德國(guó)人的經(jīng)濟(jì)觀沒(méi)錯(cuò)

At the height of the euro crisis, Mario Monti, the former Italian prime minister, liked to remark that part of the problem was that “for Germans, economics is still part of moral philosophy”. The suggestion was that the German instinct was to assign blame rather than to fix the problem — and was followed up with a reminder that the German words for guilt and debt are the same. 、

歐元危機(jī)最嚴(yán)重的時(shí)候，意大利前總理馬里奧•蒙蒂(Mario Monti)喜歡說(shuō)，部分問(wèn)題在于“對(duì)德國(guó)人而言，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)仍是道德哲學(xué)的一部分”。他的言下之意是，德國(guó)人的本能是責(zé)怪別人，而非解決問(wèn)題——他接著又提醒人們，德語(yǔ)中“罪”和“債”是同一個(gè)詞。

But the real punchline is that the Germans are right. Economics is — or should be — part of moral philosophy.

但這句妙語(yǔ)的真正點(diǎn)睛之處在于，德國(guó)人沒(méi)錯(cuò)——經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)是(或者說(shuō)應(yīng)該是)道德哲學(xué)的一部分。

Successful politicians have to do more than just deliver economic growth. They also need to offer voters a vision of the economy that makes moral sense — in which virtue is rewarded and vice is punished. Ever since the financial crisis 10 years ago, mainstream politicians in the west have lost that vital ability. The belief that the economic system is unjust has stoked the rise of rightwing and leftwing populism across the west.

成功的政治人物要做的不僅僅是帶來(lái)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)。他們還需要為選民提供一種在道德上說(shuō)得通的經(jīng)濟(jì)愿景——在這種愿景中，美德會(huì)得到回報(bào)，罪惡會(huì)受到懲罰。自10年前金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)以來(lái)，西方主流政治人物已經(jīng)喪失這一至關(guān)重要的能力。認(rèn)為當(dāng)前經(jīng)濟(jì)制度不公正的觀點(diǎn)，助長(zhǎng)了西方各國(guó)右翼和左翼民粹主義的興起。

As Mr Monti implied, the idea that economics needs to be rooted in a moral system is nothing new. Adam Smith, arguably the most important economic thinker ever, was a professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow University. His famous observation that individuals working on their own behalf would contribute to the general good, is underpinned by a theory of moral sentiments.

正如蒙蒂的話所暗示的，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)需要扎根于道德體系的觀點(diǎn)并不新鮮。堪稱史上最重要經(jīng)濟(jì)思想家的亞當(dāng)•斯密(Adam Smith)，當(dāng)年就是格拉斯哥大學(xué)(Glasgow University)的道德哲學(xué)教授。他的著名觀點(diǎn)——為自身利益工作的個(gè)人，將為整體利益作出貢獻(xiàn)——是由他的“道德情操論”支撐的。

Karl Marx’s followers went to the barricades because they believed that communism was morally superior to capitalism — not because they were inspired by Marxist economics. Friedrich Hayek was a passionate anti-Marxist, who won the Nobel Prize for economics. He was also a moral philosopher, whose The Road to Serfdom made an ethical case against state control of the economy.

卡爾•馬克思(Karl Marx)的追隨者們走上街頭革命，因?yàn)樗麄兿嘈殴伯a(chǎn)主義在道德上優(yōu)于資本主義——而非因?yàn)樗麄兪艿今R克思主義經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的啟迪。諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)得主弗里德里希•哈耶克(Friedrich Hayek)是一位充滿激情的反馬克思主義者。他也是一位道德哲學(xué)家，他撰寫(xiě)的《通往奴役之路》(The Road to Serfdom)從道德角度出發(fā)，駁斥了國(guó)家控制經(jīng)濟(jì)的體制。

Until the shocks of 2008, centrist politicians in the west were able to offer a morally coherent view of the economy that delivered them electoral success. A free-market economy was held to reward effort and success and to spread opportunity. Globalisation — the creation of a global market system — was defended as a moral project, since it involved reducing inequality and poverty across the world.

在2008年的大沖擊之前，西方中間派政治人物拿得出一套在道德上能夠自圓其說(shuō)的經(jīng)濟(jì)觀念，這讓他們贏得選舉。堅(jiān)持自由市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)是為了獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)努力和成功，并讓更多人獲得機(jī)會(huì)。全球化(創(chuàng)建全球市場(chǎng)體系)被捍衛(wèi)者稱為一項(xiàng)道德工程，因?yàn)樗婕霸谑澜绺鞯叵黄降群拓毨А?/p>

After the financial crisis, however, the “globalists” (to use a Trumpian term) began to lose the moral arguments. The fact that banks were bailed out as living standards stagnated, offended many voters’ idea of natural justice. When nobody at the apex of a failed system was sent to jail, the door was opened for a politician, such as Donald Trump, who argued that “the system is rigged”.

然而，金融危機(jī)之后，“全球主義者”(借用特朗普的術(shù)語(yǔ))開(kāi)始在道德上失據(jù)。銀行紛紛得到救助而民眾生活水平停滯不前，這一事實(shí)冒犯了許多選民對(duì)自然正義的理解。當(dāng)一個(gè)失敗體制的最高層沒(méi)有任何人被投入監(jiān)獄，宣稱“體制受到操縱”的唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)這樣的政客就有了號(hào)召力。

The success or failure of Mr Trump’s tax reforms, which are likely to go through this week, will depend to a great extent on whether he can convince voters that he is helping to make the system fairer. The Republican argument is that the new taxation system will reward hard work and reduce the burden of the state. The Democrats’ response is that the new tax reforms further rig the system in favour of the rich.

