意大利商界體制的權(quán)力的游戲

Owning less than 1 per cent of a company does not normally entitle an investor to take control of its destiny but things work differently in Italy. When Vincent Bolloré acquires a tiny minority interest, everything is up for grabs.

持有不到1%股份的投資者通常不會有資格掌控公司的命運(yùn)，但是意大利的體制有所不同。當(dāng)萬桑•博洛雷(Vincent Bolloré)買下少數(shù)股權(quán)后，一切都是囊中之物。

Vivendi, in which the French industrialist and investor holds a 14.5 per cent stake, last week took 3.5 per cent of Mediaset, the company founded by Silvio Berlusconi, Italy’s former prime minister. The deal gives Mr Bolloré an indirect interest in Mediaset of 0.5 per cent, together with control of its premium sports and films channel, yet his ascent to power is already being treated in Italy as a fait accompli.

這位法國實(shí)業(yè)家和投資者持有威望迪(Vivendi) 14.5%的股份。威望迪最近收購了意大利前總理西爾維奧•貝盧斯科尼(Silvio Berlusconi)創(chuàng)辦的Mediaset公司3.5%的股份，這筆交易讓博洛雷間接持有Mediaset 0.5%的權(quán)益，加上其付費(fèi)體育和電影付費(fèi)頻道的控制權(quán)，然而他的勢力上升在意大利已被視為既成事實(shí)。

The global media industry is replete with treacherous alliances, bulging pay packages and moguls who dominate companies by holding minority stakes with special voting rights. But Mr Bolloré’s style of corporate governance makes Rupert Murdoch, chairman of 21st Century Fox, look like a saint.

全球媒體業(yè)充斥著詭譎的聯(lián)盟、天文數(shù)字的薪酬方案以及通過持有帶有特殊投票權(quán)的少數(shù)股份而主宰公司的大亨。但博洛雷的企業(yè)治理風(fēng)格讓21世紀(jì)?？怂?21st Century Fox)的董事長魯珀特•默多克(Rupert Murdoch)看起來像個圣人。

Join the club if you cannot understand Mr Bolloré’s plans for Mediaset and Telecom Italia, of which Vivendi holds just under 25 per cent. He does not feel the need to explain himself, and may not even have worked out his endgame yet. Those who question or resist him tend not to survive for long.

如果你無法理解博洛雷對Mediaset和意大利電信(Telecom Italia)——威望迪持有意大利電信略低于25%的股份———的計(jì)劃，歡迎加入俱樂部。他不覺得有必要解釋自己的意圖，甚至可能還沒有想好自己的終局。那些質(zhì)疑或者抵制他的人往往撐不了多久。

There is much to admire about Mr Bolloré. He is a Breton outsider, not a product of the Paris establishment. He invests for the long term — decades rather than the months or years of others. He is imaginative, investing in Africa when others shunned it (although his company’s offices were raided last week as part of a corruption inquiry) and cleverly shifting out of papermaking into plastics and now batteries and electric cars.

博洛雷有許多可欽佩之處。他是布列塔尼(法國西北部布列塔尼半島上的民族——譯者注)的一個局外人，而非巴黎的名門望族之后。他注重長期投資，眼光長達(dá)幾十年、而非其他人的數(shù)月或者數(shù)年。他富有想象力，在其他人唯恐避之不及的時候?qū)Ψ侵尥顿Y(盡管其公司的非洲辦公室最近因一項(xiàng)腐敗調(diào)查而遭到突擊搜查)，精明地將造紙業(yè)務(wù)轉(zhuǎn)型為塑料業(yè)務(wù)，現(xiàn)在又生產(chǎn)電池和電動汽車。

But Mr Bolloré learnt long ago how to be a capitalist with the minimum of capital, and he has honed that skill. He regards France and Italy as fertile places to mount a challenge to Netflix and HBO. It is equally valuable to him that they permit his Game of Thrones approach to business.

但博洛雷很早就學(xué)會了如何用最少的資本成為一名資本家，他在多年的實(shí)踐中錘煉了這一技巧。他把法國和意大利視為叫板Netflix和HBO的沃土。對他來說，同樣重要的是，這兩個國家允許他以《權(quán)力的游戲》(Game of Thrones)中的那種方式經(jīng)商。

The French government did Mr Bolloré a big favour with its 2014 Florange law, which encouraged companies to allow investors holding shares for more than two years double voting rights. He exploited this well-meaning blunder to take control of Vivendi despite holding only a minority stake and to become its chairman. He has also assumed managerial oversight of Canal Plus, Vivendi’s television and film group.

法國政府在2014年出臺的《弗洛朗熱法》(Florange law)幫了博洛雷大忙——該法規(guī)定，持股兩年以上的股東具備雙倍的表決權(quán)。他利用這種無心之過掌控了威望迪(盡管只持有少數(shù)股份)，并成為其董事長。他還在威望迪旗下的影視集團(tuán)Canal Plus擔(dān)負(fù)管理監(jiān)督職責(zé)。

Mr Bolloré’s personal prominence at the helm of Vivendi is unusual. In the past he has mounted raids on French companies as an activist investor to extract better terms or to shake up management. But his use of minority stakes to give himself a large degree of influence is tried and tested.

已成為掌門人的博洛雷在威望迪擁有非同尋常的個人威望。過去，他曾作為一名維權(quán)投資者襲擊法國公司，以爭取更好的條款或者推動管理層改組。但他利用少數(shù)股權(quán)讓自己獲得極大影響力的做法是由來已久的。

Antoine Bernheim, the sphinx-like former partner of Lazard Frères and Mediobanca, the French and Italian merchant banks that once wielded influence over swaths of industry in those countries, taught him a lot. Mr Bolloré holds a stake in Mediobanca and his daughter, Marie, sits on its board, a useful position in the byzantine world of Italian high finance and politics.

