美國(guó)距離“基列國(guó)”有多遠(yuǎn)？

A lot of television drama these days has been made redundant by the Trump administration. Why watch House of Cards when you can see the real thing rolling 24/7 on CNN? But the recent MGM-Hulu adaptation of Margaret Atwood’s 1984 dystopian novel The Handmaid’s Tale has me mesmerised. I’ve been binge watching it lately, not because I think that Trump’s America is about to become a religious autocracy in which fertile females are forced into child-bearing servitude, but because Atwood was so prescient about how political extremism of any kind, coupled with a loss of trust in existing institutions, can quickly result in political milieus that one never thought possible.

由于特朗普政府的存在，眼下很多電視劇都變得多余了。既然現(xiàn)實(shí)版政治劇在有線新聞網(wǎng)(CNN) 24小時(shí)不間斷播出，何必看《紙牌屋》(House of Cards)呢?但最近MGM-Hulu根據(jù)瑪格麗特•阿特伍德(Margaret Atwood) 1985年發(fā)表的“敵托邦”(dystopian)小說(shuō)《使女的故事》(The Handmaid’s Tale)改編的電視劇讓我入迷。我近來(lái)一直在追這部劇，不是因?yàn)槲矣X(jué)得特朗普領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的美國(guó)很快會(huì)變成那種有生育能力的女性被迫提供生孩子苦役的宗教專制主義國(guó)家，而是因?yàn)榘⑻匚榈碌南纫?jiàn)之明：任何類型的政治極端主義，再加上人們對(duì)現(xiàn)有制度失去信任，都可能迅速導(dǎo)致人們?cè)詾椴豢赡艿恼苇h(huán)境。

In Atwood’s fictional world, late-stage capitalism has led inexorably to an environmental crisis in which birth rates are radically diminished. Angry, underemployed men are manipulated by self-serving elites who decide that the way to Make America Great Again is to take it back not to the 1950s but to the 1650s. After a “terrorist” attack on Congress, the White House and the Supreme Court, the US goes from being a liberal democracy to a theocratic dictatorship based on a literal interpretation of the Bible (take that, Steve Bannon). Just in case the ruling establishment didn’t get the message, Harvard University, founded by Puritans, becomes ground zero for the ensuing horrors.

在阿特伍德的虛擬世界里，晚期資本主義無(wú)情地出生率極低的環(huán)境危機(jī)。憤怒、未充分就業(yè)的男人被自私自利的精英階層操控，后者決定讓“讓美國(guó)再次偉大”(Make America Great Again)的辦法不是回到1950年代，而是回到1650年代。在國(guó)會(huì)、白宮和最高法院遭到“恐怖分子”襲擊后，美國(guó)從一個(gè)自由民主政體轉(zhuǎn)向嚴(yán)格依據(jù)《圣經(jīng)》(Bible)的神權(quán)獨(dú)裁制(比你厲害吧，史蒂夫•班農(nóng)(Steve Bannon))。為了防止統(tǒng)治階層沒(méi)有領(lǐng)會(huì)意思，由清教徒創(chuàng)辦的哈佛大學(xué)(Harvard University)成了隨后出現(xiàn)的駭人場(chǎng)面的原點(diǎn)。

Atwood is, wisely, an equal opportunity condemner of extremism on either side of the political aisle. Loony religious fanatics get slammed but so do radical feminists, who go all too quickly from porn-burning in the old society to abusing rebellious handmaids in a Red Guard-like retraining centre in the new republic of Gilead. It’s an amped-up version of the radical divides that have coursed through US culture since the 1990s, culminating in both the neo-Nazi groups and the leftwing “antifa” that protested in Charlottesville.

