SPECULATION in stocks will never disappear.It isn't desirable that it should.It cannot be checked by warnings as to its dangers.You cannot prevent people from guessing wrong no matter how able or how experienced they may be.Carefully laid plans will miscarry because the unexpected and even the unexpectable will happen.Disaster may come from a convulsion of nature or from the weather,from your own greed or from some man's vanity;from fear or from uncontrolled hope.But apart from what one might call his natural foes,a speculator in stocks has to contend with certain practices or abuses that are indefensible morally as well as commercially.
As I look back and consider what were the common practices twenty-five years ago when I first came to Wall Street,I have to admit that there have been many changes for the better.The old-fashioned bucket shops are gone,though bucketeering“brokerage”houses still prosper at the expense of men and women who persist in playing the game of getting rich quick.The Stock Exchange is doing excellent work not only in getting after these out-and-out swindlers but in insisting upon strict adherence to its rules by its own members.Many wholesome regulations and restrictions are now strictly enforced but there is still room for improvement.The ingrained conservatism of Wall Street rather than ethical callousness is to blame for the persistence of certain abuses.
Difficult as profitable stock speculation always has been it is becoming even more difficult every day.It was not so long ago when a real trader could have a good working knowledge of practically every stock on the list.In 1901,when J.P.Morgan brought out the United States Steel Corporation,which was merely a consolidation of lesser consolidations most of which were less than two years old,the Stock Exchange had 275 stocks on its list and about 100 in its“unlisted department”;and this included a lot that a chap didn't have to know anything about because they were small issues,or inactive by reason of being minority or guaranteed stocks and therefore lacking in speculative attractions.In fact,an overwhelming majority were stocks in which there had not been a sale in years.Today there are about 900 stocks on the regular list and in our recent active markets about 600 separate issues were traded in.Moreover,the old groups or classes of stocks were easier to keep track of.They not only were fewer but the capitalization was smaller and the news a trader had to be on the lookout for did not cover so wide a field.But today,a man is trading in everything;almost every industry in the world is represented.It requires more time and more work to keep posted and to that extent stock speculation has become much more difficult for those who operate intelligently.
There are many thousands of people who buy and sell stocks speculatively but the number of those who speculate profitably is small.As the public always is“in”the market to some extent,it follows that there are losses by the public all the time.The speculator's deadly enemies are:Ignorance,greed,fear and hope.All the statute books in the world and all the rules of all the Exchanges on earth cannot eliminate these from the human animal.Accidents which knock carefully conceived plans sky-high also are beyond regulation by bodies of cold-blooded economists or warm-hearted philanthropists.There remains another source of loss and that is,deliberate misinformation as distinguished from straight tips.And because it is apt to come to a stock trader variously disguised and camouflaged,it is the more insidious and dangerous.
The average outsider,of course,trades either on tips or on rumours,spoken or printed,direct or implied.Against ordinary tips you cannot guard.For instance,a lifelong friend sincerely desires to make you rich by telling you what he has done,that is,to buy or sell some stock.His intent is good.If the tip goes wrong what can you do?Also against the professional or crooked tipster the public is protected to about the same extent that he is against gold-bricks or wood-alcohol.But against the typical Wall Street rumours,the speculating public has neither protection nor redress.Wholesale dealers in securities,manipulators,pools and individuals resort to various devices to aid them in disposing of their surplus holdings at the best possible prices.The circulation of bullish items by the newspapers and the tickers is the most pernicious of all.
Get the slips of the financial news-agencies any day and it will surprise you to see how many statements of an implied semi-official nature they print.The authority is some“l(fā)eading insider”or“a prominent director”or“a high official”or someone“in authority”who presumably knows what he is talking about.Here are today's slips.I pick an item at random.Listen to this:“A leading banker says it is too early yet to expect a declining market.”
Did a leading banker really say that and if he said it why did he say it?Why does he not allow his name to be printed?Is he afraid that people will believe him if he does?
Here is another one about a company the stock of which has been active this week.This time the man who makes the statement is a“prominent director.”Now which—if any—of the company's dozen directors is doing the talking?It is plain that by remaining anonymous nobody can be blamed for any damage that may be done by the statement.
Quite apart from the intelligent study of speculation everywhere the trader in stocks must consider certain facts in connection with the game in Wall Street.In addition to trying to determine how to make money one must also try to keep from losing money.It is almost as important to know what not to do as to know what should be done.It is therefore well to remember that manipulation of some sort enters into practically all advances in individual stocks and that such advances are engineered by insiders with one object in view and one only and that is to sell at the best profit possible.However,the average broker's customer believes himself to be a business man from Missouri if he insists upon being told why a certain stock goes up.Naturally,the manipulators“explain”the advance in a way calculated to facilitate distribution.I am firmly convinced that the public's losses would be greatly reduced if no anonymous statements of a bullish nature were allowed to be printed.I mean statements calculated to make the public buy or hold stocks.
The overwhelming majority of the bullish articles printed on the authority of unnamed directors or insiders convey unreliable and misleading impressions to the public.The public loses many millions of dollars every year by accepting such statements as semi-official and therefore trustworthy.
