與普京打交道的四點(diǎn)建議

Vladimir Putin’s regime describes itself by its grudges. The Russian president harbours a lengthy list of grievances and imagined slights, reaching from the collapse of the Soviet Union to the expansion of the EU and Nato, to US military interventions in the Middle East. The most personally wounding, though, comprised a few words uttered a couple of years ago by US President Barack Obama.

弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)政權(quán)在描述自我時(shí)帶著滿腔怨恨。這位俄羅斯總統(tǒng)懷揣著一份冗長(zhǎng)的清單，記錄著他的不滿和想象中受到的怠慢——從蘇聯(lián)(Soviet Union)解體到歐盟(EU)和北約(Nato)的擴(kuò)張、再到美國(guó)對(duì)中東的軍事干預(yù)。不過，最帶有個(gè)人色彩的傷害是幾年前美國(guó)總統(tǒng)巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)說過的一些話。

Mr Putin craves respect. Russia, Mr Obama said, was no more than a “regional power” whose revanchist military intervention in Ukraine was evidence of weakness rather than a demonstration of prowess. Russian actions were “a problem”, but not the biggest threat to America’s national security. You could hear the screams of anguish in the Kremlin.

普京渴望得到尊重。奧巴馬說，俄羅斯不過是一個(gè)“地區(qū)強(qiáng)國(guó)”，它在烏克蘭復(fù)仇式的軍事干預(yù)是軟弱、而非強(qiáng)大的表現(xiàn)。俄羅斯的舉動(dòng)帶來“麻煩”，但并不是美國(guó)國(guó)家安全面臨的最大威脅。你能聽到克里姆林宮撕心裂肺的怒吼。

The assessment was at once right and wrong. By almost every metric — economic, demographic, social or technological — Russia faces inexorable decline. The US president, though, underestimated Moscow’s willingness to use its still formidable military. Mr Putin is a leader ready to take risks at a time when the west prizes caution above all else. Mr Obama missed, too, the link between adventurism and hurt national pride. If Mr Putin wants anything on the global stage, it is to be treated as the leader of a power that can sit down as an equal with the US and China.

該評(píng)價(jià)既對(duì)也不對(duì)。幾乎在所有方面——經(jīng)濟(jì)、人口、社會(huì)或科技——俄羅斯都面臨著無可挽回的衰落。不過，奧巴馬低估了俄羅斯使用其仍然令人生畏的軍事力量的意愿。當(dāng)西方對(duì)謹(jǐn)慎的重視高于其他一切時(shí)，普京是那種隨時(shí)準(zhǔn)備冒險(xiǎn)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人。奧巴馬還忽視了冒險(xiǎn)主義和受傷害的民族自豪感之間的關(guān)聯(lián)。如果說普京想要在國(guó)際舞臺(tái)上獲得某種東西的話，那便是被當(dāng)作能與美國(guó)和中國(guó)平起平坐的強(qiáng)國(guó)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人對(duì)待。

Barring a political earthquake and a victory for Republican candidate Donald Trump, November’s US election will not change the essential parameters of the relationship between Russia and the west. The “reset” offered by Mr Obama at the beginning of his presidency has been lost to the annexation of Crimea, the occupation of eastern Ukraine and the raining down of Russian bombs on the Syrian city of Aleppo.

除非發(fā)生一場(chǎng)政治地震、共和黨總統(tǒng)候選人唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)獲勝，11月的美國(guó)大選不會(huì)改變俄羅斯和西方關(guān)系的基本參數(shù)。奧巴馬在上任初期提出的“重啟”美俄關(guān)系的策略，敗給了俄羅斯的一系列舉動(dòng)——吞并克里米亞、侵占烏克蘭東部地區(qū)以及對(duì)敘利亞阿勒頗市(Aleppo)狂轟濫炸。

True, the Russian president still has admirers in the west. They extend beyond Mr Trump. Jeremy Corbyn, the leader of Britain’s Labour party, has spent a political lifetime marching against wars fought by the west. He cannot bring himself to condemn the Russian slaughter of civilians in Aleppo. He is in the company of Marine Le Pen, the leader of France’s National Front, and pro-Moscow fascist parties in Hungary and Greece. Far left thus meets far right.

