最近幾年,比特幣成了金融世界的狂野西部。然而,現在它略微被“文明化”了一些。芝加哥商品交易所(CME)計劃在未來幾周推出擁有中央清算機制的比特幣期貨。
Cboe Global Markets may follow suit. That will enable investors to bet on the coin’s future value without actually holding it — just as investors can use the Chicago exchange to bet on hog prices, say, without ever handling a pig.
芝加哥期權交易所全球市場(Cboe Global Markets)可能效仿。那將讓投資者能夠押注比特幣的未來價值,而無需實際擁有這種虛擬貨幣——就像投資者可以通過這家芝加哥交易所押注豬肉價格,而不用親自飼養(yǎng)生豬一樣。
Is this a good idea? Some of the CME’s members do not think so. This week Interactive Brokers, an important clearing firm in the exchange, took the extraordinary step of using a newspaper advertisement to ask for more regulatory oversight. It fears that bitcoin is potentially so volatile that these futures will create huge losses for traders, which might then undermine the health of the CME and hurt other brokers, given its part-mutualised structure.
這是一個好主意嗎?CME的一些會員不這么認為。最近,CME的一家重要清算機構盈透證券(Interactive Brokers)采取了非同尋常的舉措,在報紙上刊登廣告呼吁加大監(jiān)管監(jiān)督。它擔心,比特幣潛在具有如此巨大的波動性,以至于這些期貨產品會給交易者帶來巨大損失,從而損害CME的健康,而且由于其部分共有架構,還會殃及其他經紀商。
The CME — unsurprisingly — dismisses this as poppycock: it argues that any risks will be contained by rules that allow traders to charge more so as to generate fat margins (of about 30 per cent) and thus absorb losses, and by circuit breakers that would stop a trade in the event of wild price swings.
CME不出所料地認為這是一派胡言:它辯稱, 任何風險都將受到兩方面的遏制:一是允許交易商收取更多費用的規(guī)則,讓交易商達到大約30%的豐厚利潤率,從而能夠吸收虧損;二是熔斷機制,在價格劇烈波動時暫停交易。
However, it is too early for outsiders to tell whether the naysayers are correct: there is simply not enough clarity on how big any bitcoin futures market will be, how it will operate or on the CME’s capacity to absorb any losses.
然而,對于局外人來說, 判斷反對者正確與否為時尚早:對于比特幣期貨市場的規(guī)模會有多大、它將如何運行、以及CME是否有能力吸收虧損,都缺乏足夠的清晰度。
But while the regulatory debate bubbles on, there is a more immediate question facing investors: bitcoin prices. Until now, it has been an article of faith among bitcoin evangelists that if — or when — the currency became more “civilised”, this will boost the price.
但是, 盡管監(jiān)管辯論仍在繼續(xù), 投資者面臨的一個更直接的問題是比特幣的價格。迄今為止,比特幣傳道者的信條是,如果比特幣變得更加“文明化”,那將會提振其價格。
After all, the argument goes, assimilating bitcoin into the mainstream investment world should boost its appeal and demand, making it more valuable. It is highly likely there will be an opposite effect. Until now, investors have not had an easy way to bet against bitcoin — the only “short” was to sell coins. But the CME futures contract will let investors place those negative bets. You do not need to be a conspiracy theorist to imagine that some bitcoin cynics will be doing just that.
這種觀點認為, 畢竟, 將比特幣同化為主流投資, 應該能提高其吸引力和需求,使其更有價值。但這也很有可能產生相反的效果。此前投資者沒有一個簡單的方法來做空比特幣——唯一的“做空”是賣出比特幣。但CME的期貨合約將讓投資者能夠做空比特幣。你不需要成為一個陰謀論者就可以想象,一些比特幣懷疑者真的會做空比特幣。
And there is a second, more subtle issue too: the cultural “map” of finance, to use an anthropological term. Until now, bitcoin has essentially been perceived as a ringfenced product. The unstated assumption among investors has been that it occupied a distinctive space where normal investing rules did not apply. But as bitcoin becomes integrated into the derivatives market, that boundary may break down and investors apply for “normal” criteria in their valuations. Given the unresolved questions about how bitcoin works, that may lead to more scepticism; indeed, it is precisely what has often happened in the evolution of financial markets before.