Say for example that a company has gone through a period of depression in its particular line of business.The stock is inactive.The quotation represents the general and presumably accurate belief of its actual value.If the stock were too cheap at that level somebody would know it and buy it and it would advance.If too dear somebody would know enough to sell it and the price would decline.As nothing happens one way or another nobody talks about it or does anything.
The turn comes in the line of business the company is engaged in.Who are the first to know it,the insiders or the public?You can bet it isn't the public.What happens next?Why,if the improvement continues the earnings will increase and the company will be in position to resume dividends on the stock;or,if dividends were not discontinued,to pay a higher rate.That is,the value of the stock will increase.
Say that the improvement keeps up.Does the management make public that glad fact?Does the president tell the stockholders?Does a philanthropic director come out with a signed statement for the benefit of that part of the public that reads the financial page in the newspapers and the slips of the news agencies?Does some modest insider pursuing his usual policy of anonymity come out with an unsigned statement to the effect that the company's future is most promising?Not this time.Not a word is said by anyone and no statement whatever is printed by newspapers or tickers.
The value-making information is carefully kept from the public while the now taciturn“prominent insiders”go into the market and buy all the cheap stock they can lay their hands on.As this well-informed but unostentatious buying keeps on,the stock rises.The financial reporters,knowing that the insiders ought to know the reason for the rise,ask questions.The unanimously anonymous insiders unanimously declare that they have no news to give out.They do not know that there is any warrant for the rise.Sometimes they even state that they are not particularly concerned with the vagaries of the stock market or the actions of stock speculators.
The rise continues and there comes a happy day when those who know have all the stock they want or can carry.The Street at once begins to hear all kinds of bullish rumours.The tickers tell the traders“on good authority”that the company has definitely turned the corner.The same modest director who did not wish his name used when he said he knew no warrant for the rise in the stock is now quoted—of course not by name—as saying that the stockholders have every reason to feel greatly encouraged over the outlook.
Urged by the deluge of bullish news items the public begins to buy the stock.These purchases help to put the price still higher.In due course the predictions of the uniformly unnamed directors come true and the company resumes dividend payments;or increases the rate,as the case may be.With that the bullish items multiply.They not only are more numerous than ever but much more enthusiastic.A“l(fā)eading director,”asked point blank for a statement of conditions,informs the world that the improvement is more than keeping up.A“prominent insider,”after much coaxing,is finally induced by a news-agency to confess that the earnings are nothing short of phenomenal.A“well-known banker,”who is affiliated in a business way with the company,is made to say that the expansion in the volume of sales is simply unprecedented in the history of the trade.If not another order came in the company would run night and day for heaven knows how many months.A“member of the finance committee,”in a double-leaded manifesto,expresses his astonishment at the public's astonishment over the stock's rise.The only astonishing thing is the stock's moderation in the climbing line.Anybody who will analyse the forthcoming annual report can easily figure how much more than the market-price the book-value of the stock is.But in no instance is the name of the communicative philanthropist given.
As long as the earnings continue good and the insiders do not discern any sign of a let up in the company's prosperity they sit on the stock they bought at the low prices.There is nothing to put the price down,so why should they sell?But the moment there is a turn for the worse in the company's business,what happens?Do they come out with statements or warnings or the faintest of hints?Not much.The trend is now downward.Just as they bought without any flourish of trumpets when the company's business turned for the better,they now silently sell.On this inside selling the stock naturally declines.Then the public begins to get the familiar“explanations.”A“l(fā)eading insider”asserts that everything is O.K.a(chǎn)nd the decline is merely the result of selling by bears who are trying to affect the general market.If on one fine day,after the stock has been declining for some time,there should be a sharp break,the demand for“reasons”or“explanations”becomes clamorous.Unless somebody says something the public will fear the worst.So the news-tickers now print something like this:“When we asked a prominent director of the company to explain the weakness in the stock,he replied that the only conclusion he could arrive at was that the decline today was caused by a bear drive.Underlying conditions are unchanged.The business of the company was never better than at present and the probabilities are that unless something entirely unforeseen happens in the meanwhile,there will be an increase in the rate at the next dividend meeting.The bear party in the market has become aggressive and the weakness in the stock was clearly a raid intended to dislodge weakly held stock.”The news-tickers,wishing to give good measure,as likely as not will go on to state that they are“reliably informed”that most of the stock bought on the day's decline was taken by inside interests and that the bears will find that they have sold themselves into a trap.There will be a day of reckoning.
In addition to the losses sustained by the public through believing bullish statements and buying stocks,there are the losses that come through being dissuaded from selling out.The next best thing to having people buy the stock the“prominent insider”wishes to sell is to prevent people from selling the same stock when he does not wish to support or accumulate it.What is the public to believe after reading the statement of the“prominent director”?What can the average outsider think?Of course,that the stock should never have gone down;that it was forced down by bear-selling and that as soon as the bears stop the insiders will engineer a punitive advance during which the shorts will be driven to cover at high prices.The public properly believes this because it is exactly what would happen if the decline had in truth been caused by a bear raid.
