種烏云籠罩的狀況下生活數(shù)十年了——甚至還可能是蘑菇云——我們卻沒去多想。

02:00

Now it's not surprising that friends ofmine and many others like them don't know much about nuclear weapons and don'tthink about them. After all, the end of the Cold War, the United States andRussia, tension abated, we started dismantling nuclear weapons, and theystarted to become a relic of the past. Generations didn't have to grow up withthe specter of nuclear war hanging over their heads. And there other reasonspeople don't like to think about nuclear weapons. It's scary, overwhelming. Iget it. Sometimes I wish I could have chosen a cheerier field to study.

那么如今我的朋友和許多其他人 不怎么了解也不去關(guān)注核武器，也就不奇怪了。畢竟冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束后，美國和俄羅斯間局勢緩和，我們開始銷毀核武器，然后這種武器逐漸成為歷史。新一代人不需要在 核戰(zhàn)爭的在陰霾下長大。還有其他的原因讓人 不喜歡去想核武器的事。它很嚇人，讓人無所適從。我能理解。有時我也希望我當(dāng)初選個愉快一點的研究領(lǐng)域。

02:36

(Laughter) Perhaps tax law would have beenmore uplifting.

（笑聲）也許學(xué)稅法更能振奮人心一些。

02:40

(Laughter) But in addition to that, peoplehave so many other things to think about in their busy lives, and they'd muchprefer to think about something over which they feel they have some semblanceof control, and they assume that other people, smarter than they on this topic,are working away to keep us all safe. And then, there are other reasons peopledon't talk about this, and one is because we, as nuclear experts, use a wholelot of convoluted jargon and terminology to talk about these issues: CVID,ICBM, JCPOA. It's really inaccessible for a lot of people. And, in reality, itactually sometimes I think makes us numb to what we're really talking abouthere.

（笑聲）但是除此之外，人們在繁忙的生活中有那么多別的東西要去考慮，他們更愿意去為那些看似在他們控制之下的事情思考，并且他們都以為總有別人，比他們自己在這方面更聰明的人，正在全力解決這個問題，好讓大家都平平安安。另外人們不愛討論核武器還有其他原因，其中之一便是我們核專家，會用很多晦澀難懂的行話和專業(yè)術(shù)語來談?wù)撨@些問題： CVID、ICBM、JCPOA。這對很多人來說是難以理解的。并且事實上我認(rèn)為有時這反而讓我們對我們真正想要討論的東西感到麻木，

03:29

And what we are really talking about hereis the fact that, while we've made dramatic reductions in the number of nuclearweapons since the Cold War, right now, there are almost 15,000 in the worldtoday. 15,000. The United States and Russia have over 90 percent of thesenuclear weapons. If you're wondering, these are the countries that have therest. But they have far fewer, ranging in the sort of 300-ish range and below.

而我們在此真正想要討論的東西，實際上是盡管我們從冷戰(zhàn)以來已經(jīng)在數(shù)量上大幅減少核武器，但是現(xiàn)在世界上仍然有將近一萬五千枚核彈頭。一萬五千枚。美國和俄羅斯擁有超過 90% 的核武器。如果你想知道的話，這些國家擁有剩下的核武器。但是他們擁有的數(shù)量少太多了，在大約 300 多的范圍內(nèi)或者更少。

04:05

Adding to this situation is the fact thatwe have new technologies that potentially bring us new challenges. Could youimagine, one day, countries like ours and others potentially ceding decisionsabout a nuclear strike to a robot, based on algorithms? And what data do theyuse to inform those algorithms? This is pretty terrifying. So adding to thisare terrorism potential, cyberattacks, miscalculation, misunderstanding. Thelist of nuclear nightmares tends to grow longer by the day. And there are anumber of former officials, as well as experts, who worry that right now, we'rein greater danger than we were in various points in the Cold War.