還有第二個、更微妙的問題:金融的文化“地圖”(借用人類學的術語)。到目前為止,比特幣在本質上被視為一種受到圈護的產品。投資者之間沒有言明的假設是,它占據了正常投資規(guī)則不適用的某個獨特空間。但是,隨著比特幣融入衍生品市場,這一界限可能消失,使投資者在估值的時候應用“正常”標準。鑒于有關比特幣如何運作的問題懸而未決,這可能引發(fā)更多懷疑;的確,這正是過去金融市場發(fā)展進程中經常發(fā)生的情況。
Think, for example, about Japan. Before the mid-1980s, its stock market seemed to exist on a planet of its own, subject to its own valuation rules. But when Japanese equity derivative contracts were launched, and then integrated within the wider global market system as a result of financial reform, that sense of “otherness” broke down. The change in how Japan was seen through a comparative investment lens was not the only reason for the 1990 Nikkei crash, but it contributed.
比如,考慮一下日本的情況。在上世紀80年代中期之前,日本股市似乎存在于自己的星球上,遵從自己的估值規(guī)則。但是,當日本的股票衍生品合約問世、隨后作為金融改革的結果融入整個全球市場體系后,這種“差異”感就瓦解了。通過比較投資的透鏡看待日本的方式發(fā)生變化,并不是1990年日經(Nikkei)崩盤的唯一原因,但它起到了推波助瀾的作用。
So too with US mortgages. Until 2005 or so, outsiders could not easily assess or price the risks of America’s subprime mortgages: mortgage-backed bond prices were opaque, and the only way to short the market was to sell bonds. But when mortgage derivatives, such as the ABX index, were launched, it suddenly became easy to make negative bets. Then, the ABX index was published in newspapers, such as the Financial Times, in 2007, creating a visible barometer of sentiment. That helped a sense of panic to feed on itself after 2008.
美國的抵押貸款也是如此。在差不多2005年之前,局外人無法輕易評估美國次貸風險,或對其估價:抵押貸款支持債券價格不透明,賣空該市場的唯一方法是拋售債券。但是,當ABX指數等抵押貸款衍生品被推出后,賣空突然變得容易了。之后,ABX指數于2007年開始在英國《金融時報》等報紙上刊登,創(chuàng)建了一個看得見的市場情緒晴雨表。這推動了2008年后市場恐慌情緒愈演愈烈。
Of course, in the long term, this type of evolution is highly desirable. Markets exist to enable investors to express price bets. They are usually more stable in the long run if prices are transparent and there is a wide pool of players. If bitcoin futures had existed a few years ago, the prices would probably not have swung so crazily this month.
當然,從長遠來看,這類演變非??扇 J袌鲋源嬖?,就是為了讓投資者表達他們對價格走向的押注。如果價格透明且擁有大量參與者,市場通常在長期更加穩(wěn)定。如果比特幣期貨幾年前就已經存在,那么本月比特幣的價格可能不會如此瘋狂波動。
But as the tale of the ABX or Nikkei 225 futures shows, that bigger philosophical point is scant comfort when investors and their counter-parties get burnt. Which, of course, is precisely why Interactive Brokers has paid for that ad. Investors and regulators need to take note: fat margins might protect the Chicago exchange as a whole (they hope) from bitcoin shocks; they will not shield unwary punters.
但是正如ABX或日經225指數期貨的故事所表明的那樣,當投資者及其交易對手方遭受巨虧時,這種宏大的哲學道理并不令人滿意。當然,這正是盈透證券花錢打廣告的原因。投資者和監(jiān)管機構需要注意:豐厚的利潤率可能會保護整個芝加哥商品交易所(他們希望如此)免受比特幣的沖擊;但它們保護不了毫無警惕之心的投機者。