The stock in question,notwithstanding all the threats or promises of a tremendous squeeze of the over-extended short interest,does not rally.It keeps on going down.It can't help it.There has been too much stock fed to the market from the inside to be digested.
And this inside stock that has been sold by the“prominent directors”and“l(fā)eading insiders”becomes a football among the professional traders.It keeps on going down.There seems to be no bottom for it.The insiders knowing that trade conditions will adversely affect the company's future earnings do not dare to support that stock until the next turn for the better in the company's business.Then there will be inside buying and inside silence.
I have done my share of trading and have kept fairly well posted on the stock market for many years and I can say that I do not recall an instance when a bear raid caused a stock to decline extensively.What was called bear raiding was nothing but selling based on accurate knowledge of real conditions.But it would not do to say that the stock declined on inside selling or on inside non-buying.Everybody would hasten to sell and when everybody sells and nobody buys there is the dickens to pay.
The public ought to grasp firmly this one point:That the real reason for a protracted decline is never bear raiding.When a stock keeps on going down you can bet there is something wrong with it,either with the market for it or with the company.If the decline were unjustified the stock would soon sell below its real value and that would bring in buying that would check the decline.As a matter of fact,the only time a bear can make big money selling a stock is when that stock is too high.And you can gamble your last cent on the certainty that insiders will not proclaim that fact to the world.
Of course,the classic example is the New Haven.Everybody knows today what only a few knew at the time.The stock sold at 255 in 1902 and was the premier railroad investment of New England.A man in that part of the country measured his respectability and standing in the community by his holdings of it.If somebody had said that the company was on the road to insolvency he would not have been sent to jail for saying it.They would have clapped him in an insane asylum with other lunatics.But when a new and aggressive president was placed in charge by Mr.Morgan and the débacle began,it was not clear from the first that the new policies would land the road where it did.But as property after property began to be saddled in the Consolidated Road at inflated prices,a few clear sighted observers began to doubt the wisdom of the Mellen policies.A trolley system was bought for two million and sold to the New Haven for $10,000,000;whereupon a reckless man or two committed lèse majeste by saying that the management was acting recklessly.Hinting that not even the New Haven could stand such extravagance was like impugning the strength of Gibraltar.
Of course,the first to see breakers ahead were the insiders.They became aware of the real condition of the company and they reduced their holdings of the stock.On their selling as well as on their non-support,the price of New England's gilt-edged railroad stock began to yield.Questions were asked,and explanations were demanded as usual;and the usual explanations were promptly forthcoming.“Prominent insiders”declared that there was nothing wrong that they knew of and that the decline was due to reckless bear selling.So the“investors”of New England kept their holdings of New York,New Haven & Hartford Stock.Why shouldn't they?Didn't insiders say there was nothing wrong and cry bear selling?Didn't dividends continue to be declared and paid?
In the meantime the promised squeeze of the bears did not come but new low records did.The insider selling became more urgent and less disguised.Nevertheless public spirited men in Boston were denounced as stock-jobbers and demagogues for demanding a genuine explanation for the stock's deplorable decline that meant appalling losses to everybody in New England who had wanted a safe investment and a steady dividend payer.
That historic break from $255 to $12 a share never was and never could have been a bear drive.It was not started and it was not kept up by bear operations.The insiders sold right along and always at higher prices than they could have done if they had told the truth or allowed the truth to be told.It did not matter whether the price was 250 or 200 or 150 or 100 or 50 or 25,it still was too high for that stock,and the insiders knew it and the public did not.The public might profitably consider the disadvantages under which it labours when it tries to make money buying and selling the stock of a company concerning whose affairs only a few men are in position to know the whole truth.
The stocks which have had the worst breaks in the past 20 years did not decline on bear raiding.But the easy acceptance of that form of explanation has been responsible for losses by the public amounting to millions upon millions of dollars.It has kept people from selling who did not like the way his stock was acting and would have liquidated if they had not expected the price to go right back after the bears stopped their raiding.I used to hear Keene blamed in the old days.Before him they used to accuse Charley Woerishoffer or Addison Cammack.Later on I became the stock excuse.
I recall the case of Intervale Oil.There was a pool in it that put the stock up and found some buyers on the advance.The manipulators ran the price to 50.There the pool sold and there was a quick break.The usual demand for explanations followed.Why was Intervale so weak?Enough people asked this question to make the answer important news.One of the financial news tickers called up tire brokers who knew the most about Intervale Oil's advance and ought to he equally well posted as to the decline.What did these brokers,members of the bull pool,say when the news agency asked them for a reason that could be printed and sent broadcast over the country?Why,that Larry Livingston was raiding the market!And that wasn't enough.They added that they were going to“get”him.But of course,the Intervale pool continued to sell.The stock only stood then about $12 a share and they could sell it down to 10 or lower and their average selling price would still be above cost.
It was wise and proper for insiders to sell on the decline.But for outsiders who had paid 35 or 40,it was a different matter.Reading what the tickers printed there outsiders held on and waited for Larry Livingston to get what was coming to him at the hands of the indignant inside pool.
In a bull market and particularly in booms the public at first makes money which it later loses simply by overstaying the bull market.This talk of“bear raids”helps them to overstay.The public should beware of explanations that explain only what unnamed insiders wish the public to believe.