更加雪上加霜的是，我們擁有的最新科技可能會給我們帶來全新的挑戰(zhàn)。你可以想象嗎？某一天類似我們的和他們的國家有可能把執(zhí)行核打擊的決策大權(quán)交給一個基于計算機(jī)算法的機(jī)器人來決定。那么他們要用什么數(shù)據(jù)來支持這些算法呢？這太可怕了。除此之外還有潛在的恐怖主義、網(wǎng)絡(luò)攻擊、計算差錯和各國間的誤會。核武器帶來的噩夢只會一天比一天多。并且有不少前任政府官員和專家們 擔(dān)心我們現(xiàn)在正處于 比冷戰(zhàn)的各個時刻更大的危險之中。

04:55

So this is scary. What can we do?

這是很恐怖。那我們能做些什么？

05:05

We can take some control, and the way we dothat is by starting to ask some fundamental questions about the status quo andwhether we are happy with the way it is. We need to begin asking questions ofourselves and of our elected officials, and I'd like to share three with youtoday.

我們可以對此有所控制，而為了實現(xiàn)這個，我們要對于現(xiàn)狀問幾個基本的問題，以及我們是否覺得現(xiàn)狀可以接受。我們要向我們自己提問，向政府官員們提問，而今天我很樂意和你們分享三個問題。

05:27

The first one is, "How much nuclearrisk are you willing to take or tolerate?" Right now, nuclear policydepends on deterrence theory. Developed in the 1950s, the idea is that onecountry's nuclear weapons prevents another country from using theirs. So younuke me, I nuke you, and we both lose. So in a way, there's a stalemate. No oneuses their weapons, and we're all safe. But this theory has real questions.There are experts who challenge this theory and wonder: Does it really workthis way in practice? It certainly doesn't allow for mistakes ormiscalculations. Now, I don't know about you, but I feel pretty uncomfortablegambling my future survival, yours, and our future generations', on a theorythat is questionable and doesn't allow any room for a mistake. It makes me evenmore uncomfortable to be threatening the evaporation of millions of people onthe other side of the Earth. Surely we can do better for ourselves, drawing onour ingenuity to solve complex problems, as we have in the past. After all,this is a man-made, human-made -- I shouldn't say "man," becausewomen were involved -- a human-made problem. We have human solutions thatshould be possible.

第一個是，“你愿意承擔(dān)多大的核風(fēng)險？”現(xiàn)在，核武器政策取決于威懾理論。這套理論在 50 年代提出，意思是一個國家擁有核武器會防止其他國家用他們的核武器。你核爆我，我就核爆你，我們都是輸家。所以某種程度上說，雙方陷入僵局。沒人用他們的武器，我們就都安全了。但這個理論有些實際的問題。一些挑戰(zhàn)這個理論的專家提出：現(xiàn)實中真的會這樣嗎？這套理論不能容忍一點失誤和計算錯誤。我不知道你們怎么想，不過這讓我非常不安，要把你我的下一代的存亡作為賭注，全押在一個存在爭議并且毫無容錯率的理論上。讓我更加不安的是，要去威脅用核武器讓地球另一邊 數(shù)以百萬計的人全部蒸發(fā)。我們當(dāng)然自己可以做得更好，運(yùn)用我們的創(chuàng)造力去解決復(fù)雜的問題，就像我們過去一樣。終究，這都是人造的。人類制造的——我不該說人（man），因為女人也參與其中——一個人類制造的問題。我們有應(yīng)該可行的、更有人性的解決方案。

07:09

So, next question: "Who do you thinkshould make nuclear decisions?" Right now, in this democracy, in theUnited States, one person gets to decide whether or not to launch a nuclearstrike. They don't have to consult anybody. So that's the president. He or shecan decide -- within a very limited amount of time, under great pressure,potentially, depending on the scenario, maybe based on a miscalculation or amisunderstanding -- they can decide the fate of millions of lives: yours, mine,our community's. And they can do this and launch a nuclear strike, potentiallysetting in motion the annihilation of the human race. Wow.