不錯(cuò)，西方仍然有普京的崇拜者。不光是特朗普。英國(guó)工黨領(lǐng)袖杰里米•科爾賓(Jeremy Corbyn)在整個(gè)政治生涯里都在反對(duì)西方進(jìn)行的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。他做不到指責(zé)俄羅斯對(duì)阿勒頗平民的屠殺。和他一樣的還有法國(guó)國(guó)民陣線(National Front)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人馬琳•勒龐(Marine Le Pen)，以及匈牙利和希臘親俄羅斯的法西斯主義政黨。極左翼和極右翼在這點(diǎn)上不謀而合。

It is evident to just about everyone else, however, that the interventions in Ukraine and Syria are expressions of a broader Kremlin strategy. Regime survival and hostility towards the west are two sides of the same coin. Support for populist parties of left and right in Europe, the subversion of democracy in formerly communist states and the cyber attacks on Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign are all of the same piece. Mr Putin’s target is the liberal international order. He wants a great power carve-up that restores Russian suzerainty over its near-abroad and flatters its relevance in global affairs.

然而，幾乎其他所有人都清楚，俄羅斯在烏克蘭和敘利亞的軍事干預(yù)是克里姆林宮一項(xiàng)更廣泛戰(zhàn)略的表現(xiàn)。維系政權(quán)和敵視西方是同一枚硬幣的兩面。支持歐洲或左或右的民粹主義政黨、顛覆前共產(chǎn)主義國(guó)家的民主制度、以及對(duì)希拉里•克林頓(Hillary Clinton)總統(tǒng)競(jìng)選團(tuán)隊(duì)發(fā)動(dòng)網(wǎng)絡(luò)攻擊，本質(zhì)都一樣。普京的目標(biāo)是自由國(guó)際秩序。他希望由大國(guó)來瓜分世界，恢復(fù)俄羅斯對(duì)周邊鄰國(guó)的宗主地位，并凸顯俄羅斯在國(guó)際事務(wù)中的重要性。

There is no off-the-peg response available to the west. Useful lessons can be drawn from the cold war — particularly about the importance of things such as predictable and calibrated responses — and diplomats and strategists need to relearn some of the old rules for managing great power relations. But, pace Mr Putin, Russia is not the Soviet Union. What the US and its allies can usefully do is establish principles to frame a reset grounded in realism. They should start with resolve, consistency, engagement and respect.

對(duì)于西方來說，目前沒有現(xiàn)成的應(yīng)對(duì)辦法。西方國(guó)家可以從冷戰(zhàn)中吸取有益教訓(xùn)——特別是有關(guān)可預(yù)測(cè)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化回應(yīng)策略的重要性。同時(shí)，外交官和策略家需要重新學(xué)習(xí)一些有關(guān)管理大國(guó)關(guān)系的老規(guī)矩。但是，尊敬的普京先生，俄羅斯不是蘇聯(lián)。美國(guó)及其盟友可以采取的有效辦法是，確立一些原則，擬定一項(xiàng)務(wù)實(shí)的重啟戰(zhàn)略。首先要從四點(diǎn)做起：決心、一致性、接觸和尊重。

Resolve is the most important. Mr Putin is an opportunist rather than a grand strategist, a leader looking to probe and test the weaknesses of adversaries. The west’s mistake has been to worry that deterrence could be seen as provocation. By failing to show resolve, it has heightened rather than defused tensions. The forward deployment of Nato forces in eastern Europe has gone some way to provide public reassurance. But Washington should be sending unequivocal messages about lines — in Syria and Europe — that cannot be crossed without consequences.

