人民幣還會(huì)繼續(xù)升值？

The renminbi used to shake the world. The biggest global markets scare of the past six years came after China allowed the Rmb to devalue very sharply in August 2015. After that, China’s currency became a big issue in the US election, even if the administration has not prioritised it in office so far. The latest development is different. It has risen very fast. And this time, beyond the world of those most directly involved in the Chinese foreign exchange markets, it has barely attracted comment.

人民幣曾撼動(dòng)世界。在2015年8月中國(guó)允許人民幣急劇貶值之后，過去6年來最大規(guī)模的一場(chǎng)全球市場(chǎng)恐慌來臨。此后，人民幣成為美國(guó)選舉中的重大問題，即便這屆美國(guó)政府上臺(tái)后還一直沒有把它列為優(yōu)先政務(wù)。最新動(dòng)向則有所不同。人民幣近來快速升值。但這次基本上沒引起什么評(píng)論，最直接涉及中國(guó)外匯市場(chǎng)者除外。

There are various reasons for this. The first is a result of the furore of two years ago. There is a strong tendency to view Chinese authorities as all-powerful villains from James Bond movies, calmly directing everything according to a central plan, as they plot world domination. Every contradictory move would be minutely analysed to work out how it fitted in the grand plan. After the dreadfully ham-fisted response in August 2015, outside analysts have begun to grasp that Chinese officials, like their counterparts elsewhere, are often just making things up as they go along, and reacting to events.

原因有很多。首先，這是兩年前那場(chǎng)群情激奮的結(jié)果。人們很容易將中國(guó)當(dāng)局視為《007》(James Bond)系列影片中的強(qiáng)大惡棍，他們從容不迫地按照中央計(jì)劃指導(dǎo)一切，并密謀主宰世界。每個(gè)自相矛盾的舉措都將被仔細(xì)分析，以找出它如何服務(wù)于整體計(jì)劃。在2015年8月中國(guó)極為拙劣的回應(yīng)之后，外部分析師開始明白，中國(guó)官員與其他國(guó)家的官員一樣，往往只是走一步算一步，見招拆招、隨機(jī)應(yīng)變。

A second reason is that the Chinese response this time is transparently driven by the recent weakness of the dollar. Strengthening the Rmb against the dollar keeps it more stable against other currencies. The following chart compares the exchange rates with the dollar and the euro. China’s currency has weakened against the euro, until the past few weeks.

第二個(gè)原因是，中國(guó)這次的回應(yīng)顯然是最近美元疲弱推動(dòng)的。人民幣兌美元匯率升值讓它兌其他貨幣的匯率更加穩(wěn)定。下圖比較了人民幣兌美元和兌歐元的匯率。人民幣對(duì)歐元直至過去幾周一直是貶值的。

Viewed in terms of its real effective exchange rate (as calculated by Barclays), China’s currency is roughly back where it started the year, and still significantly lower than it was before the messy devaluation of August 2015:

從實(shí)際有效匯率來看(如巴克萊(Barclays)所計(jì)算)，人民幣基本回到了今年年初的水平，但仍遠(yuǎn)低于2015年8月那次無序貶值前的水平。

Then came the latest thrilling development. At the end of last week, the authorities announced that they were relaxing restrictions on selling short the currency. As Lex puts it, this appeared to be an invitation to press the currency down, even against the dollar. How should we interpret this? It is probably best to think in terms of officials reacting to events and making things up as they go along. But there may be more to it than that. NatWest Markets’ Mansoor Mohi-uddin said:

隨后就出現(xiàn)了最近的激動(dòng)人心的動(dòng)向。一周前，中國(guó)有關(guān)部門宣布，他們將放松對(duì)賣空人民幣的限制。正如英國(guó)《金融時(shí)報(bào)》的Lex專欄所言，這似乎是邀請(qǐng)人們壓低人民幣匯率，甚至是壓低人民幣兌美元匯率。對(duì)此我們應(yīng)該如何解讀?也許最好把這看成官員們?cè)谝娬胁鹫?、隨機(jī)應(yīng)變。但實(shí)際情況也可能并非如此簡(jiǎn)單。以下為NatWest Markets的曼蘇爾•毛希丁(Mansoor Mohi-Uddin)所述：

This week we visited clients and officials in Beijing and Shanghai. Dollar-yuan has continued to fall through 6.50 to breach 6.45 on Friday. But news late yesterday the People’s Bank of China was removing its 20% reserve requirement on FX forward trading — imposed in 2015 to support the yuan — helped the pair end the week higher back near 6.50.