所以下一個問題：“你認(rèn)為誰應(yīng)該決定使用核武器？”現(xiàn)在在我們這個民主政體，在美國，有一個人可以決定是否發(fā)動核打擊。這個人不需要咨詢?nèi)魏稳?。這就是我們的總統(tǒng)。他或她可以在非常有限的時間內(nèi)，根據(jù)不同情況，也許在巨大的壓力之下，也許基于錯誤的計算或誤解的基礎(chǔ)上，他們可以決定數(shù)以百萬計的人的命運(yùn)：你的、我的以及整個社會的?？偨y(tǒng)可以這樣做，發(fā)動一次核打擊，很可能推動毀滅全人類的進(jìn)程。哇哦。

08:09

This doesn't have to be our reality,though, and in fact, in a number of other countries that have nuclear weapons,it's not, including countries that are not democracies. We created this system.We can change it. And there's actually a movement underway to do so.

不過我們并不用接受這樣的現(xiàn)實，實際上很多別的，擁有核武器的國家并不是這樣的，包括不是民主政體的國家。我們創(chuàng)造這套體制，我們也可以改變它，而且有正在進(jìn)行的運(yùn)動在為此努力。

08:26

So this leads me to my third question:"What do your elected officials know about nuclear weapons, and what typesof decisions are they likely to take on your behalf?" Well, Congress has avery important role to play in oversight of and interrogating US nuclearweapons policy. They can decide what to fund, what not to fund, and theyrepresent you. Now unfortunately, since the end of the Cold War, we've seen areal decline in the level of understanding, on Capitol Hill, about these issues.While we are starting to see some terrific new champions emerge, the reality isthat the general lack of awareness is highly concerning, given that thesepeople need to make critically important decisions. To make matters worse, thepolitical partisanship that currently grips Washington also affects this issue.

那這就引出我的第三個問題：“你們的政府官員對核武器有多少了解，并且他們會代表你做出什么樣的決定？“確實國會在其中扮演非常重要的角色，去監(jiān)督和訊問美國的核武政策。他們可以決定給什么撥款，不給什么撥款，而且他們代表你們?，F(xiàn)在很不幸的是，自冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束以來，我們看到的是華盛頓在這些問題上理解的程度有真真切切的下降。在我們開始見證新的優(yōu)秀的政治家嶄露頭角的同時，現(xiàn)實卻是這種普遍缺乏的意識，讓人非常擔(dān)憂，尤其是這些人要負(fù)責(zé)做出極其重要的決定。更糟糕的是，在政府內(nèi)根深蒂固的黨派偏見與紛爭也同樣對此有影響。

09:22

This wasn't always the case, though. At theend of the Cold War, members from both sides of the aisle had a really goodunderstanding about the nuclear challenges we were facing and worked togetheron cooperative programs. They recognized that nuclear risk reduction was fartoo important to allow it to succumb to political partisanship. They createdprograms such as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, whichsought to lock down and eliminate vulnerable nuclear material in the formerSoviet Union. So we need to return to this era of bipartisanship, mutualproblem-solving that's based on understanding and awareness about thechallenges we face and the real nuclear dangers.

不過這并不是總是這樣的。在冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束時，對抗的雙方都具有對于我們所面對的核問題的深刻理解，并且共同進(jìn)行合作項目。他們認(rèn)識到核武器的削減實在太重要了，以至于政治斗爭都要為它讓路。他們開啟了一些項目，比如《納恩-盧格減少威脅合作計劃》，該計劃旨在控制與銷毀前蘇聯(lián)不穩(wěn)定的核原料。所以我們需要回到那個當(dāng)年雙邊合作的年代，根據(jù)對于我們面對的挑戰(zhàn)和實際核危機(jī)的意識和理解，以此來相互解決問題。

