FT社評(píng)：杜特爾特在中美間的危險(xiǎn)博弈

Rodrigo Duterte, the flamboyant president of the Philippines, has spent this week in Beijing executing a dramatic pivot away from the US, his country’s closest ally, and into the arms of the rising superpower, China.

行事高調(diào)的菲律賓總統(tǒng)羅德里戈•杜特爾特(Rodrigo Duterte)利用本周對(duì)北京的訪問，上演了一場(chǎng)脫離該國(guó)最親密的盟友美國(guó)、轉(zhuǎn)投崛起中的超級(jí)大國(guó)中國(guó)懷抱的大戲。

During his four-day trip, his first to a country outside the Asean bloc since becoming president in June, he said it was time to “say goodbye” to the US and claimed that “only China [could] help” the Philippines. If followed to their logical conclusion, his words would represent the most significant realignment of geopolitical power in the region since the cold war.

這是杜特爾特自6月就任總統(tǒng)以來首次訪問東盟(ASEAN)以外的國(guó)家，在為期四天的訪華行程中，他表示，是時(shí)候?qū)γ绹?guó)“說再見了”，并宣稱“只有中國(guó)(能夠)幫助”菲律賓。從遵循他此番言論的邏輯推導(dǎo)出的結(jié)論來看，此番言論將代表著冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束以來亞太地區(qū)地緣政治力量最重大的一次調(diào)整。

In spite of his uncompromising language, Mr Duterte may well in fact be playing the tides between the US and China rather than reversing the Philippines’ fundamental strategic posture. Nonetheless, he should recognise that this is a highly dangerous endeavour, not only for his country but also for the broader region.

盡管言辭堅(jiān)定，但實(shí)際上，杜特爾特很可能只是在美中之間見風(fēng)使舵，而非要徹底轉(zhuǎn)變菲律賓的根本戰(zhàn)略立場(chǎng)。盡管如此，他應(yīng)該認(rèn)識(shí)到，這是一種高度危險(xiǎn)的嘗試——不僅對(duì)菲律賓，對(duì)整個(gè)地區(qū)而言也是如此。

Mr Duterte is bashing Washington to ingratiate himself with Beijing, but his rhetoric risks alienating both of the world’s biggest powers. Manila appears to be betting that the US will not abandon one of its closest regional allies just because of the colourful insults Mr Duterte has directed at Barack Obama.

杜特爾特痛批華盛頓來討好北京，但他的話有可能同時(shí)疏遠(yuǎn)這兩個(gè)世界頭號(hào)大國(guó)。馬尼拉似乎賭的是美國(guó)不會(huì)僅僅因杜特爾特對(duì)巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)出言不遜就放棄其關(guān)系最密切一個(gè)地區(qū)盟國(guó)。

But in referring to the US president as the “son of a whore”, Mr Duterte reveals a worrying lack of finesse that may serve him ill if US-China tension in the region ramps up. In addition, Washington may be less than willing in the future to look past Mr Duterte’s more substantive threats, such as pledging to cancel the joint military exercises that form a key part of the US military presence in the region.

但杜特爾特稱美國(guó)總統(tǒng)是“婊子養(yǎng)的”言論，暴露出他嚴(yán)重缺乏手腕，這一點(diǎn)可能會(huì)讓他吃苦頭——如果美中在亞太地區(qū)的緊張關(guān)系加劇的話。此外，未來華盛頓可能不會(huì)愿意無視杜特爾特發(fā)出的更實(shí)質(zhì)性的威脅，如誓言取消與美國(guó)的聯(lián)合軍事演習(xí)，而這些軍演正是美國(guó)在亞太地區(qū)軍事存在的關(guān)鍵部分。

On China’s side of the equation, Mr Duterte is walking an even trickier path. If Manila is hoping for more Chinese trade and investment as a reward for tilting towards Beijing’s strategic position in the disputed South China Sea, this may pay off to some extent in the short term. There is ample evidence of China rewarding regional allies, such as Cambodia, that support it in political disputes.

