兩個(gè)不同的阿拉伯世界

For the past six years, there have been two Arab worlds. The world of violence and tragedy; and the world of glitz and globalisation. Syria, Iraq, Libya and, to a lesser extent, Egypt — have been engulfed by conflict. But Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Dubai have prospered as global hubs for travel, leisure, business and finance. The booming Gulf metropolises seemed untouched by the violence in the rest of the Middle East. They even profited indirectly, as safe havens in a region in turmoil.

過(guò)去6年里，一直存在著兩個(gè)阿拉伯世界：暴力與悲劇的阿拉伯世界;以及浮華與全球化的阿拉伯世界。敘利亞、伊拉克、利比亞都陷入了沖突，埃及也是如此，不過(guò)程度較輕。但是，卡塔爾、阿布扎比和迪拜一直蓬勃發(fā)展，成為了全球旅游、休閑、商業(yè)與金融中心。這些蒸蒸日上的海灣大都會(huì)似乎沒(méi)有受到中東其他地區(qū)暴力活動(dòng)的影響。它們甚至間接獲益了——充當(dāng)了一個(gè)混亂地區(qū)中的安全港。

But the wall between the two Arab worlds is breaking down. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (which includes Abu Dhabi and Dubai) have imposed a blockade on Qatar — claiming that the Qataris have been supporting jihadi movements across the region, and particularly in Syria and Libya. As a result, the illusion that the wealthy Gulf could remain uncontaminated by the wider conflicts in the Middle East has been shattered.

但是，分隔兩個(gè)阿拉伯世界的高墻正在坍塌。沙特阿拉伯、巴林、埃及和阿聯(lián)酋(包括阿布扎比和迪拜)對(duì)卡塔爾實(shí)施了封鎖——聲稱卡塔爾人一直在支持全地區(qū)、尤其是敘利亞和利比亞的圣戰(zhàn)運(yùn)動(dòng)。結(jié)果是，如下幻覺(jué)被擊碎了：富裕的海灣地區(qū)可以繼續(xù)不受中東更廣泛沖突的影響。

The obvious question is whether the dazzling rise of the Gulf states could be followed by an equally dazzling fall. If that were to happen, the implications would be global.

顯而易見(jiàn)的問(wèn)題是，這些海灣國(guó)家在耀眼的崛起之后，是否可能迎來(lái)同樣耀眼的墜落?如果發(fā)生這種情形，其后果可能是全球性的。

One of the reasons that the world has been able to look on with chilling indifference as Syria and Libya disintegrate is that neither country plays a major role in the world economy. But that is not true of the Gulf states. A security crisis there would be felt in boardrooms and finance ministries all over the world.

當(dāng)敘利亞和利比亞陷入分裂時(shí)，世界一直能以令人心寒的冷漠旁觀，原因之一在于，這兩個(gè)國(guó)家在世界經(jīng)濟(jì)中都不扮演重要角色。但是，海灣國(guó)家并非如此。海灣國(guó)家一旦發(fā)生安全危機(jī)，全世界的董事會(huì)議室和財(cái)政部都將感受到其影響。

Although they are tiny places — Qatar and the UAE have populations of 2.2m and 9.1m respectively — the Gulf states play an outsize role in the global economy. Qatar is the world’s largest exporter of liquefied natural gas. The Qatar Investment Authority holds large stakes in important western companies such as Volkswagen and Barclays — and has also invested its petrobillions in trophy assets around the world, including the Shard, London’s tallest building, and Harrods department store. The Qataris are also due to host the football World Cup in 2022.

盡管海灣國(guó)家都是彈丸之地——卡塔爾和阿聯(lián)酋的人口分別為220萬(wàn)和910萬(wàn)——但它們?cè)谌蚪?jīng)濟(jì)中扮演著極其重要的角色。卡塔爾是世界上最大的液化天然氣(LNG)出口國(guó)?？ㄋ柾顿Y局(Qatar Investment Authority)持有大眾(Volkswagen)和巴克萊(Barclays)等重要西方公司的大量股權(quán)，也把數(shù)十億的石油美元投向全球一些值得炫耀的資產(chǎn)，比如倫敦最高建筑“碎片大廈”(Shard)，以及哈羅得百貨(Harrods)?？ㄋ栠€將主辦2022年世界杯(World Cup)足球賽。

Dubai, meanwhile, has cleverly leveraged its proximity to Europe, South Asia, Africa and Russia to turn itself into the playground of the Middle East. The world’s tallest building, the Burj Khalifa, stands in downtown Dubai and Emirates airline is one of the largest in the world. The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority controls assets of more than $800bn, which makes it the second-largest sovereign wealth fund in the world — and one of the world’s largest property owners.

另一方面，迪拜聰明地利用了其臨近歐洲、南亞、非洲和俄羅斯的優(yōu)勢(shì)，把自己打造成了中東的游樂(lè)場(chǎng)。世界最高建筑哈利法塔(Burj Khalifa)坐落于迪拜市中心，阿聯(lián)酋航空(Emirates Airline)是全球最大航空公司之一。阿布扎比投資局(Abu Dhabi Investment Authority)管理著逾8000億美元的資產(chǎn)，是全球第二大主權(quán)財(cái)富基金，以及全球最大的房產(chǎn)持有者之一。

And then there is Saudi Arabia — the biggest and most powerful country in the region — whose status as the world’s largest oil producer has long underlined its significance to the global economy.

接著是中東地區(qū)最大、最有實(shí)力的沙特阿拉伯，長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)，沙特全球最大產(chǎn)油國(guó)的地位凸顯了它對(duì)于全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的重要性。

It is hard to believe that the Gulf elites would risk their pleasantly privileged lives by plunging into conflict. But even before the Qatari crisis, tension has been rising in the region.