已故的安東尼•本海姆(Antoine Bernheim)曾經(jīng)是法國拉扎德銀行(Lazard Frères)和意大利中期銀行(Mediobanca)的神秘合伙人——這兩家商業(yè)銀行在法意兩國的工商界影響巨大。本海姆教會了博洛雷很多訣竅。博洛雷持有中期銀行的股份，而他的女兒瑪麗(Marie)是該行董事會成員，在意大利錯綜復(fù)雜的高級金融和政治圈子里，這個職位非常有用。

Bernheim, who died in 2012, trained Mr Bolloré to build an empire from small beginnings. As Thomas Singlehurst, a Citigroup media analyst, observes, he is “economical” — if he gains control at 15 per cent, that is what he invests. Muddy Waters, the short seller, calls him an “outstanding capital allocator” despite the “horrifically complex” structure of the Bolloré group.

2012年去世的本海姆讓博洛雷明白偉大始于微末。正如花旗集團(tuán)(Citigroup)媒體分析師托馬斯•辛格爾赫斯特(Thomas Singlehurst)觀察到的，他“很經(jīng)濟(jì)”——如果他能以15%的股份獲得控制權(quán)，那么他就只會投資這么多。做空機(jī)構(gòu)渾水公司(Muddy Waters)將他稱為“卓越的資本配置者”，盡管博洛雷集團(tuán)(Bolloré Group)的架構(gòu)“復(fù)雜得可怕”。

All very clever but is Mr Bolloré a builder of businesses or simply of assets that he can one day dispose of at a higher price? Those close to him suggest he is both — he thinks Vivendi, once run by Jean-Marie Messier, whose attempt to build it into a global media company failed, still has potential.

所有這些做法都非常精明，但博洛雷是要打造企業(yè)還是構(gòu)建有朝一日可以高價出手的資產(chǎn)?他身邊的人表示，兩者兼而有之——他認(rèn)為威望迪還有潛力。讓-馬利•梅西耶(Jean-Marie Messier)曾經(jīng)執(zhí)掌威望迪，并希望把它打造為一家全球媒體企業(yè)，但未能成功。

If it transpires, though, that French, Spanish and Italian programmes and films only travel so far, he will be in control when a bidder — Liberty Global, BSkyB, 21st Century Fox or whoever — knocks on the door. Meanwhile, perhaps he will swap some of Telecom Italia for more of Mediaset. Who knows?

然而，如果到頭來法國、西班牙和意大利的影視內(nèi)容市場有限，他將在競購者(Liberty Global、BSkyB、21世紀(jì)?？怂够蛘咂渌魏螜C(jī)構(gòu))敲門的時候處于控制地位。與此同時，或許他會用一些意大利電信的股份來換取更多的Mediaset股份。誰知道呢?

It is a fair bet that Mr Bolloré will somehow emerge richer, given that he has achieved his usual trick of securing control without paying a control premium. The tactic failed in the UK in the mid-2000s when he tried to finagle a 29 per cent stake in advertising group Aegis into board control and was rightly rebuffed. Even so, he came out ahead when Japanese group Dentsu acquired Aegis in 2013.

鑒于博洛雷已經(jīng)像通常那樣，在沒有為控制權(quán)支付溢價的情況下獲得了控制權(quán)，因此合理的推測是，他將在交易做成后更加富裕。這種戰(zhàn)術(shù)在2005年前后在英國受挫，當(dāng)時他試圖借助安吉斯廣告集團(tuán)(Aegis)的29%股份獲取董事會控制權(quán)，結(jié)果遭到拒絕。即便如此，當(dāng)2013年日本電通集團(tuán)(Dentsu)收購安吉斯的時候，他仍然賺了一把。

But it begs the question of whether others should go along on his opaque quest. Mr Murdoch took little account of minority investors in News Corp before he spun out its entertainment arm into 21st Century Fox in 2013 but his interests were at least simple. Mr Bolloré operates through various vehicles including 60 per cent of Havas, the advertising group.

但這引發(fā)了其他人應(yīng)不應(yīng)該默許他的隱晦企圖的問題。在2013年將旗下娛樂部門注入21世紀(jì)?？怂怪?，默多克很少考慮新聞集團(tuán)(News Corp)少數(shù)股東的利益，但至少他的權(quán)益是簡單的。博洛雷通過多個工具運(yùn)作，其中包括廣告集團(tuán)哈瓦斯(Havas) 60%的股份。

A deal that suits Mr Bolloré in the round could be very good for shareholders in Vivendi but not so good for those in Telecom Italia and Havas, or any other combination of the above. Even if you trust him, you would need to mirror his investment structure to match all of the returns he makes.

對博洛雷有利的交易可能對威望迪的股東非常有利，但不利于意大利電信和哈瓦斯的股東(或者以上股東的其他任何組合)。即便你信任他，你也需要模仿他的投資架構(gòu)來跟上他的全部回報(bào)。

It also begs the question of why he is allowed to get away with it. France and Italy’s perverse and lax governance rules enable Mr Bolloré to flourish. Southern Europe is gaining the media mogul it deserves.

這也引發(fā)他為什么會被允許這么操作的問題。法國和意大利扭曲而寬松的治理規(guī)則讓博洛雷如魚得水。南歐正在得到其應(yīng)得的媒體大亨。