物質(zhì)財(cái)富與人類(lèi)幸福與人類(lèi)幸福

Economic growth is the religion of the modern world,the elixir that eases the pain of conflicts, the promiseof indefinite progress. It is the solution to ourperennial worries about not getting what we don’thave. And yet, at least in the West, the growthmodel is now as fleeting as Proust’s AlbertineSimonet: Coming and going, with busts followingbooms and booms following busts, while an idealworld of steady, inclusive, long-lasting growth fadesaway.

經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)是當(dāng)代世界的最高信條，緩解沖突之痛的靈丹妙藥，是對(duì)無(wú)限進(jìn)步的美好承諾。我們總是擔(dān)心無(wú)法得償所愿，而它就是解決這種擔(dān)心的答案。不過(guò)，至少在西方，增長(zhǎng)模式如今就像普魯斯特筆下的阿爾貝蒂娜·西莫內(nèi)(Albertine Simonet)那樣捉摸不定：來(lái)了又去，蕭條過(guò)后是繁榮，繁榮過(guò)后又是蕭條，而那種穩(wěn)定、包容而持久增長(zhǎng)的理想世界卻漸行漸遠(yuǎn)。

 

 

In the United States, 80 percent of the population has seen no growth in purchasing powerover the last 30 years. In France, annual per capita growth has dropped steadily from 3 percentin the 1970s to less than zero in 2013. In the interim, the political class has been flummoxedby stagnation, a hesitation that has opened the doors to populists of various stripes. But inits desperate search for scapegoats, the West skirts the key question: What would happen ifour quest for never-ending economic growth has become a mirage? Would we find a suitablereplacement for the system, or sink into despair and violence?

在美國(guó)，80%的人口在過(guò)去30年里沒(méi)有享受到購(gòu)買(mǎi)力的提高。在法國(guó)，人均年增長(zhǎng)從上世紀(jì)70年代的3%逐年下滑到2013年的負(fù)數(shù)。在此期間，政界被經(jīng)濟(jì)停滯搞得狼狽不堪，而這樣的躑躅不前又為形形色色的民粹分子大開(kāi)方便之門(mén)。在瘋狂尋找替罪羊的過(guò)程中，西方卻回避了最關(guān)鍵的問(wèn)題：假如我們對(duì)永無(wú)止境的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的追求已成為夸父逐日之舉，又該怎么辦?我們能找到替代這一體系的合適東西嗎?還是會(huì)跌入絕望的深淵，暴力纏身?

John Maynard Keynes, writing at the outset of the economic crisis of the 1930s, warned againstmisdiagnosing the situation. In his famous article “Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren,”he declared that a period of exceptional prosperity was at hand and that the world’s“economic problem” would soon be resolved — just as, in the preceding century, strong growthand food safety arrived on a wave of technical innovation. To wring all we can out of theeconomic growth model, he said, the world must set aside greed and fear, outdatedcharacteristics of a bygone era of misery. Instead, we must learn to enjoy ourselves — andabove all to consume, without restraint and without worrying about tomorrow. Ultimately,Keynes believed that we would end up working only three hours a day and after turn to thetruly important tasks of art, culture and religion.

在上世紀(jì)30年代的經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)之初，約翰·梅納德·凱恩斯(John Maynard Keynes)就曾撰文警告對(duì)時(shí)局的誤判。在他的著名文章《我們后代的經(jīng)濟(jì)前景》(Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren)中，他宣稱(chēng)，空前繁榮的時(shí)代指日可待，世界的“經(jīng)濟(jì)問(wèn)題”將不日得到解決——就像，在頭一個(gè)世紀(jì)里，技術(shù)革新的浪潮帶來(lái)了強(qiáng)勁增長(zhǎng)與糧食安全。他認(rèn)為，為了充分挖掘經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)模型的潛力，全世界必須擯棄代表著之前悲慘世代的那種已然過(guò)時(shí)的貪婪與恐懼。取而代之的是，我們必須學(xué)會(huì)享受生活——最重要是學(xué)會(huì)消費(fèi)，無(wú)拘無(wú)束，不懼明天。到最后，凱恩斯相信，我們可以把精力放在真正重要的藝術(shù)、文化與宗教活動(dòng)中，然后每天僅僅工作三小時(shí)。

Sadly, such metaphysical pursuits have not come to be the world’s priority at this point inhistory; instead, we still live in fear of poverty, inequality and joblessness. The perpetualquest for material wealth remains our primary goal, despite the fact that we in the West aresix times richer than we were in the 1930s. Thus it must be said that Keynes, an intellectualgiant of economics, erred: The vast accumulation of wealth hasn’t at all satisfied or moderatedthe appetites of our materialist society.