股票投機(jī)生意是永遠(yuǎn)不會(huì)消失的,人們也不希望它消失,那些關(guān)于投機(jī)有多危險(xiǎn)的勸誡也不可能阻止投機(jī)。無(wú)論人們能力多強(qiáng),或者有多么豐富的經(jīng)驗(yàn),都不可能不出錯(cuò)。那些意料不到和沒辦法預(yù)估的事情總會(huì)發(fā)生,導(dǎo)致你小心翼翼做的計(jì)劃最終失敗。厄運(yùn)可能來(lái)自天災(zāi)或氣候,可能來(lái)自人的貪欲或虛榮,也可能來(lái)自恐懼或?qū)οM牟豢啥糁啤?墒?,除了那些被叫作天敵的東西外,股票投機(jī)商們必須要與一些做法對(duì)抗,或者要能解決在正常情況下和商業(yè)土壤中不可以立足的惡行。
回想25年前我剛到華爾街那些司空見慣的行為時(shí),必須要承認(rèn),很多東西已經(jīng)好多了。舊的那種交易場(chǎng)所已經(jīng)被淘汰,可是存在欺詐行為的交易所卻還是生意很紅火,殘害著那些致力于一夜暴富的男女們。證券交易所做得非常好,不光查處了那些騙子,也始終要求會(huì)員公司嚴(yán)格遵守規(guī)則,實(shí)施了很多健全的法律法規(guī),不過(guò)還是存在值得改進(jìn)的地方,也存在一些惡行,這是由華爾街長(zhǎng)期培植的保守習(xí)慣導(dǎo)致的,而不是源于人們道德上的麻木。
股票投機(jī)商賺錢歷來(lái)都是很難的事,如今更是難上加難。不久前,真正的交易商們?cè)诿恐还善鄙喜畈欢喽加胁僮鞯闹R(shí)。1901年,摩根公司在紐交所推出了由一些小型聯(lián)合公司組成的美國(guó)鋼鐵公司股票,那時(shí)只有275只股票掛牌,沒上市的大概100只,里面有很多股價(jià)沒必要知曉,因?yàn)槎际俏⑿」?、次要股或保證股,沒有活躍的交易,所以也就沒有多少人愿意投入。實(shí)際上在一年中,大多數(shù)股票連一次都沒交易過(guò)。而今天,正常的掛牌股票就有900只,最近交易活躍的大概是600只。而且,原來(lái)的股票容易按類股分類跟蹤,當(dāng)時(shí)的類股很少,資本額又不大。股民們需要知道的消息,也沒有多大的涵蓋面。可今天你卻能夠?qū)γ恳恢还善边M(jìn)行交易,全球的哪個(gè)行業(yè)都有股票上市。只有花費(fèi)更多時(shí)間和精力,才能使自己的消息靈通。光這一點(diǎn)對(duì)聰明的股民們來(lái)說(shuō)就已經(jīng)知道投機(jī)比原來(lái)艱難了很多。
做股票交易生意的人成千上萬(wàn),可真正獲得利潤(rùn)的卻很少。從某種程度上來(lái)看,人們總徘徊在股市中,常常受到損失。缺乏知識(shí)、貪欲太盛、擔(dān)心過(guò)大和希望太強(qiáng),都是股票投機(jī)人的致命弱點(diǎn)。世界上所有的法令和證交所的規(guī)則都不能把它們從人的本性中趕跑。出乎意料的事會(huì)擊碎認(rèn)真做過(guò)的計(jì)劃,頭腦清晰的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家和樂善好施的慈善家都沒辦法制止那樣的事。另一種導(dǎo)致虧損的來(lái)源,是那些故意提供誤導(dǎo)的不同于直接內(nèi)幕消息的信息造成的。這樣的信息往往包裹在不同的偽裝里,在股民們中間傳播,這是更陰森、更危險(xiǎn)的敵人。
普通的外部人士自然要憑借口頭或文字性的、直接的或間接的內(nèi)幕消息來(lái)交易。你無(wú)法抗拒正常的內(nèi)幕消息,比如與你一直要好的朋友很真誠(chéng)地想幫你賺錢,所以對(duì)你說(shuō)了他做的事情,買賣了什么股票。他懷著好心,可要是消息有誤,你怎么辦?而且,在專業(yè)人士或者騙子們傳播消息這方面,股民們受到的保護(hù),與他在面臨假錢和假酒侵害上受到的保護(hù)差不多??墒?,在與純種的華爾街謠言對(duì)抗方面,投機(jī)人沒有得到任何保護(hù)和補(bǔ)償。很多從事證券銷售的商人、作手、內(nèi)線或者個(gè)人,以不同形式與方法,幫股民按最理想的價(jià)格交易股票。報(bào)紙和股市行情傳出來(lái)的有關(guān)多頭市場(chǎng)的報(bào)道都是很致命的。
隨便拿哪天的報(bào)紙財(cái)經(jīng)版看,都會(huì)驚奇地看到它刊登著一些暗示是來(lái)自半官方的聲明,都是“重要內(nèi)線”“知名董事”“公司高管”“權(quán)威人士”等所提供的消息。人們都覺得他們說(shuō)得很有道理。下面是今天的報(bào)道,我隨便選了一個(gè):“銀行界領(lǐng)袖說(shuō),現(xiàn)在說(shuō)空頭市場(chǎng)會(huì)出現(xiàn)還為時(shí)尚早,不能斷言?!?/p>
說(shuō)話的真是一位銀行領(lǐng)袖?他為什么這么說(shuō)?又為什么不報(bào)出姓名?是不是怕報(bào)出姓名后大家不相信?
