特朗普的危險(xiǎn)外交理念

Donald Trump loves to say that he will “make America great again”. But Mr Trump’s foreign policy ideas actually amount to a headlong American retreat from “greatness” on the world stage. 唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)總愛(ài)說(shuō)，他將“讓美國(guó)再次變得偉大”。但特朗普的外交政策理念實(shí)際上等同于讓美國(guó)倉(cāng)促退出世界舞臺(tái)上的“偉大國(guó)家”行列。

The all-but-anointed Republican candidate for the US presidency essentially wants America to resign from the role of global policeman. Any such decision would have profound implications. The world’s security system is based around a series of American “red lines” and alliances. But if the US starts pulling back from its international role, other powers, in particular China and Russia, will move to fill the vacuum.

幾乎鎖定共和黨總統(tǒng)候選人提名的特朗普，實(shí)質(zhì)上希望美國(guó)不再擔(dān)任“世界警察”角色。任何此類(lèi)決策都將產(chǎn)生深遠(yuǎn)影響。全球安全體系是圍繞美國(guó)劃出的一系列“紅線”和打造的聯(lián)盟建立起來(lái)的。但如果美國(guó)開(kāi)始收縮其國(guó)際角色，其他大國(guó)——特別是中國(guó)與俄羅斯——將去填補(bǔ)真空。

Mr Trump’s promised America-first trade protectionism could trigger a worldwide recession and undermine the globalised trading system that gives countries an incentive to co-operate rather than compete.

特朗普承諾的“美國(guó)第一”的貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義可能引發(fā)全球性的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退，破壞全球化的貿(mào)易體系，而正是這一體系激勵(lì)著各國(guó)進(jìn)行合作，而非對(duì)抗。

To understand the full implications of Trumpism unleashed, look at three crucial regions — Asia, Europe and the Middle East. It is also important to understand how Mr Trump’s dealmaking approach to diplomacy would create dangerous international uncertainty.

要理解“特朗普主義”(Trumpism)造成的全面影響，可以看看三個(gè)關(guān)鍵地區(qū)——亞洲、歐洲和中東。同樣重要的是要明白，特朗普在外交上的“做交易”策略將在國(guó)際上制造危險(xiǎn)的不確定性。

In Asia, Mr Trump would stand US policy on its head. America’s approach to the rise of China has been based on economic openness, combined with security alliances designed to balance growing Chinese power. Mr Trump wants to reverse these priorities. He has talked about imposing swinging tariffs on Chinese goods. But he has also sounded very sceptical about America’s two most important treaty alliances in East Asia, with Japan and South Korea.

在亞洲，特朗普將徹底顛覆美國(guó)的現(xiàn)行政策。美國(guó)應(yīng)對(duì)中國(guó)崛起的方式一直是以經(jīng)濟(jì)開(kāi)放為基礎(chǔ)，再加上旨在制衡中國(guó)實(shí)力增長(zhǎng)的安全同盟。特朗普希望取消這些優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)。他談到要對(duì)中國(guó)商品征收各種關(guān)稅。但他同時(shí)聽(tīng)上去也對(duì)美國(guó)在東亞的兩個(gè)最重要的條約同盟——美日同盟與美韓同盟——持非常懷疑的態(tài)度。

Mr Trump’s priorities probably sound like common sense to many US voters, who regard it as much more important to safeguard American jobs from Chinese competition than to protect Japan and South Korea from potential attack. In reality, Mr Trump’s promised diplomatic revolution in Asia would have malign consequences that would swiftly be felt back home. A Trump-inspired trade war would be seen as a threat to the prosperity and stability of China. If this were combined with a weakening of US security guarantees to its Asian allies, China could well respond aggressively. The tense shadowboxing in the East and South China seas between China, the US and Japan could escalate into something much more serious.

特朗普提出的優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)對(duì)許多美國(guó)選民來(lái)說(shuō)聽(tīng)起來(lái)或許很合理，他們認(rèn)為，保護(hù)美國(guó)的就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)免受中國(guó)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，比保護(hù)日、韓兩國(guó)免遭潛在攻擊重要得多。實(shí)際上，特朗普承諾在亞洲進(jìn)行的外交革命將造成有害后果，而且這些后果將迅速波及美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)。特朗普引發(fā)的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)將被視為對(duì)中國(guó)繁榮穩(wěn)定的一大威脅。如果再加上美國(guó)對(duì)亞洲盟友安全保障的弱化，中國(guó)極有可能予以強(qiáng)硬的回?fù)?。中?guó)、美國(guó)以及日本圍繞東中國(guó)海、南中國(guó)海的緊張博弈可能升級(jí)至嚴(yán)重得多的地步。

The implications of Mr Trump’s pronouncements on Europe are no less profound. They threaten to gravely weaken the western alliance that has guaranteed security in Europe since the end of the second world war. For decades, US policy to Europe has been based on the twin pillars of Nato and the EU. But Mr Trump has abandoned America’s traditional support for European integration, suggesting that it would be a good idea if Britain voted to leave the EU. Mr Trump’s scepticism about alliance commitments extends to Nato, which he sees as a bad deal for America. Combine that with his admiration for Vladimir Putin and you have a formula for a radically different US approach in the region. Mr Trump could take America back to the isolationism of the 1930s, when the US was reluctant to countenance security commitments in Europe.