遺憾的是，在今天這個(gè)歷史節(jié)點(diǎn)上，這類(lèi)形而上的追求尚未成為全世界的取向;我們?nèi)匀换钤趯?duì)貧困、不公與失業(yè)的恐懼之中。對(duì)物質(zhì)財(cái)富的不懈追求依舊是我們的首要目標(biāo)，盡管我們西方人實(shí)際上已比上世紀(jì)30年代富裕六倍。于是，我們不得不說(shuō)，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)巨匠凱恩斯出了錯(cuò)：財(cái)富的大規(guī)模累積，完全未能滿足或馴服我們對(duì)物質(zhì)社會(huì)的渴求。

The so-called Easterlin paradox helps explain Keynes’s mistake. According to the economistRichard Easterlin, wealth does not correlate to happiness. A higher salary is obviously alwaysdesirable, yet once we’ve reached that target it is never enough: We fall victim to a process ofhabituation of which we are largely unaware. Similarly, as we each set goals for ourselvesdriven by our current desires, we fail to take into account how our desires change over timeand in new circumstances. This explains why economic growth, more than pure wealth, is thekey to the functioning of our society: It provides each of us with the hope that we can riseabove our present condition, even though this dream remains ever elusive.

名為“伊斯特林悖論”的理論一定程度上解釋了凱恩斯的這個(gè)錯(cuò)誤。根據(jù)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家理查德·伊斯特林(RichardEasterlin)的研究，財(cái)富與幸福并無(wú)關(guān)聯(lián)。漲薪當(dāng)然總是好事，但一旦我們達(dá)到了目標(biāo)，就會(huì)永遠(yuǎn)不夠：我們陷入了一個(gè)基本不能察覺(jué)的循環(huán)而不能自拔。與之類(lèi)似的是，當(dāng)我們每個(gè)人受到當(dāng)前欲望驅(qū)使而設(shè)定目標(biāo)時(shí)，我們不會(huì)考慮到自己的欲望會(huì)隨著時(shí)間與新環(huán)境而變遷。這解釋了，為何經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)而非純粹的財(cái)富，是我們社會(huì)正常運(yùn)行的關(guān)鍵：它為我們每個(gè)人創(chuàng)造了一種希望，也就是我們能夠超越眼前，盡管這樣的夢(mèng)想總是那么虛無(wú)縹緲。

Which brings us to the fundamental question: Will economic growth return, and if it doesn’t,what then? Experts are sharply divided. The pessimists, led by the economist Robert Gordon,believe that the potential for economic growth is now much lower than in the last century. Thenew industrial revolution may have given us the smartphone, but that hardly compares, in histhinking, to the great advances of the 20th century: electricity, the automobile, the airplane,movies, television, antibiotics. On the other hand, optimists like Erik Brynjolfsson and AndrewMcAfee tell us in their book “The Second Machine Age” that Moore’s Law is going to allow “thedigitization of just about everything.” Already, Google is experimenting with driverless cars, androbots are caring for the elderly in Japan: Another burst of growth appears to be at hand.

于是最根本的問(wèn)題擺在了眼前：經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)會(huì)重現(xiàn)嗎?如若不能，又將如何?在這方面，專(zhuān)家的意見(jiàn)南轅北轍。以經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家羅伯特·戈登(Robert Gordon)為首的悲觀派認(rèn)為，今時(shí)今日的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)潛力遠(yuǎn)不及上個(gè)世紀(jì)。新工業(yè)革命縱然給我們送上了智能手機(jī)，但在他看來(lái)，這與20世紀(jì)的那些偉大進(jìn)步——電力、汽車(chē)、飛機(jī)、電影、電視、抗生素等等——比起來(lái)，不可同日而語(yǔ)。另一方面，埃里克·布林約爾松(Erik Brynjolfsson)與安德魯·麥卡菲(Andrew McAfee)這樣的樂(lè)觀派，在他們的著作《第二次機(jī)器時(shí)代》(The Second MachineAge)中告訴讀者，摩爾定律將令“幾乎所有東西的數(shù)碼化”成為可能。谷歌(Google)已經(jīng)在測(cè)試無(wú)人駕駛的車(chē)輛，而機(jī)器人照顧老人的事情在日本成為了現(xiàn)實(shí)：又一輪的爆發(fā)性增長(zhǎng)似乎近在眼前。