還有一條與這周股票交易比較活躍的一家公司有關(guān)的消息,是一位“知名董事”所說(shuō)。好吧,要真有這么一個(gè)人,那么他是這家公司那么多董事中的哪一個(gè)?誠(chéng)然,不署名的爆料即便出錯(cuò)為別人帶來(lái)了損失,也沒辦法責(zé)怪。
股票交易人要很明智地研究各地的交易市場(chǎng),還要考慮與炒股游戲相關(guān)的事情;要想辦法搞清楚怎么賺錢和怎么才不會(huì)虧損,要明白什么該做、什么不該做也非常重要。所以,你最好記清楚,一種炒作差不多會(huì)出現(xiàn)在個(gè)股的任何漲勢(shì)中,這是內(nèi)線們發(fā)起的漲勢(shì),就是為了能賣出賺錢的股票??善胀ǖ慕灰坠镜念櫩蛡冇X得,如果頑固地去挖掘一只股票上漲的原因,就是個(gè)刨根究底的聰明人。作手們肯定會(huì)按照特意布置的有利于賣出股票的手段來(lái)解釋漲勢(shì)。我堅(jiān)定地覺得,如果主管部門不讓報(bào)紙刊發(fā)不報(bào)姓名的利多言論,那股民們賠的錢就會(huì)少很多。我說(shuō)的是那種特別策劃的引導(dǎo)人們交易股票的言論。
利用不報(bào)姓名的董事和內(nèi)線人士言論的大多數(shù)報(bào)道,向人們傳達(dá)的都是不值得信賴的信息。股民們覺得消息性質(zhì)是半官方的,就有必要相信,因此每年都會(huì)賠掉成百上千萬(wàn)美元。
比如說(shuō),某家公司的某項(xiàng)業(yè)務(wù)在某段時(shí)間比較疲軟,公司股票很不受人待見。它在普通股民們心中的價(jià)值表現(xiàn)就是股價(jià),而且可能是真實(shí)的價(jià)值。假如這個(gè)價(jià)位的股價(jià)便宜,就會(huì)有人知道這一點(diǎn),接著去買進(jìn),股價(jià)就漲高;假如這個(gè)價(jià)位的股價(jià)貴,有人知道后就會(huì)賣,股價(jià)也就下跌。不存在這兩種情況的話,人們就不會(huì)議論它,不會(huì)對(duì)它采取行動(dòng)。
是誰(shuí)最早知道公司業(yè)務(wù)有了好轉(zhuǎn)?公司內(nèi)部人士還是普通股民?肯定不是普通股民。然后會(huì)出現(xiàn)什么事?假如一直處于好轉(zhuǎn)狀態(tài),盈余就會(huì)增多,公司就有恢復(fù)配股息的機(jī)會(huì),如果一直不斷裂,股利率就會(huì)提高。也就是說(shuō),股票的價(jià)值會(huì)變高。
如果情況持續(xù)好轉(zhuǎn)的話,經(jīng)營(yíng)者會(huì)不會(huì)對(duì)外講這個(gè)讓人開心的事情?總裁會(huì)對(duì)股東們說(shuō)嗎?哪位好心的董事會(huì)有名有姓地告訴看報(bào)紙的讀者們嗎?那些謙虛的內(nèi)線們會(huì)跟往常一樣不報(bào)姓名地說(shuō)公司的前景非常好嗎?不會(huì)!沒人會(huì)說(shuō),報(bào)紙和股票報(bào)價(jià)機(jī)器上都不會(huì)有任何信息。
他們會(huì)小心謹(jǐn)慎地阻止這類股票增值的消息傳播,那些不怎么說(shuō)話的著名內(nèi)線會(huì)在股市中盡力獲取能買到的所有賤股。這樣的狀況在持續(xù)的時(shí)候,股價(jià)就會(huì)上漲。財(cái)經(jīng)版的讀者們清楚,內(nèi)線們知道股價(jià)為什么上漲,所以會(huì)去問(wèn)。都不愿意透露姓名的內(nèi)線人士會(huì)統(tǒng)一口徑地說(shuō),他們沒什么可透露,不知道為什么上漲。他們有時(shí)還會(huì)說(shuō)自己并不太重視股市的奇怪行情,不重視股票投機(jī)者們的所作所為。
股價(jià)上漲到了讓人們興奮的時(shí)候,了解內(nèi)情的人也買夠了他們想買進(jìn)或有能力買進(jìn)的股票,華爾街上就會(huì)再次出現(xiàn)各種利多的傳言?!鞍凑諜?quán)威人士透露的消息”,電報(bào)機(jī)會(huì)把公司的確由逆境轉(zhuǎn)到順境狀態(tài)的消息讓股民們知道。一位謙虛謹(jǐn)慎的董事以前會(huì)說(shuō),他不知道股票上漲的原因,而此時(shí)他的話卻在人們口中被引述出來(lái):股東們有對(duì)公司未來(lái)非??春玫某渥憷碛?。當(dāng)然了,他還是沒有透露姓名。