10:09

And that's where you come in. Publicpressure is important. Leaders need a constituent base to act. So create thatconstituent base, by asking them some simple questions. Ask them, "What doyou know about nuclear weapons?" "Do you have a nuclear expert onyour staff? Or, if not, do you know somebody you could refer to if you need tomake an important decision?" Start to find out what they believe andwhether it aligns with your own views and values. Ask them, "How would youchoose to spend US national treasure? On a new nuclear arms race or anothernational security priority, such as cybersecurity or climate change?" Askthem, "Are you willing to put aside partisanship to address thisexistential threat that affects my survival and your constituents'survival?"

而這就是你出場的時候。公眾的壓力很關(guān)鍵。領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人需要一群忠實的選民才會行動起來。那么為了創(chuàng)造這群忠實的選民，問他們一些簡單的問題。問他們，“你對核武器了解多少？”“你的麾下是否有核專家？或者如果沒有，你知道有誰在你要做出重大決定的時候，可以向其咨詢和請教的？”開始了解他們的想法，看看是否和你自己的看法和價值觀所吻合。問他們，“你會怎么去用美國的國家財富？是用在新的核武軍備競賽上，或是別的國家安全優(yōu)先事項，比如網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全或者氣候變化？”問他們，“你是否愿意先將黨派爭斗放在一邊，好好著手解決現(xiàn)存的、影響我和你忠實選民生命的威脅？”

11:07

Now, people will tell you nuclear policy isfar too difficult to understand and complexed and nuanced for the generalpublic to understand, let alone debate. After all, this is "nationalsecurity." There needs to be secrets. Don't let that put you off. Wedebate all sorts of issues that are critically important to our lives -- whyshould nuclear weapons be any different? We debate health care, education, theenvironment. Surely congressional oversight, civic participation that are suchhallmarks of US democracy, surely they apply here. After all, these are casesof life and death that we're talking about. And we won't all agree, but whetheror not you believe nuclear weapons keep us safe or that nuclear weapons are aliability, I urge you to put aside partisan, ideological issues and listen toeach other.

然后人們會告你，核武器政策太難理解了，對于普通大眾來講，實在太復(fù)雜有太多細(xì)節(jié)了，更不要說討論了。畢竟，這是“國家安全”。有些事必須得是機(jī)密。但不要被這套說辭迷惑了。我們討論各種各樣對于我們生活至關(guān)重要的事情，為什么核武器就是特例？我們討論醫(yī)保、教育和環(huán)境。當(dāng)然作為美國民主標(biāo)志的國會監(jiān)督和公民參與，這些自然都在此適用。畢竟我們談?wù)摰氖玛P(guān)乎生死。我們雖不會全都同意彼此，但無論你覺得核武器確保我們的安全，或者核武器只是個累贅，我想在此勸大家放下黨派偏見與意識形態(tài)，好好聆聽他人。

12:09

So I'll tell you now what I didn't have theguts to tell my friends at the time. No, you're not safe -- not just because ofNorth Korea. But there is something you can do about it. Demand that yourelected representatives can give you answers to your questions, and answersthat you can live with and that billions of others can live with too. And ifthey can't, stay on them until they can. And if that doesn't work, find others,who are able to represent your views. Because by doing so, we can begin tochange the answer to the question "Am I safe?"

那么我現(xiàn)在可以告訴你們，當(dāng)初我沒有膽量告訴我朋友的話。不，你并不安全——不僅僅是因為朝鮮。不過你可以盡自己的一份力，要求你們選出的議員，給出你們問題的答案，你們可以接受的以及千千萬萬民眾們可以接受的答案。如果他們做不到，反復(fù)跟提這事直到他們做到為止。如果還是沒用，找其他可以代表你們觀點的人。因為只有這樣做，我們才能改變這個問題的答案?！拔野踩珕幔俊?/p>

12:57

(Applause)

（掌聲）