阿特伍德明智地譴責(zé)政治陣營(yíng)兩邊的極端主義。宗教狂熱分子受到辛辣抨擊，但激進(jìn)女權(quán)主義者也難逃譴責(zé)——她們從焚燒色情圖書(shū)的老社會(huì)正經(jīng)女性，太快地蛻變成在新的“基列”(Gilead)共和國(guó)“紅衛(wèi)兵”式的再教育中心里虐待叛逆的使女。這有些夸張地反映了上世紀(jì)90年代以來(lái)美國(guó)文化出現(xiàn)的根本分歧，這一分歧最終造就在夏洛茨維爾抗議期間發(fā)生對(duì)抗的新納粹組織和左翼“反法西斯”(antifa)陣營(yíng)。

Another thing Atwood nails is just how fragile liberal democracy is. Pre-Gilead America is rife with inequality, but it is also filled with careless, apolitical people who take their freedoms for granted. When chaos ensues, they quickly trade freedom for order — which is how a paramilitary force takes over. This point feels uncomfortably familiar in the US right now, where not only has the president surrounded himself with generals, but the majority of people, liberals included, are bizarrely happy that he has. Perhaps that’s because retired general John F Kelly, Trump’s new chief of staff, seems a safe pair of hands in an unstable White House, or because numerous military officials have condemned Trump’s disastrous handling of the racially charged violence in Charlottesville, with army chief of staff General Mark Milley taking to the president’s own preferred communications platform, Twitter, to do so.

阿特伍德一針見(jiàn)血揭示的另一個(gè)問(wèn)題是自由民主制度有多脆弱。成為“基列國(guó)”前的美國(guó)充斥著不平等現(xiàn)象，但也有的是不關(guān)心政治的淡漠的人，他們把自由當(dāng)作理所應(yīng)當(dāng)?shù)臋?quán)利。但在混亂降臨后，他們很快放棄自由以換取秩序——準(zhǔn)軍事力量由此接管一切。這一點(diǎn)與當(dāng)下美國(guó)令人不安地相像——不僅圍繞在總統(tǒng)身邊的都是將軍，而且大多數(shù)人(包括自由派人士)都匪夷所思地樂(lè)見(jiàn)這樣的安排。或許這是因?yàn)樘乩势盏男履涣砰L(zhǎng)、退役將軍約翰•F•凱利(John F Kelly)是本屆不穩(wěn)定白宮里的定海神針，或許是因?yàn)楹芏嘬姺焦賳T譴責(zé)特朗普災(zāi)難性地處理帶有種族主義色彩的夏洛茨維爾暴力事件——陸軍參謀長(zhǎng)馬克•米萊(Mark Milley)利用特朗普本人最愛(ài)的交流平臺(tái)Twitter來(lái)指責(zé)他。

The idea of the military as an enforcer of order in a world filled with corrupt and even crazy political leaders has long been a theme in emerging markets from Turkey to Argentina. But as those countries also show, it usually doesn’t end well. This should give pause at a time when a June Gallup poll shows that while only 12 per cent of Americans have confidence in Congress, and only 32 per cent in the president, a whopping 72 per cent have “a great deal” of faith in the military. I guess I shouldn’t have been surprised when a long-time source of mine, behavioural economist Peter Atwater, released an investor note in mid-August pointing out these numbers, and suggesting that markets and experts were naive to dismiss entirely the possibility of an American coup d’état.

在從土耳其到阿根廷這樣的新興市場(chǎng)國(guó)家，一直有這樣的說(shuō)法：在腐敗甚至瘋狂的政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者當(dāng)?shù)赖氖澜缋?，不如讓軍?duì)作為秩序的維護(hù)者。但正如這些國(guó)家所表明的那樣，最終結(jié)果通常不好。這一點(diǎn)應(yīng)該讓人深思，尤其是因?yàn)?月蓋洛普(Gallup)民調(diào)顯示，盡管僅有12%的美國(guó)人對(duì)國(guó)會(huì)有信心、32%的人對(duì)總統(tǒng)有信心，但高達(dá)72%的美國(guó)人“非常”信任軍隊(duì)。我猜測(cè)，當(dāng)我長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)的消息來(lái)源、行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家彼得•阿特沃特(Peter Atwater)在8月中旬發(fā)布投資者簡(jiǎn)報(bào)時(shí)指出這些數(shù)字，并提出市場(chǎng)和專家完全忽略美國(guó)發(fā)生政變的可能性太過(guò)幼稚時(shí)，我本不應(yīng)該那么驚訝。

