《中國(guó)任務(wù)》：馬歇爾未能阻止的國(guó)共殊死之爭(zhēng)

George Marshall’s Unfinished War, 1945-1947

By Daniel Kurtz-Phelan

Illustrated. 476 pp. W.W. Norton & Company. $28.95.

《中國(guó)任務(wù)——喬治·馬歇爾未完成的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，1945–1947》(THE CHINA MISSION: George Marshall’s Unfinished War, 1945-1947)。

丹尼爾·庫(kù)爾茨-費(fèi)倫(Daniel Kurtz-Phelan)著。

有插圖。476頁(yè)。

W·W·諾頓出版社(W.W. Norton & Company)出版。28.95美元。

George Catlett Marshall is rightly regarded as among the greatest soldier-statesmen in American history, comparable in his achievements to Dwight Eisenhower and, perhaps, to George Washington himself. Appointed chief of staff by Franklin Roosevelt in 1939, Marshall oversaw the transformation of the United States Army from a small, stagnant force into a mighty engine of war, then helped to direct its successful use in Europe and the Pacific. Praised by Harry Truman as “the greatest man of World War II” and by Winston Churchill as the true “architect of victory,” Marshall would go on to play an essential role in shaping the subsequent, uneasy peace. The enormous program of economic assistance that bore his name helped rebuild the shattered nations of Western Europe, securing their place in an alliance of liberal democracies that contained the Soviet Union and ultimately won the Cold War.

喬治·卡特利特·馬歇爾(George Catlett Marshall)堪稱(chēng)美國(guó)歷史上最偉大的軍人政治家之一，他的成就可比德懷特·艾森豪威爾(Dwight Eisenhower)，或許還堪與喬治·華盛頓(George Washington)本人相提并論。1939年，他被富蘭克林·羅斯福(Franklin Roosevelt)任命為參謀長(zhǎng)，負(fù)責(zé)將美國(guó)陸軍從一支弱小、萎靡的部隊(duì)，轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)橐蛔鶑?qiáng)大的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)機(jī)器，然后在他參與指揮下，成功地在歐洲和太平洋戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)上加以運(yùn)用。他被哈里·杜魯門(mén)(Harry Truman)譽(yù)為“二戰(zhàn)中最偉大的人物”，被溫斯頓·丘吉爾(Winston Churchill)譽(yù)為真正的“勝利建筑師”，在塑造戰(zhàn)后不穩(wěn)定的和平之中，他也發(fā)揮了重要作用。以他的名字命名的大型經(jīng)濟(jì)援助計(jì)劃幫助滿(mǎn)目瘡痍的西歐國(guó)家進(jìn)行重建，鞏固了它們?cè)谧杂擅裰鲊?guó)家聯(lián)盟中的地位，遏制了蘇聯(lián)，并最終贏得了冷戰(zhàn)。

Marshall’s many successes bracketed one notable failure. Within days of retiring from the Army and returning to his home in Leesburg, Va., for a well-deserved rest, he received a telephone call summoning him back to government service. Two weeks later, after a series of hasty meetings with Truman and his top advisers, Marshall boarded a plane for the long trip to China. He would spend the next two years there, trying in vain to head off a renewed civil war between forces under the command of the Communist Party chairman Mao Zedong and their Nationalist rivals led by the Washington-backed ally Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

但是，在馬歇爾的眾多成功之中，夾雜著一次重大失敗。在退伍回到位于弗吉尼亞州利斯堡的家中后，他休息了沒(méi)幾天就接到一個(gè)電話(huà)，召喚他回來(lái)為政府服務(wù)。兩周內(nèi)，他與杜魯門(mén)及其高級(jí)顧問(wèn)進(jìn)行了一系列倉(cāng)促的會(huì)議，之后登上一架飛機(jī)，長(zhǎng)途跋涉飛往中國(guó)。他將在未來(lái)兩年的時(shí)間里，試圖阻止中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨的毛澤東指揮的部隊(duì)與其對(duì)手、華盛頓的盟友蔣介石領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的國(guó)民黨之間再次爆發(fā)內(nèi)戰(zhàn)。

Daniel Kurtz-Phelan’s book, “The China Mission,” tells the story of Marshall’s unsuccessful mission to China. Thoroughly researched and compellingly written, it is at once a revealing study of character and leadership, a vivid reconstruction of a critical episode in the history of the early Cold War and an insightful meditation on the limits of American power even at its peak.

