書(shū)評(píng)：《解析失敗》

How long does it take for the US military to admit defeat? The answer is forever, according to Harlan Ullman. Today there are US soldiers deployed in Afghanistan who were one year-olds when the war began. Yet the Taliban is no closer to being banished than it was in 2001. Indeed, it occupies considerably more of the country today than it did two years ago. In the meantime, the US presence has fluctuated from a few thousand troops to more than 100,000 and back again. Each president thinks he has found the key to winning the conflict. Every time, the key breaks. Yet the Pentagon refrain continues: “Give me the tools and I will finish the job.

美國(guó)軍方要承認(rèn)失敗需要多長(zhǎng)時(shí)間?哈倫•烏爾曼(Harlan Ullman)說(shuō)，答案是永不。當(dāng)今部署到阿富汗的美軍士兵里，有人在阿富汗戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)開(kāi)始時(shí)還只是1歲的孩子。然而，比起2001年時(shí)，美國(guó)并沒(méi)有更接近自身的目標(biāo)——搗毀塔利班(Taliban)。事實(shí)上，如今塔利班的地盤(pán)顯著大于2年前。與此同時(shí)，駐阿富汗美軍的兵力上上下下，從幾千人增加到逾10萬(wàn)人，后來(lái)又回落。每一任總統(tǒng)都認(rèn)為他找到了贏得這場(chǎng)沖突的鑰匙。每一次，鑰匙都崩斷了。然而五角大樓依然繼續(xù)高唱：“給我工具，我就能完成任務(wù)。”

If there was a president who might have resisted the “deep state” it was Donald Trump. He campaigned against America’s endless wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. He won the mandate to say “no” to the Pentagon. Yet, in power, Mr Trump has given the Pentagon everything it has requested — and more. For the first time in modern US history, military commanders have discretion to make large battlefield decisions without civilian approval.

如果說(shuō)有一位總統(tǒng)可能抵制“深層國(guó)家勢(shì)力”的話，那就是唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)了。他在競(jìng)選期間反對(duì)美國(guó)在伊拉克、阿富汗和其它地方無(wú)休止的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。他贏得了對(duì)五角大樓說(shuō)“不”的民意授權(quán)。然而，在真正上任后，特朗普向五角大樓提供了其所要求的一切——甚至更多。在美國(guó)現(xiàn)代史上，軍事指揮官首次具有較大的自由裁量權(quán)，可以在不經(jīng)文職官員批準(zhǔn)的情況下做出重大戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)決定。

Last year, the Pentagon took advantage of its new latitude to drop the “mother of all bombs” — the largest non-nuclear weapon in history — on an Isis-occupied warren of caves in eastern Afghanistan. “We have the greatest military in the world,” said Mr Trump. “We have given them total authorisation and that is what they are doing.” Alas, Isis is still there.

去年，五角大樓利用新的行動(dòng)自由，向阿富汗東部一處“伊拉克與黎凡特伊斯蘭國(guó)”(ISIS)地道設(shè)施投下“炸彈之母”(mother of all bombs)，這是有史以來(lái)威力最大的非核武器。“我們擁有世界上最強(qiáng)大的軍隊(duì)。”特朗普說(shuō)，“我們給予他們完全的授權(quán)，這就是他們正在做的事情。”唉，可ISIS還在那里。

Ullman’s subtitle is a pardonable exaggeration. Occasionally the US wins wars it did not start — such as its 1991 liberation of Kuwait. For the most part, though, he is right. From the deadly stalemate in Korea in 1950 that holds to this day, to the Vietnam war, the second Iraq war, and Afghanistan, the world’s greatest military has a poor record. Individual battles are no problem. There is not an army in the world that could stand up to the Americans in a fair fight. But winning wars is a different matter.

烏爾曼的著作的副標(biāo)題(“為何每一場(chǎng)美國(guó)發(fā)起的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)都以失敗告終”)有夸張成分，但無(wú)傷大雅。美國(guó)偶爾打贏不由美國(guó)發(fā)起的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)——比如1991年解放科威特的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。然而，在很大程度上，烏爾曼是對(duì)的。從1950年在朝鮮半島陷入僵局(這個(gè)僵局一直持續(xù)到今天)到越南戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)、從第二次伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)以及阿富汗戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，世界上最強(qiáng)大軍隊(duì)的記錄很糟糕。具體的戰(zhàn)斗不是問(wèn)題。世界上沒(méi)有哪支軍隊(duì)能夠在公平戰(zhàn)斗中抗衡美軍。但贏得戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)是另一回事。

What is the problem? Ullman is a good person to answer the question. Having fought in Vietnam as a Swift Boat captain, he is a veteran of the US’s most costly defeat. He is also a respected military strategist on the Washington scene. As an instructor at the Naval War College in the 1990s, he coined the strategy of “shock and awe” that was put to devastating use in the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. As a friend and sometime adviser to figures including Robert McNamara, the former secretary of defence, and Colin Powell, the former secretary of state, Ullman understands their weak spots.

