普京為何回避十月革命百年慶典？

On November 7, the Communist party of the Russian Federation will celebrate the centenary of the 1917 revolution with a festive march and a gala reception. But President Vladimir Putin will be absent from the procession, and the evening event will take place at the Renaissance Moscow Monarch Centre, a nondescript conference hotel far from the Kremlin.

11月7日，俄羅斯聯(lián)邦的共產(chǎn)黨將慶祝1917年革命100周年，舉行一場(chǎng)節(jié)日游行和一場(chǎng)歡慶招待會(huì)。但俄羅斯總統(tǒng)弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)將缺席游行活動(dòng)，而晚間活動(dòng)將在距離克里姆林宮很遠(yuǎn)的一家毫無(wú)特色的會(huì)議酒店——莫斯科蒙那多中心萬(wàn)麗酒店(Renaissance Moscow Monarch Centre)舉行。

For Mr Putin, removing himself so far from a momentous historical anniversary is out of character — under his presidency, history has become an ever more important ideological tool for strengthening national unity and rallying public support.

對(duì)普京而言，讓自己距離一次重大的歷史性周年紀(jì)念活動(dòng)這么遠(yuǎn)，不符合他的個(gè)性。在他擔(dān)任總統(tǒng)期間，歷史已成為一件越來(lái)越重要的意識(shí)形態(tài)工具，被用來(lái)加強(qiáng)民族團(tuán)結(jié)和動(dòng)員公眾支持。

Over the past decade, “Russia has taken to a cult of the past,” says Gennady Bordyugov, a historian and senior official at the Association of Researchers of Russian Society, which monitors public sentiment about the revolution.

過(guò)去10年來(lái)，“俄羅斯變得很崇拜歷史，”歷史學(xué)家、俄羅斯社會(huì)研究人員協(xié)會(huì)(Association of Researchers of Russian Society)高官根納季•布爾久戈夫(Gennady Bordyugov)說(shuō)。該協(xié)會(huì)監(jiān)測(cè)公眾對(duì)1917年革命的情緒。

Indeed, Mr Putin has marked the victory over Nazi Germany with ever more pomp including massive military parades on Red Square, speeches emphasising the role of the Soviet Union over western powers in defeating Hitler and invoking pride in the people’s strength and sacrifices in the second world war.

的確，普京以越來(lái)越大的排場(chǎng)紀(jì)念擊敗納粹德國(guó)的勝利，包括在紅場(chǎng)(Red Square)舉行規(guī)模浩大的閱兵式，發(fā)表強(qiáng)調(diào)蘇聯(lián)在擊敗希特勒過(guò)程中的作用大于西方大國(guó)、號(hào)召俄羅斯人對(duì)前輩們?cè)诙?zhàn)期間的力量與犧牲感到自豪的演講。

On the president’s instructions, a broad range of history textbooks with widely diverging interpretations of events such as the revolution were replaced with just a few, based on a standardised interpretation.

在這位總統(tǒng)的授意下，對(duì)1917年革命等事件的解讀各不相同的眾多版本歷史教材，被換成了基于一種標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化解讀的少數(shù)幾個(gè)版本。

Last year, Mr Putin argued that Russia’s recent economic weakness — partly triggered by western sanctions over the annexation of Crimea — was insignificant in the grand sweep òf history.

去年，普京辯稱，俄羅斯近期的經(jīng)濟(jì)疲軟——在一定程度上是由吞并克里米亞之后西方出臺(tái)的制裁措施引發(fā)的——在歷史長(zhǎng)河中是無(wú)足輕重的。

“The country may lag behind in some respects, but it has a thousand-year history, and Russia will not trade its sovereignty for anything,” he said. “這個(gè)國(guó)家也許在某些方面落在后面，但俄羅斯有1000年的歷史，絕不會(huì)為了任何東西而出賣主權(quán)，”他說(shuō)。

Andrei Kolesnikov, a political analyst at the Moscow Carnegie Centre, says the Kremlin’s heavy use of history has been convenient in legitimising Mr Putin’s regime. “The elites and pro-Putin majority identify with that and identify with the help of the past ‘who we are and where we come from’.”

