大學(xué)教育不能靠市場競爭
英國政府關(guān)于高等教育的法案正在上議院接受嚴(yán)格審查。政府方面辯稱，該法案“將提升大學(xué)教學(xué)水平，形成更大競爭，為學(xué)生帶來更多選擇，同時(shí)捍衛(wèi)學(xué)府自治和學(xué)術(shù)自由”。但實(shí)際上，該法案更有可能帶來反效果。
The proposals manage to be both too radical and not radical enough. The explanation for this is the influence of half-baked economics. One example is the idea that, since competition is good, more competition must be better. Another example is the idea that, since graduates earn more than non-graduates, raising their numbers must deliver a matching rise in benefits. The first error is market fundamentalism. The second is the fallacy of composition.
這些政策建議有的過于極端，有的又不到位。對此的解釋是半吊子經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的影響。例如，有觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為，既然競爭有好處，那么更多的競爭一定更好。還有一種觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為，既然大學(xué)畢業(yè)生比非大學(xué)生掙得更多，那么增加大學(xué)生數(shù)量必然帶來相應(yīng)的效益增加。第一種觀點(diǎn)的錯(cuò)誤在于市場原教旨主義。第二種錯(cuò)在以偏概全。
I sought to explain the limits of market competition in guiding higher education in a lecture delivered to the Council for the Defence of British Universities. A market in university education suffers from five defects.
在為“捍衛(wèi)英國大學(xué)協(xié)會”(Council for the Defence of British Universities)所做的一次講座中，我力圖解釋市場競爭在引導(dǎo)高等教育發(fā)展上的種種局限。大學(xué)教育市場化受到五種缺陷的影響。
First, consumers do not know what they have bought until well after they have bought it. Second, the most important information is the reputation of the institution. Third, the price charged is a decisive signal of quality. Fourth, the failure of providers destroys the value of its qualifications. Finally, the government rightly takes much of the risk, via income-contingent loans.
首先，消費(fèi)者要等到買下很久之后，才會知道自己購買了什么。其次，最重要的信息是大學(xué)的名氣。第三，所收學(xué)費(fèi)價(jià)格是教育質(zhì)量的決定性指標(biāo)。第四，教育提供方的失敗會破壞其所授學(xué)歷的價(jià)值。最后，政府通過根據(jù)收入償還學(xué)生貸款的政策，正確地承擔(dān)了大部分風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
Given these features, reliance on market competition to drive this sector is almost sure to lead to perverse results. The government’s answer is a new regulator — the Office for Students. Yet this body, apart from being far too powerful, will find it impossible to provide credible evidence on teaching quality.
鑒于這些特點(diǎn)，依靠市場競爭推動高等教育幾乎必然導(dǎo)致扭曲的結(jié)果。英國政府的回應(yīng)是成立新的監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)——學(xué)生辦公室(Office for Students)。然而，除了掌握過多實(shí)權(quán)以外，該機(jī)構(gòu)會發(fā)現(xiàn)，它不可能提供有關(guān)教學(xué)質(zhì)量的可信證據(jù)。
The proposed creation of a market-driven university system, with no limits on numbers, no minimum qualifications on entry and government-backed loans is a disaster waiting to happen. In this respect, the policy is too radical.
擬議創(chuàng)建的市場導(dǎo)向型大學(xué)體系——沒有數(shù)量限制，沒有最低入學(xué)資格要求，卻有政府支持的貸款——將是一場必然降臨的災(zāi)難。就此而言，政策過于極端。
The root of this plan is the idea that expanding student numbers will bring huge economic benefits. Yet, as Alison Wolf of King’s College London (my wife) argues in a paper on Remaking Tertiary Education for the Education Policy Institute, this is unjustified.
上述計(jì)劃根植于這樣的理念：擴(kuò)大學(xué)生數(shù)量將帶來巨大的經(jīng)濟(jì)效益。但是，正如我的妻子、倫敦大學(xué)國王學(xué)院(King's College London)的艾莉森•沃爾夫(Alison Wolf)在為教育政策研究所(Education Policy Institute)撰寫的一篇有關(guān)重塑高等教育的論文中所主張的，這一理念毫無依據(jù)。
Ample evidence exists of graduates doing jobs that used not to need degrees. With close to half of the age cohort now acquiring degrees (up from 8 per cent in 1970), a rising number of graduates fails to earn more than non-graduates. Far more of them will not earn enough extra to justify a debt of £27,000 for a three-year degree. The economy also shows no sign of the surge in productivity that the huge rise in graduation rates was intended to create.