就中國(guó)這一頭而言，杜特爾特走的是一條更難把握的道路。如果馬尼拉希望用在南中國(guó)海爭(zhēng)端中向北京的戰(zhàn)略立場(chǎng)傾斜，來換取中國(guó)更多的貿(mào)易和投資，短期內(nèi)或?qū)⒂幸欢ǖ男Ч?。大量證據(jù)顯示，中國(guó)會(huì)對(duì)在政治爭(zhēng)端中對(duì)支持自己的地區(qū)盟友(如柬埔寨)給予回報(bào)。

But Beijing sees the South China Sea as a binary issue; it regards the 41 disputed islands and land features as its own territory and it plans to take all of them back. Thus, emollient words are unlikely to satisfy China for long. Manila risks falling prey to a diplomatic dynamic in which China exacts the surrender of territorial claims as downpayments for investment and trade pledges. Such an outcome could quickly pall, eroding Mr Duterte’s popularity at home and the tough guy image he has burnished through a ruthless domestic crackdown on drugs.

但北京方面認(rèn)為南中國(guó)海是一個(gè)二元問題，它將41個(gè)爭(zhēng)議性島嶼及地物視作自己的領(lǐng)土，并計(jì)劃全部收回。因此安撫性的話不太可能長(zhǎng)久令中國(guó)滿意。馬尼拉有可能成為這一外交事態(tài)的犧牲品，即中國(guó)會(huì)要求其以放棄領(lǐng)土主張作為投資和貿(mào)易承諾的定金。這樣的結(jié)果可能會(huì)迅速失去吸引力，損害杜特爾特在國(guó)內(nèi)的人氣，以及他通過在國(guó)內(nèi)無情鎮(zhèn)壓毒品而提升的硬漢形象。

What is more, any territorial concessions by Mr Duterte that run counter to the ruling of an international tribunal this year would undermine the rule of law in the region and potentially embolden Beijing. The tribunal found that China lacked a “legal basis” to multiple claims in the South China Sea.

此外，杜特爾特作出的任何領(lǐng)土讓步如違反國(guó)際仲裁庭今年作出的裁決，都將破壞該地區(qū)的法治，并可能為北京壯膽。該仲裁庭認(rèn)為中國(guó)對(duì)南中國(guó)海的多項(xiàng)主張缺乏“法律依據(jù)”。

Mr Duterte is not the only one who needs to engage in careful reflection. Washington too should recognise that it is partly responsible for Manila’s flirtation with China. Mr Obama’s rebalancing towards Asia has been halfhearted, and the US has taken the loyalty of countries such as the Philippines for granted. It needs to show greater commitment to its regional friends.

杜特爾特不是唯一需要仔細(xì)思考的人。華盛頓方面也該認(rèn)識(shí)到它對(duì)馬尼拉與中國(guó)之間的互動(dòng)負(fù)有部分責(zé)任。奧巴馬的轉(zhuǎn)向亞洲戰(zhàn)略一直實(shí)施得不溫不火，美國(guó)也一直將菲律賓等國(guó)的忠誠視為理所當(dāng)然的事情。美國(guó)需要展現(xiàn)出維系與亞太地區(qū)盟友之間友情的更大決心。

For Mr Duterte, it is not too late to reverse course on his rash excursion into diplomatic adventurism. He should make it clear to the Americans that he has no intention of abandoning their alliance. Setting the US and China against one another over such an incendiary issue as the South China Sea is foolhardy. The Philippines leader should see this before it is too late.

對(duì)杜特爾特來說，現(xiàn)在從他草率涉足的外交冒險(xiǎn)主義這條路上掉頭還不算太晚。他應(yīng)該向美國(guó)人表明自己不打算放棄他們的聯(lián)盟。在南中國(guó)海這樣一個(gè)一點(diǎn)就著的問題上挑撥美中兩國(guó)互相對(duì)立是愚蠢的。菲律賓領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人應(yīng)及時(shí)看清這一點(diǎn)，以免追悔莫及。