丹尼爾·庫(kù)爾茨-費(fèi)倫的書(shū)《中國(guó)任務(wù)》講述了這樁馬歇爾在中國(guó)未能成功完成的任務(wù)。它經(jīng)過(guò)深入研究，寫(xiě)得非常精彩，既是對(duì)性格和領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力的揭示性研究，也是對(duì)早期冷戰(zhàn)史中一段關(guān)鍵歷史的生動(dòng)重構(gòu)，以及對(duì)美國(guó)力量的局限性——哪怕是在它的鼎盛期——的深刻思考。

Marshall was renowned for his skills as a strategist and an organizer, but also for personal characteristics. His rectitude and dedication to duty were legendary, prompting Churchill to label him “the noblest Roman of them all.” He could be severe, even forbidding (at one point telling his deputy Dean Acheson, “I have no feelings except those reserved for Mrs. Marshall”), and seems to have evoked a mixture of fear, awe and devotion from his subordinates. But Marshall also had a sense of proportion and humility, and an aversion to self-aggrandizement and self-promotion that set him apart from contemporaries like Douglas MacArthur.

馬歇爾的名聲得自他作為戰(zhàn)略家和組織者的才能，同時(shí)也是因?yàn)樗膫€(gè)性。他的正直和盡責(zé)是眾所周知的，丘吉爾稱(chēng)他為“最高貴的羅馬人”。他可能會(huì)很?chē)?yán)厲，甚至令人生畏(有一次，他對(duì)自己的副手迪恩·艾奇遜[Dean Acheson]說(shuō)：“我沒(méi)有感情，僅有的一點(diǎn)是留給馬歇爾夫人的”)，下屬對(duì)他似乎既敬畏又忠誠(chéng)。但是馬歇爾也很謙遜、有分寸，厭惡自我膨脹和自吹自擂，這和道格拉斯·麥克阿瑟(Douglas MacArthur)等同時(shí)代人不一樣。

All of these qualities, but especially the combination of doggedness and strategic vision, emerge clearly from Kurtz-Phelan’s finely detailed account. Despite a realistic appraisal of the enormous difficulties involved, Marshall was relentless in his attempts to bring the Communists and Nationalists together, first negotiating a cease-fire and then working to merge their respective armies and to join the parties into some form of unity government. When talks faltered he shuttled back and forth between the two sides, meeting for hours at a time, first with Chiang, then with Mao’s deputy, Zhou Enlai, flying to Yenan to confer directly with Mao and traveling repeatedly by plane, boat, jeep and sedan chair when the generalissimo retreated to his summer home in the mountains outside Nanjing. Marshall “clings so tenaciously to a seemingly hopeless job,” one observer noted. “More meetings and more futility all the time,” another wrote in his diary. “I don’t see how the general stands it.”

所有這些品質(zhì)，特別是頑強(qiáng)和戰(zhàn)略眼光的結(jié)合，都清楚地從庫(kù)爾茨-費(fèi)倫的細(xì)致描述中顯現(xiàn)出來(lái)。盡管對(duì)其中涉及的巨大困難做出了現(xiàn)實(shí)的評(píng)估，但馬歇爾堅(jiān)持要將共產(chǎn)黨人和國(guó)民黨人聚在一起，首先談判?；?，然后努力合并各自的軍隊(duì)，將兩黨合并為某種形式的聯(lián)合政府。談判進(jìn)展不順利的時(shí)候，他在兩邊奔走，先是與蔣進(jìn)行長(zhǎng)達(dá)幾個(gè)小時(shí)的會(huì)晤，然后與毛的副手周恩來(lái)一起飛往延安，同毛直接交涉，之后又換乘飛機(jī)、船、吉普車(chē)和轎子去往蔣在南京郊外的山間別墅，一位旁觀者形容馬歇爾“頑強(qiáng)地堅(jiān)持做著看似無(wú)望的工作”。“更多的會(huì)議和更多的徒勞，”另一位旁觀者在日記中寫(xiě)道。“我真不知道將軍怎么能忍受這些。”

Unlike some Western observers, Marshall had no illusions that the Communists were mere “agrarian reformers” with genuine democratic inclinations. Nor was he blind to the faults of the Nationalists. Although he respected Chiang, Marshall recognized that many of his lieutenants were corrupt and inclined to use brutal tactics to suppress their opponents, including the assassination of moderate, anti-Communist advocates of liberal political reforms.