有大量證據(jù)證明，大學(xué)畢業(yè)生正做著過去并不需要學(xué)歷的工作。隨著同齡人群中如今有近一半獲得學(xué)位(1970年時(shí)僅為8%)，越來越多的大學(xué)畢業(yè)生賺的錢并不比非大學(xué)畢業(yè)生多。還有多得多的大學(xué)畢業(yè)生將無法賺到足夠多的額外收入，來證明為一個(gè)三年制學(xué)位課程背上2.7萬英鎊債務(wù)是劃算的。英國經(jīng)濟(jì)也沒有顯示出大學(xué)擴(kuò)招旨在帶來的生產(chǎn)率大幅提高的跡象。
The belief that the university degree is the only tertiary qualification that matters has had other dysfunctional results. The system of tertiary-level vocational qualifications has collapsed. Funding is concentrated almost entirely on universities. Marginal students gain little but debts. But they (and those who do not attend university) have few good alternatives. As Professor Wolf puts it, “Far from equalising opportunity . . . , our current tertiary arrangements work systematically against it.”
認(rèn)為大學(xué)學(xué)歷是唯一重要高等教育學(xué)歷的信念，還帶來了其他功能失調(diào)的結(jié)果。高等職業(yè)資格教育體系已經(jīng)崩潰。資金幾乎完全集中在大學(xué)。處在邊緣的學(xué)生除了背債之外沒有什么收獲。但是他們(以及那些未上大學(xué)的青年)幾乎沒有什么好的替代選擇。正如倫敦大學(xué)國王學(xué)院的艾莉森教授指出的，“非但沒有讓機(jī)會均等……，我們現(xiàn)行的高等教育安排正在系統(tǒng)化地阻礙機(jī)會均等。”
It does not have to be this way. Many European countries, notably including Austria, Germany and the Netherlands, have well-respected non-degree tertiary qualifications that deliver substantial benefit to students and employees. England seems unique in the extent to which this provision has been allowed to collapse. Yet there is clear evidence of market demand for such skills. But little or no incentive exists to meet that demand, because government support is so skewed toward universities.
其實(shí)不必如此。許多歐洲國家(尤其是奧地利、德國和荷蘭)都有受尊敬的非學(xué)位高等學(xué)歷教育，這些課程給學(xué)生和雇員帶來了巨大的好處。在讓這一級的教育體系崩潰方面，英格蘭似乎是獨(dú)一無二的。然而，有明確證據(jù)證明此類技能的市場需求。但很少或根本不存在對滿足這種需求的激勵(lì)，因?yàn)檎С秩绱讼虼髮W(xué)傾斜。
In this respect, the policy on higher education is not nearly radical enough. A good reform would create a universal entitlement to borrow for tertiary education, which could be used over a lifetime, subject to an upper age limit.
就此而言，高等教育政策根本不到位。好的改革將創(chuàng)建一種用于接受高等教育的全民借款資格(可設(shè)定一個(gè)年齡上限)。
The government would also create an updated set of tertiary vocational qualifications equivalent to those that existed in the 1970s, but were then destroyed. Qualifications are a public good. It is government’s job to help establish procedures for creating them.
政府還應(yīng)創(chuàng)建一套升級版的高等職業(yè)資格教育體系;這種體系在上世紀(jì)70年代存在過，但后來被放棄。學(xué)歷是一種公益。協(xié)助建立創(chuàng)造學(xué)歷的程序是政府的工作。
Until these things happen, most young people will seek to gain a degree, however useless, because there is no credible and adequately funded alternative. We are moving into a world in which tertiary education of some kind will be almost universal.
在實(shí)現(xiàn)這些之前，大多數(shù)年輕人將尋求獲得一個(gè)學(xué)位——無論多么無用——因?yàn)樗麄儧]有可信的、有充足資金支持的其他選擇。我們正在步入一個(gè)某些高等教育將幾乎普及的世界。
Yet that does not mean everyone should do a three-year degree. A radical government would universalise the entitlement, but promote a more diverse and appropriate set of qualifications. This happens elsewhere. Why not in England?
然而，這并不意味著每個(gè)人都應(yīng)該攻讀一個(gè)三年制學(xué)位課程。一個(gè)激進(jìn)的政府會讓這種權(quán)利全民化，同時(shí)推廣一個(gè)更加多樣化、更加合用的職業(yè)資格教育體系。這在其他地方早已實(shí)現(xiàn)。為什么英格蘭不行?