特朗普稅改(很可能在本周獲得通過(guò))的成敗，在很大程度上將取決于他能否讓選民相信，他正在幫助使這一體制更加公平。共和黨辯稱，新稅制將獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)辛勤工作，并減輕國(guó)家負(fù)擔(dān)。民主黨人的回應(yīng)是，新的稅改將朝著有利于富人的方向進(jìn)一步操縱體制。

At the moment, a majority of Americans seem to agree with the proposition that the Trump tax reforms largely favour the wealthy. If that interpretation takes hold, voters may drift away from the rightwing populism of Mr Trump, towards the leftwing populism of Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren. The Sanders and Warren campaigns have also capitalised on the sense that America’s economic system is rigged. They have focused in particular on generational injustice — which leaves many young voters burdened with student debt and insecure jobs.

眼下，大多數(shù)美國(guó)人似乎都認(rèn)同這樣一個(gè)觀點(diǎn)，即特朗普稅改主要照顧富人。如果這種解釋站穩(wěn)腳跟，選民可能會(huì)告別特朗普的右翼民粹主義，轉(zhuǎn)投伯尼•桑德斯(Bernie Sanders)和伊麗莎白•沃倫(Elizabeth Warren)的左翼民粹主義。桑德斯和沃倫的競(jìng)選活動(dòng)也利用了美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)體制被操縱的感覺(jué)。他們格外關(guān)注代際不公正——這使得很多年輕選民背負(fù)著學(xué)生貸款的重?fù)?dān)，而工作又不穩(wěn)定。

These arguments resonate not just in the US but right across the west. In Britain, Nigel Farage’s UK Independence party and the Brexiters seized the banner of rightwing populism, while the leftwing populism of Jeremy Corbyn took control of the Labour party. In France, the rightwing and leftwing populism of Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon respectively captured more than 40 per cent of the vote in the first round of this year’s presidential election. Add in other fringe parties and some 50 per cent of the French, British and American electorates are now clearly tempted by populist, anti-system politicians.

這些觀點(diǎn)不僅在美國(guó)引起共鳴，在西方各國(guó)都很盛行。在英國(guó)，奈杰爾•法拉奇(Nigel Farage)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的英國(guó)獨(dú)立黨(UKIP)等退歐派扛起了右翼民粹主義的旗幟，而左翼民粹主義的杰里米•科爾賓(Jeremy Corbyn)控制了工黨(Labour)。在法國(guó)，右翼民粹主義的馬琳•勒龐(Marine Le Pen)和左翼民粹主義的讓-呂克•梅朗雄(Jean-Luc Mélenchon)在今年總統(tǒng)大選的第一輪投票中總計(jì)得到了40%以上的選票。再加上其他邊緣政黨，法國(guó)、英國(guó)和美國(guó)都有大約50%的選民如今明顯受到民粹主義的反體制政客的誘惑。

In Germany, however, the rightwing and leftwing variants of populism are still getting well under 25 per cent of the vote — despite the radicalising effect of the refugee crisis. In part, that is down to the success of the German economy. But it is also because Angela Merkel, the chancellor, realised that, in handling the euro crisis, she had to take account of ordinary voters’ sense of right and wrong. Many economists in the US and southern Europe argued that the crisis could only be solved by formally writing off a lot of Greek debt. They also made the case that German bankers were more to blame for the crisis than Greek pensioners. But Ms Merkel knew that, inside Germany, the argument that hard-working Germans should not be asked to write off the debts of wasteful Greeks was too powerful to tackle head-on. She could only make progress in tackling the euro crisis by respecting basic ideas about effort and reward.

然而在德國(guó)，盡管難民危機(jī)帶來(lái)了激進(jìn)化的影響，但右翼和左翼民粹主義代表得到的選票仍然遠(yuǎn)低于25%。在某種程度上，這可以歸因于德國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的成功。但這也是因?yàn)榈聡?guó)總理安格拉•默克爾(Angela Merkel)在處理歐元危機(jī)時(shí)意識(shí)到，她必須考慮到普通選民的是非感。當(dāng)時(shí)美國(guó)以及南歐的很多經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家認(rèn)為，歐元危機(jī)只能通過(guò)正式大規(guī)模注銷希臘債務(wù)的方式解決。他們還指出，相比希臘退休者，德國(guó)的銀行家對(duì)那場(chǎng)危機(jī)負(fù)有更大責(zé)任。但是默克爾知道，德國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)很多人認(rèn)為，辛勤工作的德國(guó)人不應(yīng)該被要求減記鋪張浪費(fèi)的希臘人的債務(wù)，這種觀點(diǎn)太過(guò)強(qiáng)大，不宜正面對(duì)抗。她只有尊重關(guān)于努力和回報(bào)的基本理念，才能在解決歐元危機(jī)問(wèn)題上取得進(jìn)展。

A whole generation of western politicians has grown up with the Clintonian slogan, “It’s the economy, stupid”, ringing in their heads. But in today’s politics, “the economy” is not just about growth. It is also about justice.

整整一代的西方政客在成長(zhǎng)過(guò)程中深受克林頓的口號(hào)“笨蛋，關(guān)鍵在于經(jīng)濟(jì)”的影響。但在當(dāng)今的政治中，“經(jīng)濟(jì)”不只關(guān)乎增長(zhǎng)。它也關(guān)乎公正。