股民們受到洪水般的利好消息的蠱惑,開始購(gòu)買那只股票,這就會(huì)使股價(jià)更高。時(shí)機(jī)成熟后,全部不愿意透露姓名的董事們的預(yù)測(cè)就很準(zhǔn)啊,公司恢復(fù)了股利分配,甚至可能增加股利。如此消息彌散后,利多的消息鋪天蓋地,數(shù)量大增,傳播消息的人也變得熱情。當(dāng)人們請(qǐng)某個(gè)重要董事直接講明情形時(shí),他會(huì)告訴全世界,好轉(zhuǎn)現(xiàn)象不只是能持續(xù)而已;某位重要內(nèi)線架不住人們的請(qǐng)求,最終在報(bào)社慫恿下,說(shuō)公司盈余非常之高;某個(gè)與公司關(guān)系緊密的著名銀行家也在別人請(qǐng)求下說(shuō),股票銷售量增多,簡(jiǎn)直創(chuàng)造了這個(gè)行業(yè)的交易歷史,在沒有其他訂單的前提下,公司日夜不停歇地運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn),還不知道需要多少個(gè)月才能完成目前手里的業(yè)務(wù)量;某個(gè)財(cái)政委員會(huì)成員的表述在報(bào)紙上通過(guò)特殊處理后會(huì)變成,他很驚訝人們?cè)趺磿?huì)對(duì)這只股票上漲頗感意外。讓人震驚的唯一現(xiàn)象是,股價(jià)上漲的速度慢了下來(lái)。不管誰(shuí)去對(duì)公司將發(fā)出的年報(bào)進(jìn)行分析,都能隨便看出來(lái),這只股票凈值要遠(yuǎn)高于市場(chǎng)價(jià)。不過(guò),那些善于與人們溝通的好心人不管在哪種情況下,都是不愿意透露姓名的。
公司內(nèi)線人士只要看到盈余還在增長(zhǎng),沒出現(xiàn)公司運(yùn)氣要減弱的表現(xiàn),他們就會(huì)牢牢地握住低價(jià)回購(gòu)的股票。沒有什么讓股價(jià)降低,他們憑什么要賣?不過(guò),公司業(yè)務(wù)變得很差勁的時(shí)候,你看會(huì)出現(xiàn)什么情況?他們會(huì)發(fā)出聲明、警告或一點(diǎn)兒小暗示嗎?不可能。正如當(dāng)時(shí)公司業(yè)務(wù)好的時(shí)候,他們沒有大張旗鼓地買進(jìn)股票一樣,此時(shí)公司業(yè)務(wù)走下坡路了,他們必定也在偷偷地賣出。公司內(nèi)線的賣出導(dǎo)致股價(jià)下跌,股民們緊接著就聽到了一些熟悉的說(shuō)法。一個(gè)重要內(nèi)線人士咬緊牙說(shuō)什么都很通暢,出現(xiàn)的小下跌是一些空頭在摜壓這只股票,想對(duì)整個(gè)股市施加些影響而已。如果某個(gè)時(shí)候,經(jīng)過(guò)一陣下跌后的股價(jià)出現(xiàn)暴跌的情況,那么就會(huì)有更多的聲音要求說(shuō)明原因,給出解釋。只要有人解釋清楚就好,不然人們就會(huì)非常擔(dān)心出現(xiàn)那種最可怕的情況。所以,如今新聞媒體的印刷機(jī)上正在印著這些報(bào)道:“當(dāng)我們要求公司的一位重要董事解釋清楚,為什么股價(jià)會(huì)這么糟糕時(shí),他說(shuō)導(dǎo)致今天股價(jià)下跌的唯一原因,就是那些空頭在摜壓。不過(guò)大趨勢(shì)還沒有發(fā)生變化,公司現(xiàn)在業(yè)務(wù)非常繁忙。而且,下次開會(huì)時(shí),非常有可能會(huì)討論提高股利分配比率的問(wèn)題,除非出現(xiàn)預(yù)料之外的突發(fā)情況。市場(chǎng)空頭們太猖狂了,股價(jià)不景氣是他們摜壓的結(jié)果,他們就是為了賣掉手里不好的股票。”新聞媒體為了讓新聞更權(quán)威,可能還會(huì)補(bǔ)充寫道,他們獲悉了可靠消息,完全是由公司內(nèi)線人士在股價(jià)下跌的這一天吃進(jìn)了大多數(shù)股票,而那些空頭會(huì)明白自作孽不可活,自己陷入了自己挖的陷阱,遲早會(huì)付出代價(jià)。
股民們對(duì)那些利多說(shuō)法信以為真,買了好多股票,結(jié)果賠了錢,除此之外也有人因?yàn)槭軇e人蠱惑,放棄了賣出而賠錢。防止人們賣那些重要內(nèi)線們不想支持或不想買進(jìn)的同一只股,是除了讓人們買進(jìn)他們想賣出的那只股票外第二好的辦法。股民們看到重要董事的說(shuō)法后,會(huì)相信什么?自然是相信這只股肯定不會(huì)下跌,而是空頭摜壓的表現(xiàn),一旦空頭停止賣出,內(nèi)線們就會(huì)大反攻,對(duì)空頭們施以懲戒,到那時(shí)空頭們必須要用更多的錢來(lái)回補(bǔ)。人們絕對(duì)對(duì)這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)信心十足,如果股票下跌確實(shí)是空頭們摜壓的結(jié)果,那么后續(xù)發(fā)展也就會(huì)如他們所想。