與一些西方觀察人士不同，馬歇爾沒(méi)有幻想共產(chǎn)黨人只是有真正民主傾向的“土地改革者”。他也絕非對(duì)國(guó)民黨的問(wèn)題視而不見(jiàn)。雖然馬歇爾尊重蔣介石，但他認(rèn)識(shí)到，蔣的許多下屬都很腐敗，傾向于用殘酷的手段壓制自己的對(duì)手，包括暗殺溫和的、反對(duì)共產(chǎn)主義的自由主義政治改革倡導(dǎo)者。

American strategy was based on the hope that forcing the two sides to cooperate would eventually have a moderating influence on both. It was a long shot, but as far as Marshall was concerned, there really was no alternative. Cutting off all assistance to Chiang would only harden his worst inclinations while abandoning any hope of shaping his behavior. On the other hand, notwithstanding the Nationalists’ advantages in American-supplied weapons and logistics, Marshall was skeptical that they could finish off their enemies and establish control over all of China. As he correctly anticipated, trying to do so would plunge the nation back into all-out civil war and open the way for increased Soviet involvement and influence.

美國(guó)戰(zhàn)略的基礎(chǔ)是希望通過(guò)強(qiáng)迫雙方合作，最終會(huì)對(duì)兩黨產(chǎn)生溫和的影響。這是一個(gè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)很大的賭局，但就馬歇爾而言，確實(shí)沒(méi)有其他選擇。切斷對(duì)蔣的一切援助只會(huì)加劇他最壞的方面，同時(shí)也等于放棄了影響他行為的希望。另一方面，盡管?chē)?guó)民黨在美國(guó)供應(yīng)的武器和后勤方面具有優(yōu)勢(shì)，但馬歇爾懷疑他們是否能夠完全擊敗敵人并控制整個(gè)中國(guó)。他正確地預(yù)料到，國(guó)民黨試圖擊敗對(duì)手的行動(dòng)，會(huì)使中國(guó)重新陷入全面內(nèi)戰(zhàn)，并為蘇聯(lián)加強(qiáng)干涉和影響開(kāi)辟道路。

Looking back, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that a final duel to the death between Nationalist and Communist forces was inevitable, even if its outcome perhaps was not. As Kurtz-Phelan correctly notes, Marshall’s ability to exert influence over the Nationalists was limited from the start by Chiang’s belief (bolstered by back-channel communications with his friends in Washington) that, in the end, the United States would have no choice but to support him. (Here American policymakers were faced for the first time with what would become a recurrent problem of the postwar era: how to impose reform on a weak, corrupt and dependent client facing a ruthless and highly motivated opponent.) In retrospect it also seems obvious that, despite Marshall’s earnest efforts, both Chiang and Mao were simply playing for time, waiting for the most opportune moment to finish their two-decade struggle.

回顧過(guò)去，很難不得出這樣的結(jié)論：國(guó)民黨和共產(chǎn)黨軍隊(duì)的最終殊死決斗是不可避免的，盡管它的結(jié)果并非不可避免。正如庫(kù)爾茨-費(fèi)倫正確地指出的，馬歇爾對(duì)國(guó)民黨的影響力從一開(kāi)始就很有限，因?yàn)槭Y介石相信(得益于他與華盛頓的朋友們的私下溝通)，美國(guó)將最終別無(wú)選擇，只能支持他(這是美國(guó)政策制定者第一次面對(duì)二戰(zhàn)后反復(fù)出現(xiàn)的一個(gè)問(wèn)題：如何推動(dòng)一個(gè)弱小、腐敗、嚴(yán)重依賴(lài)美國(guó)的附庸國(guó)改革，以應(yīng)對(duì)有著強(qiáng)大動(dòng)力的無(wú)情對(duì)手)?；叵肫饋?lái)，似乎同樣十分明顯的是，盡管馬歇爾十分努力，但蔣和毛都只是在拖延時(shí)間，等待最合適的時(shí)機(jī)，結(jié)束二十年的爭(zhēng)斗。

