東海撞船事件的原因何在？

The sinking of the Iranian oil tanker Sanchi in the East China Sea and the loss of 32 lives, has raised questions over how such a collision could happen, with analysts and traders focusing on its navigation and satellite tracking systems.

伊朗油輪“桑吉號(hào)”(Sanchi)在東海沉沒，32人喪生。這次事故令外界產(chǎn)生疑問：怎么會(huì)發(fā)生這樣的撞船事故?分析人士和交易員把注意力放在這艘船的導(dǎo)航和衛(wèi)星跟蹤系統(tǒng)上。

The Sanchi was carrying about 1m barrels of condensate — a light, highly flammable oil — from Iran to South Korea, when Chinese authorities say it hit the CF Crystal, which was loaded with grain, 160 nautical miles east of the mouth of the Yangtze river nine days ago.

9天前，中國(guó)當(dāng)局表示“桑吉號(hào)”油輪在長(zhǎng)江口以東160海里處撞上裝載著糧食的長(zhǎng)峰水晶(CF Crystal)散貨船時(shí)，“桑吉號(hào)”正載著約100萬(wàn)桶的凝析油(一種輕質(zhì)、高度易燃的石油)從伊朗駛向韓國(guó)。

Yet vessel tracking services say the Sanchi was last spotted almost 24 hours prior, off Taiwan’s coast. After this point the tanker’s automatic identification system (AIS) did not appear to submit information.

然而，船舶跟蹤公司表示，“桑吉號(hào)”最后一次被發(fā)現(xiàn)是在近24小時(shí)之前的臺(tái)灣附近海域。此后，這艘油輪的自動(dòng)識(shí)別系統(tǒng)(AIS)似乎就沒有再提交信息。

The communications system used by vessels to continuously broadcast their identity and position over public airwaves, using unencrypted radio signals, has become an essential tool over the last 15 years for ensuring safety at sea.

船舶使用的這種通信系統(tǒng)，利用未加密無(wú)線信號(hào)在公共波段持續(xù)播報(bào)船舶身份及位置。該系統(tǒng)已成為過(guò)去15年確保海上安全的重要工具。

Rumours have swirled about whether an intentional shutdown of the AIS, poor signal or a fault in the system, contributed to the collision involving the tanker owned by the National Iranian Tanker Company.

坊間盛傳各種說(shuō)法，猜測(cè)導(dǎo)致此次撞船事故的原因是否跟如下幾點(diǎn)有關(guān)：有人故意關(guān)閉自動(dòng)識(shí)別系統(tǒng)、信號(hào)差或該系統(tǒng)出現(xiàn)故障。涉事油輪“桑吉號(hào)”由伊朗國(guó)家油輪公司(National Iranian Tanker Company)所有。

A big concern now is the environmental impact, as crews on Monday tried to clean up a giant oil spill left behind after the sinking of the burning tanker.

現(xiàn)在的一項(xiàng)嚴(yán)重?fù)?dān)憂是環(huán)境影響。工作人員周一試圖清理在這艘燃燒的油輪沉沒后遺留的大面積漏油。

As a substitute, investigators could turn to the voyage data recorders, akin to a ‘Black Box’ on aeroplanes, from both vessels. Still, the incident casts a spotlight on the role of AIS in the shipping and oil industries.

作為替代選擇，調(diào)查人員可以借助兩艘船只的航行數(shù)據(jù)記錄儀——類似飛機(jī)上的“黑匣子”。然而，該事件讓外界關(guān)注自動(dòng)識(shí)別系統(tǒng)在航海和石油行業(yè)中扮演的角色。

Originally intended as a near-shore security and navigation device, a plethora of companies now use the system to track movements of oil globally, getting an early jump on data — from Chinese imports to shipments from big Opec exporters — that can be traded on.

這種系統(tǒng)原本是被用來(lái)保障近海安全和導(dǎo)航的，如今很多公司利用這個(gè)系統(tǒng)跟蹤全球的石油運(yùn)動(dòng)軌跡，以提早獲得可用于指導(dǎo)交易的各種數(shù)據(jù)——從中國(guó)石油進(jìn)口數(shù)據(jù)、到石油輸出國(guó)組織(Opec，簡(jiǎn)稱：歐佩克)主要石油出口國(guó)的發(fā)貨數(shù)據(jù)。

Matt Smith, director of commodity research at ClipperData, a vessel tracking company, said it was possible the Sanchi had turned off its AIS transponder. Iranian vessels have at times sought to hide their movements when exports from the country were restricted by sanctions. While Iranian barrels have been freed up by the nuclear deal in the past two years, there have been incidents of vessels “going dark”.

船舶跟蹤公司ClipperData的大宗商品研究主管馬特•史密斯(Matt Smith)表示，“桑吉號(hào)”有可能關(guān)閉了船上的自動(dòng)識(shí)別系統(tǒng)應(yīng)答器。在伊朗出口受到制裁限制時(shí)，該國(guó)船舶有時(shí)會(huì)試圖隱藏其運(yùn)動(dòng)軌跡。過(guò)去兩年，伊朗核協(xié)議解除了對(duì)伊朗石油的限制，但船舶關(guān)閉應(yīng)答器的事件仍時(shí)有發(fā)生。

“In the last two months we have recorded a number of incidents of Iranian vessels apparently manipulating their AIS signals,” said Mr Smith, adding that when rhetoric ramps up around reimposing sanctions, as it has done in recent weeks, Iran has a greater tendency to shutdown AIS signals for its tankers.