這只股票的價(jià)格并沒有反彈。雖然出現(xiàn)了很多威脅和承諾,說(shuō)要軋死那些放肆的空頭,可股價(jià)還在下跌。怎么可能不跌,公司內(nèi)線人士把那么多股票賣了出去,市場(chǎng)根本消化不過(guò)來(lái)。而且,重要董事和內(nèi)線人士賣向市場(chǎng)的那一批股票,被專業(yè)的交易商們來(lái)回踢皮球。股價(jià)持續(xù)下跌,好像沒有到頭的時(shí)候。公司內(nèi)線們清楚,業(yè)務(wù)情況對(duì)公司以后的盈余有嚴(yán)重的影響,因此在公司業(yè)務(wù)情況再次出現(xiàn)好轉(zhuǎn)之前,沒膽量再支撐股票了。等到有所好轉(zhuǎn)時(shí),內(nèi)線們又會(huì)一點(diǎn)兒都不對(duì)外張揚(yáng),悄悄買進(jìn)。
我做交易很多年,對(duì)市場(chǎng)消息非常靈通。我可以這么說(shuō),沒有哪次的股價(jià)大跌是空頭摜壓的結(jié)果。通常意義上的摜壓,實(shí)際上只是精確掌握了實(shí)際情況后賣掉股票而已??扇绻f(shuō)是內(nèi)線不支持或者賣出股票而導(dǎo)致了股價(jià)下跌,卻也行不通,這樣的話,誰(shuí)都要趕緊賣出股票,沒有人買進(jìn),情況就會(huì)變得慘不忍睹。
人們應(yīng)該牢記,股價(jià)持續(xù)下跌,真實(shí)的原因并非空頭摜壓的結(jié)果。當(dāng)一只股票一直下跌,你就能確定里面必定出什么事了,不是因?yàn)槭袌?chǎng),就是因?yàn)楣緝?nèi)部。假如下跌是沒什么原因的,那么等股價(jià)下跌到真正的價(jià)值以下,就會(huì)有人購(gòu)買,跌勢(shì)也會(huì)被拉止。其實(shí),只有當(dāng)股價(jià)特別高時(shí),空頭在賣出時(shí)才能賺很大利潤(rùn)。你可以用你的最后那份錢做賭,內(nèi)線人士必定不會(huì)對(duì)外宣布這個(gè)真實(shí)情況。
紐海文鐵路公司就是其中的代表性事例。今天所有人都知道,可在當(dāng)時(shí)卻只有極少的人了解。1902年,他們的股票價(jià)格達(dá)到了255美元,在新英格蘭地區(qū),是數(shù)一數(shù)二的鐵路投資標(biāo)靶。東北部的人就是根據(jù)是不是持有這只股票,來(lái)判斷某人在社區(qū)里有多么受尊敬,或者有多大威信。如果有人說(shuō)這家公司很快要倒閉,是不會(huì)被抓進(jìn)監(jiān)獄的,可他會(huì)被當(dāng)成瘋子一樣,關(guān)進(jìn)精神病院??墒牵?dāng)摩根任命了一位闖勁十足的新總裁后,悲慘的情況開始了。起初,人們并沒想到新的政策會(huì)把公司拉到最終那個(gè)地步。但是,當(dāng)資金一次次地以浮夸價(jià)投入進(jìn)去后,有些高瞻遠(yuǎn)矚的觀察家們就開始對(duì)此提出了質(zhì)疑。按照200萬(wàn)買進(jìn)的一套電車系統(tǒng),一轉(zhuǎn)手就可以按照1000萬(wàn)賣給紐海文鐵路公司。此時(shí),公司委員會(huì)里會(huì)有一兩個(gè)不計(jì)后果的成員,對(duì)管理層的莽撞行事表示不齒,犯了不尊敬上級(jí)的罪過(guò)。他們的意思是,即便是紐海文這樣有實(shí)力的公司,也不能胡亂揮霍。這些話脆弱渺小,起不了任何作用,就像你想要向直布羅陀海峽里的礁石發(fā)出挑戰(zhàn)一般。
首先看出災(zāi)難跡象的肯定是公司內(nèi)線人士,他們對(duì)公司的真實(shí)情況逐步進(jìn)行掌握,然后賣出持股。經(jīng)過(guò)他們的賣出,在新英格蘭地區(qū)非常貴氣而富有的紐海文鐵路股票開始掉價(jià)。人們?nèi)缦褚酝前阗|(zhì)疑,要求給予解釋,而解釋也如以往那般果真出現(xiàn)了。有重要內(nèi)線放話說(shuō),他們不知道哪里有問(wèn)題,股價(jià)下跌是因?yàn)殂额^青的空頭在摜壓。因此,在新英格蘭地區(qū)的所謂投資者們繼續(xù)把他們的紐約、紐海文和哈特弗鐵路公司的股票握在手里。是啊,他們有什么理由不繼續(xù)握著呢??jī)?nèi)線人士都說(shuō)了是空頭在放空,沒什么問(wèn)題嘛,公司不也還在說(shuō)要發(fā)放紅利嗎?