我們近來拜訪了北京和上海的客戶和官員。9月8日，美元兌人民幣匯率跌至6.50后繼續(xù)下探，擊穿6.45。但中國(guó)人民銀行(PBoC)將取消遠(yuǎn)期賣匯業(yè)務(wù)20%外匯風(fēng)險(xiǎn)準(zhǔn)備金要求的消息，幫助人民幣兌美元匯率重回6.50附近——中國(guó)人民銀行從2015年開始對(duì)遠(yuǎn)期賣匯業(yè)務(wù)征收20%的外匯風(fēng)險(xiǎn)準(zhǔn)備金、以支撐人民幣匯率。

We recommend staying short dollar-yuan. But we would not add to positions at current levels given the risks of further action by policymakers.

我們建議繼續(xù)做空美元兌人民幣匯率。但我們不會(huì)增加現(xiàn)有頭寸水平，因?yàn)檎咧贫ㄕ呖赡苓€會(huì)出臺(tái)進(jìn)一步舉措。

First, domestic corporates still have greenbacks to sell. Local companies have been caught out this year by accumulating foreign exchange at the start of 2017 and then being forced to sell after the authorities engineered a stronger yuan from 6.90 against the dollar in May to encourage foreign participation in China’s and Hong Kong’s new Bond Connect. Local banks we met were divided on how much more dollars domestic corporates needed to sell. But some banks thought Chinese companies were only half way through cutting greenback longs.

首先，中國(guó)企業(yè)還會(huì)繼續(xù)拋售美元。中國(guó)企業(yè)在2017年年初積累外匯，隨后被迫拋售，因?yàn)榻衲?月政府讓人民幣兌美元匯率從6.90的水平一路升值，以鼓勵(lì)外資參與中國(guó)內(nèi)地和香港新推出的“債券通”項(xiàng)目。我們拜訪的中國(guó)銀行對(duì)中國(guó)企業(yè)還需要拋售多少美元意見不一。但一些銀行認(rèn)為，中國(guó)企業(yè)削減美元儲(chǔ)備的過程才進(jìn)行到一半。

Second, the People’s Bank of China’s options for supporting dollar-yuan in the near term appear constrained by the upcoming Chinese Communist Party’s Congress starting on October 18. Ahead of the event, clients in Beijing and Shanghai felt the monetary authorities could not publicly call for the yuan’s surge to ease. If senior officials at the central bank were to verbally intervene and foreign countries responded adversely, the exchange rate would become a very inconvenient issue at a key time for China’s political leadership.

其次，中國(guó)人民銀行近期支撐美元兌人民幣匯率的可選手段，似乎受到10月18日召開的中共“十九大”的限制。在“十九大”前，北京和上海的客戶感到貨幣當(dāng)局不能公開呼吁人民幣放緩升值。如果中國(guó)人民銀行的高級(jí)官員發(fā)聲干預(yù)，而外國(guó)做出負(fù)面的回應(yīng)，匯率就會(huì)在中國(guó)政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層換屆這個(gè)節(jié)骨眼上成為極其棘手的問題。

Third, increased carry costs this year are also forcing onshore dollar longs to cut their positions. The short-term 1Y China government bond — US Treasury yield differential currently stands at 227bps compared with 140bps at the end of 2016.

第三，今年持有成本增加也迫使在岸美元多頭削減頭寸。中美的1年期政府債券收益率差目前是227個(gè)基點(diǎn)，而2016年年底是140個(gè)基點(diǎn)。

Fourth, alternative indicators signal continuing yuan strength. In the CSI 300 equity index, cyclical real estate developers have been underperforming defensive healthcare providers this year as China’s important property sector cools. This suggests Chinese demand for iron ore may ease in future to the benefit of the yuan.

第四，其他指標(biāo)表明人民幣將會(huì)繼續(xù)升值。從滬深300(CSI 300)股指來看，隨著中國(guó)至關(guān)重要的房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)降溫，今年周期性的房地產(chǎn)板塊的表現(xiàn)一直不如防御性的醫(yī)療板塊。這表明中國(guó)對(duì)鐵礦石的需求可能在未來下降，這有利于人民幣升值。

Last, offshore demand has begun to rise. The total amount of yuan (CNH) deposits in Hong Kong, Seoul, Singapore and Taipei have picked up since March. This marks a reversal of the trend seen after the yuan’s devaluation in August 2015 when CNH deposits across Asia fell almost every month from CNY1.65trn to CNY950bn in Q1’17.

最后，離岸需求開始升溫。香港、首爾、新加坡和臺(tái)北的離岸人民幣(CNH)存款額自今年3月以來增長(zhǎng)。這標(biāo)志著自2015年8月那次人民幣貶值以來的趨勢(shì)開始逆轉(zhuǎn)——當(dāng)時(shí)整個(gè)亞洲的離岸人民幣存款幾乎每月都在下降，從1.65萬億元人民幣下降至2017年一季度的9500億元人民幣。

Perhaps another way of summing this up is: Chinese authorities are making this up as they go along, and so should investors.

上面這段話或許可以總結(jié)為：因?yàn)橹袊?guó)當(dāng)局正在見機(jī)行事，所以投資者也應(yīng)如此。