莫斯科卡內(nèi)基中心(Moscow Carnegie Center)政治分析師安德烈•科列斯尼科夫(Andrei Kolesnikov)表示，克里姆林宮大量利用歷史為普京政權(quán)提供合法性。“精英和支持普京的大多數(shù)民眾認(rèn)同這種做法，認(rèn)同‘我們是誰(shuí)，我們從哪里來(lái)’的歷史所提供的幫助。”

Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has been seeking answers to those questions. For many other former Soviet republics, many of them dominated by ethnic groups other than Russians, gaining independence in itself was a strong basis for national identity. But in the minds of many citizens of the Russian Federation, the day their country became independent they lost more than they gained — an empire, global power status, a state in which for decades they had been taught to take pride.

自1991年蘇聯(lián)解體以來(lái)，俄羅斯一直在尋找這些問(wèn)題的答案。對(duì)于其他許多前蘇聯(lián)加盟共和國(guó)而言，其多數(shù)人口并非俄羅斯人，獲得獨(dú)立本身就是民族認(rèn)同的強(qiáng)大基礎(chǔ)。但在俄羅斯聯(lián)邦的很多公民看來(lái)，他們?cè)趪?guó)家獨(dú)立的那一天所得到的小于所失去的——一個(gè)帝國(guó)、全球強(qiáng)國(guó)地位、他們受了幾十年灌輸要為之驕傲的一個(gè)國(guó)家。

“That’s why history politics has become so important: What’s needed is clear heroes that inspire people, narratives that can help with reconciliation in society,” says Mr Kolesnikov. “The 1917 revolution is useless for that because the frontlines that played a role then are irrelevant today.”

“這就是歷史政治變得如此重要的原因：我們需要的是鼓舞人民的完全正面形象的英雄，以及有助于社會(huì)和解的敘述，”科列斯尼科夫說(shuō)，“就此而言，1917年革命毫無(wú)用處，因?yàn)楫?dāng)時(shí)曾扮演角色的前線如今是無(wú)關(guān)的。”

Mr Putin himself has made his ambivalent attitude to the October Revolution very clear.

普京本人很清楚地表達(dá)了他對(duì)十月革命的矛盾態(tài)度。

“We see how ambiguous its results were, how closely the negative and positive consequences of those events are intertwined,” he said last week. On the one hand, he argued that gradual, evolutionary development would have served Russia much better than the upheaval of 1917 with its “ruin of statehood and the ruthless destruction of millions of human lives”.

“我們看到那場(chǎng)革命的結(jié)果是多么模糊，那些事件的消極后果和積極后果是多么緊密地交織在一起，”他在上周表示。一方面，他辯稱，相比1917年那場(chǎng)“毀掉了國(guó)家，無(wú)情地奪走數(shù)百萬(wàn)人生命”的劇變，漸進(jìn)式、進(jìn)化式的發(fā)展本來(lái)對(duì)俄羅斯會(huì)好得多。

Mr Putin’s abhorrence of the turmoil of 1917 reflects a broader anxiety over revolutionary ferment that has shaped his outlook. He prides himself in having returned Russia to stability after the turbulent 1990s. For more than a decade, he has railed against the overthrow of regimes whether in Ukraine, Egypt or Syria, readily seeing them as western plots that might one day extend to Russia itself.

普京對(duì)1917年混亂的憎惡，反映了他在整體上對(duì)革命狂熱感到的焦慮，這種情緒塑造了他的世界觀。他為自己讓俄羅斯在經(jīng)歷動(dòng)蕩不安的1990年代之后恢復(fù)穩(wěn)定感到自豪。10多年以來(lái)，他譴責(zé)推翻政權(quán)的事件或企圖，無(wú)論是在烏克蘭、埃及還是敘利亞，往往把它們看做西方的陰謀，有朝一日也許會(huì)用到俄羅斯身上。

But then he credited the Soviet Union with raising living standards, creating a powerful middle class, reforming the labour market and boosting human rights, and claimed it had helped in advancing these positive developments in the west as well.