史密斯表示：“過(guò)去兩個(gè)月，我們記錄到多起伊朗船舶似乎對(duì)它們的自動(dòng)識(shí)別系統(tǒng)信號(hào)動(dòng)了手腳的事件。”他補(bǔ)充稱，在有關(guān)重新實(shí)施制裁的言論增多時(shí)(就像最近幾周那樣)，伊朗就有更大可能性關(guān)閉其油輪的自動(dòng)識(shí)別系統(tǒng)信號(hào)。

Other tanker tracking companies, including Israeli-based Windward, said it may not, however, be a case of the ship going dark on purpose. AIS technology has limitations, such as when too many ships are in range and signals jam each other.

但其他油輪跟蹤公司(包括總部位于以色列的Windward)表示，有可能不是油輪故意關(guān)閉應(yīng)答器。自動(dòng)識(shí)別系統(tǒng)技術(shù)具有局限性，例如在太多船舶處于同一水域時(shí)，信號(hào)會(huì)互相堵塞。

One shipbroker added: “Sometimes when you are mid-ocean it doesn’t receive signal.”

一家船舶經(jīng)紀(jì)公司補(bǔ)充稱：“有時(shí)，當(dāng)你處于遠(yuǎn)海時(shí)，系統(tǒng)收不到信號(hào)。”

Windward said it had assessed only seven incidents between July 2015 and July 2016 where it was confident Iran’s tanker company NITC had intentionally turned off AIS, four times before sanctions were lifted and three times after.

Windward表示，2015年7月至2016年7月之間，它只檢測(cè)到7起它確信伊朗國(guó)家油輪公司故意關(guān)閉了自動(dòng)識(shí)別系統(tǒng)的事件，在制裁解除前為4次，在制裁解除后是3次。

Nevertheless investigators are likely to focus on whether the two vessels — with the Iranian Suezmax tanker as long as many skyscrapers are tall — failed to somehow spot each other, or if there was a mechanical fault.

然而，調(diào)查人員可能會(huì)關(guān)注于這兩艘船(這艘伊朗蘇伊士型(Suezmax)油輪的長(zhǎng)度堪比很多摩天大樓的高度)是否未能發(fā)現(xiàn)對(duì)方，或者是否出現(xiàn)了機(jī)械故障。

The practice of turning off AIS to avoid tracking has not been limited to national oil companies, with some of the world’s largest oil traders also employing it. Crude shipments from the semi-autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan, which the federal government in Baghdad opposes, often go offline shortly after leaving Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, before making deliveries or taking part in ship-to-ship transfers.

關(guān)閉自動(dòng)識(shí)別系統(tǒng)以避免被追蹤的做法并不限于國(guó)有石油公司，一些全球最大石油交易者也在這么做。從半自治的伊拉克庫(kù)爾德斯坦地區(qū)發(fā)出的原油，經(jīng)常在離開土耳其地中海港口杰伊漢后不久就關(guān)閉應(yīng)答器，在交貨或與其他船只對(duì)接進(jìn)行貨物轉(zhuǎn)移前才打開。伊拉克聯(lián)邦政府與庫(kù)爾德斯坦地區(qū)政府對(duì)立。

The International Maritime Organization said piracy or other security incidents might also prompt a shipmaster to turn off the AIS to prevent the vessel from being compromised.

國(guó)際海事組織(International Maritime Organization)表示，海盜或其他安全事件也可能促使船長(zhǎng)關(guān)閉自動(dòng)識(shí)別系統(tǒng)，以防范船只遭到破壞。

But Pottengal Mukundan at the International Maritime Bureau said this is less likely in the East China Sea. “One of the risk areas where you might do that is the Somali basin or off the coast of Aden but not there.”

但國(guó)際海事局(International Maritime Bureau)的波廷加爾•穆昆丹(Pottengal Mukundan)表示，在中國(guó)東海，不太可能出現(xiàn)這種情況。“你可能會(huì)在索馬里海盆或亞丁灣等高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)海域這么做，在那里不會(huì)。”

Iman Nasseri, consultant at FGE Energy, said even without AIS tracking there are other means to track the ship which is why an accident of this magnitude is difficult to understand.

FGE Energy的咨詢顧問伊曼•納賽里(Iman Nasseri)表示，即便沒有自動(dòng)識(shí)別系統(tǒng)追蹤，也還有其他途徑追蹤這艘船只，因此發(fā)生這么大規(guī)模的事故讓人很難理解。

“The vessel’s radar should have worked even if AIS was off, a collision should not be possible,” Mr Nasseri said.

納賽里表示：“即便自動(dòng)識(shí)別系統(tǒng)關(guān)閉，這艘船的雷達(dá)也本應(yīng)運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)，這種撞船事故原本應(yīng)該是不可能發(fā)生的。”