To decide who is right, one must first recognize that the two camps aren’t focusing on thesame things: For the pessimists, it’s the consumer who counts; for the optimists, it’s themachines. Yes, computers have in some cases replaced humans, but the essential questionthen becomes: What happens to the workers who are replaced by machines? This is not aclash between those who believe in technology and those who don’t. New technologies aredestined to produce marvels. What matters is whether they will substitute for human labor orwhether they will complement it, allowing us to be even more productive.

為了搞清哪一方有理，大家必須首先認(rèn)識(shí)到，這兩大陣營(yíng)關(guān)注點(diǎn)并不一致：在悲觀派看來(lái)，重要的是消費(fèi)者;而在樂(lè)觀派看來(lái)，則是機(jī)器。的確，計(jì)算機(jī)在某些領(lǐng)域代替了人類(lèi)，但隨之而來(lái)的核心問(wèn)題是：被機(jī)器代替的勞動(dòng)力該怎么辦?這并不是相不相信技術(shù)的兩方在發(fā)生沖突。新技術(shù)注定會(huì)創(chuàng)造出奇觀。關(guān)鍵的地方在于，它們到底是會(huì)替代勞動(dòng)力，還是會(huì)助力我們提高效率?

It’s useful to compare this situation with the 20th century when American farmers, comprising38 percent of the labor force in 1900, moved to the cities and became highly productiveworkers in new industries. Economic growth quickly doubled. The fact that the purchasingpower of the American middle class has grown so little over the last 30 years reflects anothermajor change: Workers have left the factories — but their productivity in their new jobs (ifthey find them) is stagnant, meaning that economic growth is petering out. The logicalconclusion, then, is that both sides in this debate are right: We’re living an industrialrevolution without economic growth. Powerful software is doing the work of humans, but thehumans thus replaced are unable to find productive jobs.

我們可以把目前的狀況與20世紀(jì)進(jìn)行一番比較。1900年的時(shí)候，務(wù)農(nóng)者占到美國(guó)勞動(dòng)人口的38%。此后，他們紛紛遷移到城市，在新的產(chǎn)業(yè)里成為生產(chǎn)力極高的勞動(dòng)者。經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)迅速翻倍。而美國(guó)中產(chǎn)階級(jí)的購(gòu)買(mǎi)力過(guò)去30年幾乎沒(méi)有增長(zhǎng)的事實(shí)，則反映了另一項(xiàng)重大變遷：勞動(dòng)力在離工廠而去——但他們?cè)谛鹿ぷ?如果能找到的話)中的生產(chǎn)力并未得到提升。這意味著經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)正在停止。所以，符合邏輯的結(jié)論是，討論的雙方都是對(duì)的：我們正在經(jīng)歷一場(chǎng)沒(méi)有經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的產(chǎn)業(yè)革命。強(qiáng)大的軟件正在做人類(lèi)的工作，但被取代的人類(lèi)卻無(wú)法找到有價(jià)值的工作。

So how do we deal with a world without economic growth — if that were to come to pass? Howdo we motivate people if we can’t fulfill their hopes for rising living standards? One recalls theradical move by Henry Ford to double salaries in his factories to cut back on absenteeism andto reinvigorate his employees’ desire to work. In growing economies you can reward diligentworkers with rising wages. Today’s companies do give bonuses to workers based on merit, butthat carrot comes with a stick: layoffs if goals aren’t met.