海灣精英階層過(guò)著令人羨慕的特權(quán)生活，很難相信他們會(huì)愿意冒著失去這種生活的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，投身于沖突中。但是，即便在卡塔爾危機(jī)爆發(fā)之前，中東地區(qū)的緊張局勢(shì)也一直在升級(jí)。

The Saudi and Emirati complaint that the Qataris have been funding jihadis across the region has been echoed by western officials. But the argument that this dispute is solely about terrorism is undermined by the fact that the Saudis themselves have been notorious for exporting and promoting the Salafi ideology that underpins jihadi movements.

沙特阿拉伯和阿聯(lián)酋抱怨卡塔爾人一直在資助中東圣戰(zhàn)分子，西方官員也這樣說(shuō)。但是，這場(chǎng)爭(zhēng)端僅僅關(guān)乎恐怖主義的主張，被如下事實(shí)削弱了：沙特人自己因?yàn)檩敵龊屯茝V薩拉菲(Salafi)意識(shí)形態(tài)而臭名昭著，該意識(shí)形態(tài)正是圣戰(zhàn)運(yùn)動(dòng)的支柱。

The reality is that the Saudis have long resented Qatar’s successful efforts to strut the international stage as an independent actor — something symbolised by the country’s sponsorship of Al Jazeera, which has provided a platform for the Muslim Brotherhood, a group detested by the Saudis. Saudi Arabia also believes Qatar has got far too close to Iran.

事實(shí)上，對(duì)卡塔爾成功地以獨(dú)立力量的姿態(tài)趾高氣昂地行走在國(guó)際舞臺(tái)上，沙特人長(zhǎng)期感到不滿。卡塔爾這一姿態(tài)的標(biāo)志是，它贊助半島電視臺(tái)(Al Jazeera)。半島電視臺(tái)為沙特人憎恨的團(tuán)體穆斯林兄弟會(huì)(Muslim Brotherhood)提供了一個(gè)平臺(tái)。

This fear of rising Iranian influence across the region has already led the Saudis and the Emiratis to go to war in neighbouring Yemen — with grim consequences for the civilian population. One ironic consequence of the blockade of Qatar is that it could force the country to get closer to Iran.

對(duì)伊朗在中東不斷擴(kuò)大的影響力的擔(dān)憂，已導(dǎo)致沙特和阿聯(lián)酋對(duì)鄰國(guó)也門開(kāi)戰(zhàn)，戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)讓平民遭殃。封鎖卡塔爾的一個(gè)具有諷刺意味的后果是，這可能迫使該國(guó)向伊朗靠得更近。

Under normal circumstances, the US would do its utmost to smooth over a dangerous dispute between its Gulf allies. But these are far from normal times in Washington. Donald Trump has taken the Saudi side in the dispute — indeed the US president may well have given the green light to the Saudi-led blockade, during his visit to the kingdom last month.

在正常情況下，美國(guó)將盡最大努力平息各海灣盟國(guó)之間的危險(xiǎn)爭(zhēng)端。但現(xiàn)在華盛頓遠(yuǎn)非處于正常時(shí)期。唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)在這場(chǎng)爭(zhēng)端中站到了沙特那邊，實(shí)際上在上月訪問(wèn)沙特時(shí)，這位美國(guó)總統(tǒng)很可能對(duì)這場(chǎng)沙特主導(dǎo)的封鎖點(diǎn)了頭。

By contrast, the State Department and the Pentagon are clearly trying to play a more neutral role, not least because Qatar is host to the largest American air base in the Middle East.

相比之下，美國(guó)國(guó)務(wù)院和五角大樓明顯正努力采取更中立的立場(chǎng)，重要原因在于美國(guó)在卡塔爾設(shè)有其中東地區(qū)最大的空軍基地。

Qatar has reason to be thankful for the large US military presence in the country. Were it not for that, the Qataris would be much more vulnerable to a Saudi-led military intervention. Even so, it is unclear whether the Saudis and Emiratis have a plausible endgame in mind, short of total capitulation by Qatar. If that is not achieved in short order, the risks of a military conflict will remain and the economic damage from the blockade will grow and contaminate the region.

卡塔爾有理由感激美國(guó)在本國(guó)的大規(guī)模軍事存在。如果不是因?yàn)檫@一點(diǎn)，卡塔爾人在面對(duì)一場(chǎng)沙特領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的軍事干預(yù)時(shí)將更為脆弱。即便如此，除了卡塔爾完全投降之外，沙特人和阿聯(lián)酋人心里是否還設(shè)想了別的什么可能實(shí)現(xiàn)的結(jié)局，我們不得而知。如果卡塔爾沒(méi)有在短期內(nèi)完全投降，那么軍事沖突的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)將持續(xù)存在，封鎖造成的經(jīng)濟(jì)損失將越來(lái)越大，并影響整個(gè)中東地區(qū)。

For residents and tourists in the Gulf, the wars in the Middle East have been taking place in flyover country — places that they can glance down at from thousands of feet, as they take their Emirates or Etihad flights to Europe or the US. But the Qatar crisis suggests that the days when the tragedies of the Middle East could be kept at a safe distance from the booming Gulf may be over.

對(duì)于海灣地區(qū)的居民和游客而言，中東戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)一直在他們飛行時(shí)經(jīng)過(guò)的國(guó)家里上演——在乘坐阿聯(lián)酋航空或阿提哈德航空(Etihad)航班前往歐洲或美國(guó)途中，他們可以從數(shù)千英尺的高空俯視這些地方。但卡塔爾危機(jī)暗示，那個(gè)蒸蒸日上的海灣地區(qū)能夠跟中東悲劇保持安全距離的日子，也許已一去不復(fù)返。