普京：加大對朝制裁沒有意義
俄羅斯總統(tǒng)弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)抨擊了美國和韓國加強(qiáng)對朝鮮制裁的嘗試，并補(bǔ)充道，平壤寧可“吃草”，也不會就這么放棄核武計劃。
Speaking after the US asked the UN to impose stronger sanctions against a North Korea that Washington says is “begging for war”, Mr Putin argued that “military hysteria” could lead to global catastrophe.
普京的講話是在美國要求聯(lián)合國(UN)對華盛頓所稱的“乞求戰(zhàn)爭”的朝鮮實施更嚴(yán)厲制裁之后發(fā)表的。普京表示，“軍事歇斯底里”可能導(dǎo)致全球災(zāi)難。
The Russian president’s call for an increased focus on diplomacy not only reduces the prospect of punitive UN sanctions in response to Pyongyang’s biggest nuclear test to date but could also be intended to drive a wedge between Washington and South Korea. Seoul has said it would begin lobbying the UN to staunch North Korea’s oil supply but is more alarmed about the risk of military action than is Donald Trump’s administration.
俄羅斯總統(tǒng)呼吁要更加重視外交，這不僅降低了聯(lián)合國針對平壤迄今最大當(dāng)量的核試驗出臺懲罰性制裁的可能性，還有可能是有意制造美國和韓國之間的分歧。首爾方面已表示，將開始游說聯(lián)合國切斷朝鮮的石油供應(yīng)，但韓國政府比唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)政府更擔(dān)心軍事行動的風(fēng)險。
“The sanctions regime has run its course, it is ineffective,” Mr Putin said at a press conference at a Brics summit in Xiamen, China.
“制裁制度已經(jīng)走到了頭，它是無效的，”普京在中國廈門金磚國家峰會的一個新聞發(fā)布會上說。
“They will rather eat grass in North Korea than abandon this programme unless they feel safe . . . And what can ensure safety? The application of international law.”
“朝鮮人寧可吃草也不會放棄這個計劃，除非他們感到安全……而什么能確保安全呢?應(yīng)用國際法。”
The Russian president argues North Korea’s leadership is acting rationally in continuing to pursue its weapons programme, since Iraq and Libya — both regimes that gave up their nuclear ambitions — were ultimately toppled by the US and its allies.
普京辯稱，朝鮮領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層推進(jìn)其武器計劃是一種理性的行為，因為伊拉克和利比亞這兩個放棄核武野心的政權(quán)最終都被美國及其盟友推翻。
“Everyone remembers well what happened with Iraq and with Saddam Hussein. Hussein gave up the production of weapons of mass destruction . . . And they also know and remember that well in North Korea,” Mr Putin said. “And you think that North Korea will abandon [its course] because of some sanctions?”
“大家都清楚地記得伊拉克和薩達(dá)姆•侯賽因(Saddam Hussein)的下場。侯賽因放棄了生產(chǎn)大規(guī)模殺傷性武器……朝鮮人也知道這一點(diǎn)，并且記得清清楚楚，”普京說，“你認(rèn)為朝鮮會因為一些制裁而放棄(它的道路)嗎?”
Moscow has been trying to balance criticism of Pyongyang with criticism of the US and South Korea, and believes that only tacit acknowledgment of North Korea as a de facto nuclear power can bring the crisis under control.
莫斯科一直在批評平壤與批評美國和韓國之間試圖達(dá)到平衡，并且認(rèn)為只有默認(rèn)朝鮮的事實核武國家地位，才能讓這場危機(jī)得到控制。
Russia’s scepticism about sanctions is shared by China, North Korea’s fellow Communist neighbour and largest trading partner by far, which fears the collapse of the Pyongyang regime and the humanitarian and geopolitical chaos that could ensue.
中國也和俄羅斯一樣，對制裁抱懷疑態(tài)度。作為朝鮮的共產(chǎn)黨鄰國和遙遙領(lǐng)先的最大貿(mào)易伙伴，中國懼怕平壤政權(quán)崩潰以及可能隨之而來的人道主義和地緣政治亂局。
But South Korea, whose spy agency believes a further North Korean long-range missile test is imminent, is, like the US, seeking to step up UN measures against Pyongyang.
但韓國情報機(jī)構(gòu)認(rèn)為，朝鮮很快就會進(jìn)行又一次遠(yuǎn)程導(dǎo)彈試射，韓國和美國一樣，希望聯(lián)合國加大對平壤制裁力度。
“It’s time for the United Nations Security Council to seriously consider ways to block North Korea’s sources of foreign currency, including a halt to oil supplies to the North and a ban on its exportation of labourers,” Moon Jae-in, South Korea’s president, was quoted by his office as saying.
“聯(lián)合國安理會(UN Security Council)是時候認(rèn)真考慮切斷北韓外匯來源的辦法了，包括停止向北韓供應(yīng)石油和禁止北韓輸出勞務(wù)，”韓國總統(tǒng)辦公室援引總統(tǒng)文在寅(Moon Jae-in)的話稱。
Last month, the Security Council unanimously imposed tough new sanctions on the Kim regime, banning its export of coal, iron and lead in a move that could slash Pyongyang’s $3bn export revenue.
上月，聯(lián)合國安理會一致通過對金正恩(Kim Jong Un)政權(quán)實施新一輪嚴(yán)厲制裁，禁止該國出口煤炭、鐵和鉛，此舉可能大幅減少朝鮮每年30億美元的出口收入。
“Trade is the single most important source of foreign currency for the North Korean regime,” said Professor Byung-Yeon Kim, an authority on the North Korean economy at Seoul National University.
“貿(mào)易是北韓政權(quán)獲得外匯的一條最重要的渠道，”首爾大學(xué)(Seoul National University)的朝鮮經(jīng)濟(jì)問題權(quán)威金炳連(Kim Byung-yeon)教授說。
“Given a high profit margin of mineral exports, the new sanctions might decrease North Korea’s hard currency revenue by more than one-third. This would be a substantial hindrance to the regime’s nuclear and missile weapons programme.”
“鑒于礦物出口的利潤率很高，新制裁也許會使北韓的硬通貨收入減少逾三分之一。這將對北韓政權(quán)發(fā)展核武及導(dǎo)彈武器計劃構(gòu)成重大障礙。”
Prof Kim noted, however, that for sanctions to be effective China “must be on board”.
但金炳連教授指出，若想讓制裁產(chǎn)生效果，中國“必須加入進(jìn)來”。
Tong Zhao, an expert on Korean affairs at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Centre for Global Policy in Beijing, said “there is no reason why China would not take additional actions” given the “serious provocation by North Korea”.
北京清華-卡內(nèi)基全球政策中心(Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy)的朝鮮問題專家趙通表示，鑒于“朝鮮的嚴(yán)重挑釁行為”，“中國沒有理由不采取進(jìn)一步行動”。
“But in terms of what specifically China would do, there are less radical measures than an oil embargo,” he said. “For example, a cutback on North Korean labourers allowed into China, or cuts on North Korean exports would be more likely.”
“但在中國具體會采取何種措施方面，存在與石油禁運(yùn)相比不那么激進(jìn)的舉措，”他說，“比如，削減允許進(jìn)入中國的朝鮮勞務(wù)輸出人員人數(shù)，或者削減朝鮮出口，這樣的措施更有可能。”