Extreme, to be sure, but coups need not be of the bloody emerging-market variety to be effective. One could imagine a 25th amendment process organised by the generals in the president’s cabinet, or a forced resignation with details revealed only after the fact. In any case, Atwater isn’t alone in feeling that the political situation in the US is nearing a dangerous breaking point. In a public post on LinkedIn, Ray Dalio, Bridgewater founder and America’s most famous hedge funder, recently announced that he was rejigging his portfolio in reaction to political risk in the US. “It seems to me that we are now economically and socially divided and burdened in ways that are broadly analogous to 1937,” he wrote. “During such times conflicts (both internal and external) increase, populism emerges, democracies are threatened and wars can occur. I can’t say how bad this time around will get. I’m watching how conflict is being handled as a guide, and I’m not encouraged.”

沒(méi)錯(cuò)，這是極端情況，但不一定只有新興市場(chǎng)那樣的流血政變才有效。人們可以想象由特朗普內(nèi)閣的將軍們策劃的一場(chǎng)第25修正案程序(美國(guó)憲法第25修正案規(guī)定了總統(tǒng)職位空缺時(shí)的繼任順位與程序——譯者注)，或者只是在事后才披露細(xì)節(jié)的被迫辭職。無(wú)論如何，阿特沃特絕不是唯一覺(jué)得美國(guó)政局正在靠近危險(xiǎn)的崩潰邊緣的人。橋水公司(Bridgewater)創(chuàng)始人、美國(guó)最著名的對(duì)沖基金經(jīng)理雷蒙德•戴利奧(Ray Dalio)最近在領(lǐng)英(LinkedIn)公開(kāi)發(fā)表的帖子中宣布，針對(duì)美國(guó)的政治風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，他正在重新調(diào)整投資組合。“在我看來(lái)，我們?nèi)缃裨诮?jīng)濟(jì)和社會(huì)層面都處于分裂狀態(tài)并承受壓力，大體上與1937年類似，”他寫(xiě)道，“在這種時(shí)候，沖突(包括內(nèi)部和外部的沖突)增加，民粹主義抬頭、民主制度受到威脅，戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)可能爆發(fā)。我說(shuō)不出這一次情況會(huì)有多糟。我正在關(guān)注沖突得到了怎樣的處理，視其為一種指引，目前我感覺(jué)不樂(lè)觀。”

The precariousness of US politics has led many investors to wonder if the country should have some kind of emerging-market discount attached to its assets. Of course, you can also make just the opposite argument; after all, many of our institutions, such as the media and the judicial system, are holding up well, and nobody is kicking in the door when we complain about our president. We’re quite a long way from Gilead. And yet not so far as to make parts of this dystopian society unimaginable. When Atwood wrote her book, she gave herself two rules; first, she wouldn’t include any technology that didn’t already exist, and second, she wouldn’t write about any political event that hadn’t already happened in some country or another, throughout history. Let’s hope her resulting vision remains fiction.

美國(guó)政局不穩(wěn)導(dǎo)致很多投資者猜想，美國(guó)的資產(chǎn)是否應(yīng)該像新興市場(chǎng)的資產(chǎn)那樣，帶有某種價(jià)格折扣。當(dāng)然，你也可以提出完全相反的主張;畢竟，美國(guó)的許多機(jī)構(gòu)，比如媒體和司法體制，都保持得不錯(cuò)，而且當(dāng)我們抱怨總統(tǒng)時(shí)，沒(méi)人上門找我們的麻煩。我們距離“基列國(guó)”還很遠(yuǎn)。然而，這種距離也不是如此之遠(yuǎn)，以至于“敵托邦”社會(huì)的部分特征完全不可想象。當(dāng)阿特伍德寫(xiě)這本書(shū)時(shí)，她給自己定了兩條規(guī)則：第一，她不會(huì)寫(xiě)入當(dāng)時(shí)不存在的科技;第二，她不會(huì)描寫(xiě)在任何國(guó)家歷史上從未發(fā)生過(guò)的政治事件。但愿她創(chuàng)作的未來(lái)景象留在小說(shuō)里。

Rana Foroohar is the FT’s global business columnist and an FT associate editor.

插圖由肖納格•雷(Shonagh Rae)提供

Illustration by Shonagh Rae

譯者/馬柯斯