但在另一方面，他承認(rèn)蘇聯(lián)提高了生活水平，打造了一個(gè)強(qiáng)大的中產(chǎn)階層，改革了勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)，以及改善了人權(quán)狀況。他還聲稱，這一切也曾幫助推動(dòng)了西方發(fā)生這些積極改變。

Mr Putin’s conflicted attitude towards the Soviet Union has long puzzled western observers. In 2005, he memorably called the collapse of the Soviet Union the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century”. The phrase was misread by many in the west as praise of the USSR, but was more a reflection of the trauma a majority in the Russian public feels, and a warning of the risks created by the crumbling of a global power.

長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)，普京對(duì)蘇聯(lián)的矛盾態(tài)度一直令西方觀察人士感到困惑。2005年，他令人難忘地把蘇聯(lián)解體稱為“20世紀(jì)最大的地緣政治災(zāi)難”。這一說(shuō)法被西方很多人誤解為普京在贊頌蘇聯(lián)，其實(shí)這在更大程度上反映出俄羅斯大部分公眾感受到的創(chuàng)傷，以及對(duì)于一個(gè)全球強(qiáng)國(guó)瓦解所引發(fā)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的一個(gè)警告。

The Russian president’s view of the revolution’s protagonists is equally ambivalent. On the one hand, he blamed Lenin himself for the Soviet Union’s eventual demise, saying that the revolutionary leader had put a “time bomb” under the state he founded by drawing borders along ethnic lines, He called Lenin a traitor for starting a civil war when Russia was already fighting external enemy in the First World War.

這位俄羅斯總統(tǒng)對(duì)革命主角的看法同樣很矛盾。一方面，他譴責(zé)列寧本人要對(duì)蘇聯(lián)的最終滅亡負(fù)責(zé)——他說(shuō)，這位革命領(lǐng)袖以民族界線劃定邊界，從而為他創(chuàng)立的國(guó)家埋下一枚“定時(shí)炸彈”。普京還把列寧稱為叛徒，因?yàn)樵诹袑幵诙砹_斯已經(jīng)在第一次世界大戰(zhàn)中與外敵交戰(zhàn)的情況下發(fā)起了內(nèi)戰(zhàn)。

But Mr Putin has also defended dictator Josef Stalin for making a pact with Nazi Germany, and fiercely criticised neighbouring states for removing monuments glorifying the Soviet army or Lenin. 但普京也為獨(dú)裁者約瑟夫•斯大林(Josef Stalin)跟納粹德國(guó)簽訂互不侵犯條約辯護(hù)，并激烈抨擊了鄰國(guó)移除蘇軍或列寧紀(jì)念碑的做法。

Fresh research conducted on the eve of the revolution’s centennial shows that with this seemingly contradictory stance, the Russian president stands firmly among the mainstream.

在十月革命100周年前夕進(jìn)行的最新調(diào)查顯示，這一看似矛盾的立場(chǎng)使俄羅斯總統(tǒng)堅(jiān)定地站在主流中間。

A poll by the pro-Kremlin Russia Public Opinion Research Centre (VCIOM) conducted last year found that 45 per cent believe that the October Revolution represented the will of the Russian people, while 43 per cent disagreed. In 1990, on the eve of the Soviet Union’s collapse, 36 per cent had agreed and 37 per cent disagreed.

去年，親克里姆林宮的俄羅斯輿論調(diào)查中心(VCIOM)在調(diào)查中發(fā)現(xiàn)，45%的人認(rèn)為十月革命代表了俄羅斯民眾的意愿，而43%的人不同意這一看法。在蘇聯(lián)解體前夕的1990年，贊同和反對(duì)這一看法的比例分別為36%和37%。

“The civil war is long over, but the discussion about it is not,” says VCIOM general director Valery Fyodorov. “The proportion of people who don’t know how to answer has shrunk, showing that people understand more about the revolution than they used to. But the rift is as deep as ever.”

“那場(chǎng)內(nèi)戰(zhàn)結(jié)束很長(zhǎng)時(shí)間了，但對(duì)于它的討論沒(méi)有結(jié)束，”俄羅斯輿論調(diào)查中心負(fù)責(zé)人瓦列里•費(fèi)奧多羅夫(Valery Fyodorov)說(shuō)。“不知如何回答的受訪者的比例降低了，這顯示出人們對(duì)十月革命的理解相比過(guò)去更深刻。但分歧仍跟以往一樣深。”