決心是最重要的一點(diǎn)。普京是機(jī)會(huì)主義者，而不是大戰(zhàn)略家，他伺機(jī)試探著敵人的弱點(diǎn)。西方的失誤是擔(dān)心威懾會(huì)被視為挑釁。由于沒能表現(xiàn)出決心，它激化、而非緩和了緊張關(guān)系。北約部隊(duì)在東歐的前沿部署，在某種程度上使公眾安心。但是華盛頓方面應(yīng)該發(fā)出明確的信息，明確其在敘利亞和歐洲的底線——俄羅斯一旦跨過這條線就要承擔(dān)后果。

The second ingredient is consistency. Mr Putin is adept at exploiting division and hesitation. European states, in particular, need to show that they can put differences to one side in treating with Moscow. Instead of rolling over economic sanctions every few months — each occasion providing an opportunity for Russia to sow dissent — the EU should change the dynamic by declaring them open-ended. They will be lifted only when the Kremlin changes its behaviour. Consistency also demands a series of graduated responses to hostile acts. Moscow should know that cyber attacks and subversion will elicit a response, whether travel restrictions on those closely associated with the regime or tighter economic sanctions.

第二點(diǎn)是一致性。普京擅長(zhǎng)利用分歧和猶豫。歐洲各國(guó)尤其需要表現(xiàn)出他們?cè)趯?duì)待莫斯科方面可以放下分歧。與目前每隔幾個(gè)月便重啟一輪經(jīng)濟(jì)制裁——每一次都給俄羅斯提供挑撥離間的機(jī)會(huì)——的做法相反，歐盟應(yīng)該宣布無限期制裁來改變這一現(xiàn)狀。只有當(dāng)克里姆林宮改變做法時(shí)，制裁才能解除。一致性也要求西方在面對(duì)敵對(duì)行動(dòng)時(shí)采取一系列遞進(jìn)的應(yīng)對(duì)辦法。莫斯科方面應(yīng)該明白，網(wǎng)絡(luò)攻擊和顛覆行為將招致西方回應(yīng)，無論是針對(duì)那些與政府有密切關(guān)系的人士的旅行限制還是不斷加強(qiáng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)制裁。

Engagement is a word often used by those whose real agenda is submission. Mr Corbyn comes to mind. But tough-minded management of the relationship should not preclude recognition of mutual interests. Where the two sides can co-operate usefully — say, in countering terrorism or nuclear proliferation — the west should take the initiative in promoting joint action.

那些真心想屈服的人士，經(jīng)常把接觸這個(gè)詞掛在嘴上。這讓人一下子就想到了科爾賓。但是，以堅(jiān)定的態(tài)度管理雙方關(guān)系，不應(yīng)妨礙對(duì)共同利益的承認(rèn)。在雙方可以有效合作的領(lǐng)域——比方說在打擊恐怖主義或阻止核擴(kuò)散方面——西方在推進(jìn)共同行動(dòng)方面應(yīng)該抓住主動(dòng)權(quán)。

Finally, there is that word respect. To say that Russia is weak in most of the dimensions of power is to state the obvious. That does not mean it is wise for a US president publicly to confront a thin-skinned Russian president with the uncomfortable reality. Dissembling has a place in diplomacy. The sadness is that, if Mr Putin continues to pretend Russia is a great power, it will eventually cease to be a great nation.

最后，還要尊重對(duì)方。沒錯(cuò)，在判斷實(shí)力的大多數(shù)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)上，俄羅斯都很薄弱。這并不意味著美國(guó)總統(tǒng)以令人不悅的事實(shí)公開叫板臉皮薄的俄羅斯總統(tǒng)是明智的行為。看破而不說破是可取的外交策略。可悲的是，如果普京繼續(xù)假裝俄羅斯是世界強(qiáng)國(guó)，那么它是怎么也不會(huì)成為強(qiáng)國(guó)的。