原本公司董事承諾出現(xiàn)的軋空也沒實(shí)現(xiàn),出現(xiàn)的只是更低的股價(jià)記錄。內(nèi)線人士制造的賣壓更加緊張了,也逐漸擺在了明面上。波士頓的那些具備公益素養(yǎng)的人,以及代表民意的出頭人向發(fā)行方提出要求,讓他們對(duì)這樣的境況做出解釋,到底是什么原因使得新英格蘭地區(qū)那些本想穩(wěn)當(dāng)賺點(diǎn)兒錢的所有人,都蒙受了特大的損失,但他們卻被指責(zé)為股票投機(jī)分子。
這只股票從255美元暴跌到了12美元,這絕不是、也不可能是空頭摜壓造成的。空頭沒有引發(fā)股票下跌,也不是他們?cè)斐闪说鴦?shì)無(wú)法停止。公司的內(nèi)線人士一直在賣,拋售價(jià)要高于他們說(shuō)明真實(shí)情況或者允許真實(shí)情況被人們知道時(shí)候的價(jià)格。無(wú)論股價(jià)是250美元、200美元、150美元,還是100美元,甚至50美元、25美元,對(duì)這只股票而言都屬于高價(jià),內(nèi)線們很清楚,只是股民們不知道。如果股民們想通過(guò)交易某家公司的股票來(lái)賺錢,而事先就知道這家公司的業(yè)務(wù)狀況只有一少部分人才能有辦法完全了解,那可能會(huì)對(duì)他有利。
在過(guò)去的20年里,出現(xiàn)過(guò)的跌勢(shì)最嚴(yán)重的股票,下跌原因都不是空頭摜壓造成的,而人們那么容易就接受這樣的理由,正是他們虧損成百上千萬(wàn)的原因。那樣的說(shuō)法,讓不喜歡這種股價(jià)變動(dòng)態(tài)勢(shì)的人沒有出售股票,他們把希望寄托在空頭停止摜壓后的股價(jià)反彈上,不然也可能賣掉股票。我以前聽到過(guò)別人抱怨凱恩,更早之前,人們習(xí)慣于罵查理·伍利雪弗和愛迪生·卡馬克,而后來(lái),我自己也成了股市的代罪羊。
我記得有關(guān)山谷石油公司的那件事情。這家公司的股票是被公司內(nèi)線集團(tuán)操控的,他們拉抬股價(jià),也找到了在上漲的時(shí)候買進(jìn)的股民。這些作手們把股價(jià)炒到了50美元,然后賣出手中的股票,股價(jià)就暴跌了。然后,人們一如既往地求解釋,山谷石油股票為什么這么羸弱?有大量提問(wèn)的人,對(duì)問(wèn)題的回答也就成了新聞。一家財(cái)經(jīng)媒體去采訪最了解山谷石油公司股票上漲內(nèi)幕消息的一個(gè)經(jīng)紀(jì)商,作為炒作集團(tuán)成員的他,對(duì)股票為什么下跌也一樣清楚。報(bào)紙請(qǐng)他說(shuō)一個(gè)可以向全國(guó)范圍內(nèi)刊登報(bào)道的原因。哦,那當(dāng)然是拉里·利文斯頓打壓股市引發(fā)的啦。除此之外,他還補(bǔ)上一句,說(shuō)要準(zhǔn)備收拾我??缮焦仁凸緝?nèi)線人士依然在出售,當(dāng)時(shí)股價(jià)大概12美元,他們甚至可以賣到10美元以下,平均賣價(jià)還是要高于他們的成本。
公司內(nèi)線把價(jià)格拉低后賣出股票是精明的做法,也做得恰到好處,而對(duì)那些花費(fèi)了35美元或40美元的不知道內(nèi)情的外人而言就不一樣了。他們讀到印刷機(jī)印出來(lái)的報(bào)紙報(bào)道后,就緊抱著股票不放手,還等著看利文斯頓被內(nèi)線集團(tuán)抓住后狠狠地修理一番呢。
在牛市里,特別是盛況空前的高潮期,人們最早都獲得了利潤(rùn),可后來(lái)都賠了本,完全是因?yàn)樗麄儗?duì)牛市太不舍了。廣大的股民要提防那種只解釋不愿意透露姓名的內(nèi)線人士希望股民相信的解釋。
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