那么，我們?cè)撛鯓用鎸?duì)一個(gè)失去了經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的世界呢——如果說(shuō)它將注定到來(lái)的話?倘若不能滿足人們不斷提高生活水平的愿望，我們又該怎樣激勵(lì)他們?有人想起了亨利·福特(Henry Ford)的激進(jìn)做法，為杜絕曠工現(xiàn)象并提高工作的積極性，把員工的薪酬加倍。在經(jīng)濟(jì)持續(xù)增長(zhǎng)時(shí)，你可以用更高的工資來(lái)回報(bào)勤奮的員工。如今的公司也的確會(huì)根據(jù)績(jī)效為員工提供獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)，但胡蘿卜和大棒是同時(shí)祭出的：要是沒(méi)達(dá)到目標(biāo)，員工就會(huì)被解雇。

Work hard or get laid off, as opposed to work hard and get higher wages: This management-by-stress technique is a major cause of suffering in our modern societies. The economistsDavid Blanchflower and Andrew Oswald have shown that mental stress in the workplace hasonly grown worse over the years. Unfortunately, unhappy workers are less productive; on theother hand, content workers are more cooperative and creative. The point is this: If workersare to be productive again, then we must come up with new motivation schemes. No longerable to promise their employees higher earnings over time, companies will now have to adjust,compensate, and make work more inspiring.

不是努力工作就能漲工資，而是不努力工作就會(huì)被辭退：這種壓力管理的策略，是我們當(dāng)代社會(huì)令人痛苦的主要原因。經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家戴維·布蘭奇福勞(David Blanchflower)和安德魯·奧斯瓦爾德(Andrew Oswald)已經(jīng)告訴我們，職場(chǎng)的精神壓力愈來(lái)愈嚴(yán)重。遺憾的是，不快樂(lè)的員工的工作效率也更低;另一方面，心滿意足的員工則更具團(tuán)隊(duì)精神和創(chuàng)造力。歸根結(jié)底：如果想讓員工重新變得高效起來(lái)，我們必須拿出新的激勵(lì)辦法。由于無(wú)法再向員工承諾未來(lái)會(huì)提供更高的薪酬，企業(yè)現(xiàn)在需要做出調(diào)整和補(bǔ)償，讓工作更加鼓舞人心。

The Danish economic model, much discussed in Europe, shows that it is indeed possible tomotivate workers by something other than fear. Denmark ranks highest in “job quality inEurope,” namely because the level of autonomy granted to workers is so extensive. Thecountry’s ample safety net protecting laid-off workers and providing job retraining encouragesmobility in the workplace and eases fears about losing one’s job. It’s no wonder then that in2013 Denmark was declared the happiest country in the world.

丹麥的經(jīng)濟(jì)模式已經(jīng)在歐洲得到了大量討論。它顯示出，通過(guò)恐懼之外的東西來(lái)激勵(lì)員工的確是有可能的。在“歐洲就業(yè)質(zhì)量”的排名中，丹麥高居榜首。這完全是因?yàn)?，丹麥的勞?dòng)者享有非常大的自由度。這個(gè)國(guó)家完善的福利體系能夠保護(hù)失業(yè)的勞動(dòng)者，提供再就業(yè)培訓(xùn)，從而促進(jìn)了職場(chǎng)的流動(dòng)性，減輕了對(duì)失業(yè)的恐懼。難怪丹麥在2013年被評(píng)為世界上最快樂(lè)的國(guó)家。

It would be absurd to argue that the ills of Western societies all arise from the stagnation ofindividuals’ purchasing power. But to ignore the problem and go on pretending that growth willsurely return, just as it did after World War II, will only blind us to the reasons weak economicgrowth produces a morose society. We must now imagine a world in which happiness andsatisfaction with one’s life and work replaces the futile quest to always earn more.

認(rèn)為西方社會(huì)的弊病都源于個(gè)人購(gòu)買(mǎi)力的停滯不前，這是很可笑的。但如果忽視這個(gè)問(wèn)題，繼續(xù)假裝增長(zhǎng)肯定會(huì)像二戰(zhàn)后那樣自動(dòng)重新到來(lái)，我們就會(huì)看不到疲軟的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)導(dǎo)致整個(gè)社會(huì)悶悶不樂(lè)的真正原因。我們現(xiàn)在應(yīng)該希望的是，人們對(duì)生活和工作的快樂(lè)與滿足，可以取代對(duì)掙更多錢(qián)的徒勞追求。