特朗普對(duì)歐洲的表態(tài)同樣影響深遠(yuǎn)。它們可能?chē)?yán)重削弱自二戰(zhàn)結(jié)束以來(lái)一直保障歐洲安全的西方同盟。幾十年來(lái)，美國(guó)對(duì)歐洲的政策一直建立在兩大支柱——北約(Nato)與歐盟(EU)——之上。但特朗普已丟棄美國(guó)對(duì)歐洲一體化的傳統(tǒng)支持，他暗示，如果英國(guó)投票決定退出歐盟會(huì)是個(gè)好主意。特朗普對(duì)聯(lián)盟承諾的質(zhì)疑還延伸到了北約身上，他將后者視為對(duì)美國(guó)不劃算的一項(xiàng)協(xié)議。再加上特朗普對(duì)弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)的贊賞，這意味著美國(guó)在這一地區(qū)與以往截然不同的政策。特朗普可能會(huì)把美國(guó)帶回至上世紀(jì)30年代的孤立主義時(shí)期，那時(shí)的美國(guó)不愿意支持在歐洲的安全承諾。

The structural damage that Mr Trump would do to the western alliance would be compounded by the harm that he would inflict on America’s image in Europe. Mr Trump has already engaged in an intermittent public row with Sadiq Khan, the new mayor of London, who is a Muslim. If the Republicans were genuinely to attempt to ban Muslims from entering the US, even temporarily, that would create a huge diplomatic issue with countries such as the UK and France, which could not accept such frank discrimination against millions of their citizens.

特朗普對(duì)美國(guó)在歐洲的形象的破壞將進(jìn)一步加劇他對(duì)西方同盟造成的結(jié)構(gòu)性破壞。特朗普已經(jīng)開(kāi)始了與倫敦新任穆斯林市長(zhǎng)薩迪克•汗(Sadiq Khan)斷斷續(xù)續(xù)的公開(kāi)爭(zhēng)吵。如果共和黨真的試圖禁止穆斯林進(jìn)入美國(guó)(即便是暫時(shí))，這將在美國(guó)與英法等國(guó)之間制造巨大的外交問(wèn)題，這些國(guó)家無(wú)法接受對(duì)數(shù)以百萬(wàn)計(jì)的本國(guó)公民如此不加掩飾的歧視。

The “Muslim ban” would obviously go down even worse in the Middle East, where Trumpism would promise a further deterioration in US regional power. Many of America’s Middle Eastern allies regard Barack Obama, the US president, as feckless and unreliable — and some may hope that Mr Trump would be an improvement. But they would be disappointed. Mr Trump’s scepticism about US alliance commitments, combined with wild promises to grab Middle Eastern oil, are not a formula for the restoration of American regional leadership.

顯然，“穆斯林禁令”在中東將受到更嚴(yán)重的抵制，特朗普主義勢(shì)將使美國(guó)的地區(qū)影響力進(jìn)一步削弱。美國(guó)在中東的許多盟友認(rèn)為，巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)總統(tǒng)軟弱、靠不住——有些國(guó)家或許希望特朗普將有所改觀。但現(xiàn)實(shí)會(huì)令他們失望。特朗普對(duì)美國(guó)作出的同盟承諾的質(zhì)疑，以及攫取中東石油的厥詞，不可能幫助美國(guó)恢復(fù)地區(qū)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力。

Of course it is hard to know how much of what Mr Trump says he actually means and how much is campaign rhetoric or random musing. But that, in itself, points to another big problem with his approach to the world.

當(dāng)然，我們很難知道，特朗普所言有多少是自己的真實(shí)想法，有多少是競(jìng)選口號(hào)或者即興想法。但這本身就指向了他對(duì)待世界的方式的另一個(gè)大問(wèn)題。

Traditionally, American leaders have made a fetish of US “credibility” in international affairs. They believe that global security can only be guaranteed if potential adversaries believe that America’s military commitments are utterly reliable. That is why Mr Obama’s failure to enforce his red line against Syria’s use of chemical weapons in 2013 was felt to be such a big deal.

傳統(tǒng)上，美國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人最為珍視的是美國(guó)在國(guó)際事務(wù)中的“可信性”。他們認(rèn)為，只有潛在敵手相信美國(guó)的軍事承諾是絕對(duì)可靠的，全球安全才能得到保障。這就是為什么2013年敘利亞使用化學(xué)武器時(shí)，奧巴馬未能?chē)?yán)格守住紅線、對(duì)其采取措施被認(rèn)為如此事關(guān)重大。

Mr Trump, however, has made it clear that he wants America to become more unpredictable. In his writings on business, he has extolled the virtues of making extravagant demands or promises as an opening bid, before eventually finding a compromise. This approach might work well in real estate. But it is potentially a formula for disaster in international politics, where America’s friends and foes should believe that the US says what it means, and means what it says. Anything else could prompt dangerous miscalculations by US rivals, leading to uncertainty, instability — and, ultimately, war.

然而，特朗普明確表示，他希望美國(guó)變得更加難以捉摸。在其商業(yè)論述中，特朗普對(duì)一種做法洋洋得意，就是在最初開(kāi)價(jià)時(shí)提出過(guò)分要求或做出過(guò)度承諾，然后達(dá)成最終的妥協(xié)。這種策略或許在房地產(chǎn)領(lǐng)域很有效，但在國(guó)際政治中可能招致災(zāi)難，在國(guó)際事務(wù)中，美國(guó)應(yīng)該讓自己的朋友和敵人相信，美國(guó)說(shuō)話算話。否則可能促使美國(guó)的敵手做出危險(xiǎn)的誤判，導(dǎo)致不確定性和不穩(wěn)定，甚至最終導(dǎo)致戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。