問(wèn)題出在哪兒?烏爾曼是回答這個(gè)問(wèn)題的合適人選。作為越戰(zhàn)期間的快艇船長(zhǎng)，他是經(jīng)歷過(guò)美國(guó)代價(jià)最慘重的戰(zhàn)敗的老兵。他還是華盛頓受尊敬的軍事戰(zhàn)略家。烏爾曼在上世紀(jì)90年代擔(dān)任美國(guó)海軍戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)學(xué)院(US Naval War College)講師期間，提出了“震懾”戰(zhàn)略(shock and awe)，這一戰(zhàn)略被應(yīng)用于2003年美國(guó)牽頭的入侵伊拉克行動(dòng)，造成了毀滅性打擊。烏爾曼是前國(guó)防部長(zhǎng)羅伯特•麥克納馬拉(Robert McNamara)和前國(guó)務(wù)卿科林•鮑威爾(Colin Powell)等人物的朋友，有時(shí)還擔(dān)當(dāng)他們的顧問(wèn)，因而了解他們的弱點(diǎn)。

He has three explanations. First, the US keeps electing poorly qualified presidents. Second, they keep making strategic mistakes. As Mr Trump is showing, the less experienced the president, the more likely they are to take advice from the military. But the Pentagon should not be entrusted with strategic decisions. That is the job of the civilian who is elected to be their commander-in-chief.

烏爾曼提供了3個(gè)解釋。首先，美國(guó)一直選出不夠格的總統(tǒng)。第二，他們總是在犯戰(zhàn)略性錯(cuò)誤。就如特朗普表現(xiàn)出來(lái)的那樣，越是缺乏經(jīng)驗(yàn)的總統(tǒng)，就越有可能聽(tīng)從軍方的建議。但制定戰(zhàn)略決策的任務(wù)不應(yīng)該交給五角大樓，而應(yīng)該是經(jīng)選舉產(chǎn)生、擔(dān)任美軍總司令的文職官員的工作。

Just as often, presidents invent their own blunders. John F Kennedy’s presidency was almost upended when he took the Central Intelligence Agency’s advice to launch a botched invasion of Cuba. George W Bush thought that Iraq’s defeat would deflate tyrants everywhere. Barack Obama believed the Taliban would fall for his “Hello, I must be going” temporary surge in Afghanistan. Two exceptions were Dwight Eisenhower, who had been commander of US forces in Europe, and George H W Bush, who had been head of the CIA. Bush Senior wisely stopped the 1991 invasion of Iraq long before it reached Baghdad. Bush Junior was clearly not paying attention.

同樣經(jīng)常的是，總統(tǒng)自己也會(huì)搞砸決策。約翰•肯尼迪(John F Kennedy)聽(tīng)取中央情報(bào)局(CIA)建議而對(duì)古巴發(fā)起拙劣的入侵行動(dòng)，幾乎葬送了他的總統(tǒng)任期。小布什(George W Bush)以為，打敗伊拉克會(huì)讓任何地方的暴君聞風(fēng)喪膽。巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)以為，他向阿富汗暫時(shí)增兵所傳達(dá)的“哈嘍，我得按時(shí)撤出”的訊息會(huì)讓塔利班配合。僅有的兩個(gè)例外是曾擔(dān)任歐洲戰(zhàn)區(qū)美軍司令的德懷特•艾森豪威爾(Dwight Eisenhower)以及曾擔(dān)任中情局局長(zhǎng)的老布什(George H W Bush)。1991年，老布什在美軍在距離巴格達(dá)還很遠(yuǎn)的時(shí)候就決定收手。小布什顯然沒(méi)有領(lǐng)悟這其中的智慧。

Ullman’s third explanation — that American forces lack cultural knowledge of the enemy — is where he is most scathing. “Ignorance of the local situation is . . . embedded in our decision-making DNA,” he writes. “Too often, American leaders have believed that the enemy is always thinking as we do.” Perhaps the best example of this was seen in Vietnam. Washington thought it would be the next communist domino to fall. People who knew the country understood this was a war of self-determination.

烏爾曼的第三個(gè)解釋——美軍缺乏對(duì)敵人文化的了解——這是他筆鋒最尖銳的地方。“對(duì)當(dāng)?shù)厍闆r的無(wú)知……植根于我們的決策DNA中。”他寫(xiě)道，“美國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人往往以為，敵人會(huì)像我們一樣思考。”越戰(zhàn)或許就是最好的例子。華盛頓認(rèn)為這是下一張落入共產(chǎn)黨手中的多米諾骨牌。而了解越南的人都知道，那是一場(chǎng)民族自決戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。

Ullman’s thesis can be boiled down to one phrase: too much muscle; not enough thinking. He recommends a “brains-based” approach. That would be a good place to start. Intelligent volunteers should begin by reading his book.

烏爾曼的論點(diǎn)可以歸結(jié)為一句話：肌肉太多，思考不足。他推薦采用“用腦子的”策略。那將是一個(gè)很好的開(kāi)端。聰明的志愿者應(yīng)該以閱讀本書(shū)作為開(kāi)始。

The writer is the FT’s Washington columnist and commentator

本文作者是英國(guó)《金融時(shí)報(bào)》華盛頓專(zhuān)欄作家和評(píng)論員