The eventual Communist victory triggered recriminations and an ugly, polarizing debate back in the United States. Congressional Republicans claimed that the Truman administration had “lost” China by not backing Chiang to the hilt. Some suggested that this failure was the work of a vast web of Communist spies and sympathizers operating at all levels of the government. Even Marshall, with his towering reputation, was not immune. Senator Joe McCarthy, an early practitioner of the dark art of spreading “fake news,” denounced him for “criminal folly” and put him at the heart of “a conspiracy so immense and an infamy so black as to dwarf any previous venture in the history of man.”

共產(chǎn)黨的最終勝利在美國(guó)引發(fā)了相互指責(zé)以及丑陋的、兩極化的辯論。國(guó)會(huì)的共和黨人聲稱(chēng)，杜魯門(mén)政府未能全力支持蔣介石，因此“失去”了中國(guó)。有些人認(rèn)為，這個(gè)失敗是共產(chǎn)黨在美國(guó)政府各個(gè)層級(jí)的間諜和同情者組成的龐大網(wǎng)絡(luò)造成的。就連享有崇高聲譽(yù)的馬歇爾也未能幸免。參議員喬·麥卡錫(Joe McCarthy)是傳播“假新聞”這門(mén)黑暗藝術(shù)的早期踐行者，他譴責(zé)馬歇爾做了“罪惡的蠢事”，認(rèn)為他是“一樁陰謀和丑聞的中心，陰謀之龐大，丑聞之黑暗，令人類(lèi)歷史上所有的創(chuàng)舉都相形見(jiàn)絀”。

Marshall’s reaction to such demagogy was nonchalant: “If I have to explain at this point that I am not a traitor to the United States I hardly think it’s worth it.” On the more serious question of whether an alternative approach could have prevented Mao’s victory and perhaps put China on a path toward liberal democracy, he does not appear to have harbored deep doubts. Even a commitment of several hundred thousand American troops would not have been sufficient to guarantee success, and it would have diverted scarce resources from “more vital regions,” like Western Europe, where the United States had “a reasonable opportunity of meeting or thwarting the Communist threat.”

馬歇爾對(duì)這種蠱惑言論的反應(yīng)非常冷靜：“如果我必須在此刻解釋自己不是美國(guó)的叛徒，那么我認(rèn)為是不值得。”在關(guān)于本來(lái)是否有其他辦法可以阻止毛澤東獲勝、也許能讓中國(guó)走上自由民主道路這個(gè)更嚴(yán)肅的問(wèn)題上，馬歇爾似乎并不這樣認(rèn)為。就算派出幾十萬(wàn)美國(guó)軍隊(duì)，也不足以保證成功，而且還會(huì)把稀缺的資源從“更重要的地區(qū)”轉(zhuǎn)移走，比如西歐，美國(guó)在西歐“有機(jī)會(huì)應(yīng)對(duì)或挫敗共產(chǎn)黨的威脅”。

The “loss” of China may have been unavoidable, at least at anything close to an acceptable cost to the United States, but it was still a tragedy. As China continues to gain in wealth and power, while its political system devolves into a one-man dictatorship, it would appear that the final chapters of this tragedy have yet to be written.

如果前提是美國(guó)付出的代價(jià)要在可接受范圍內(nèi)，“失去”中國(guó)也許是不可避免的，但這仍然是一場(chǎng)悲劇。隨著中國(guó)繼續(xù)獲得財(cái)富和權(quán)力，而它的政治體系則淪為一人獨(dú)裁統(tǒng)治，這場(chǎng)悲劇的最后篇章似乎尚未被書(shū)寫(xiě)出來(lái)。