美國(guó)政要第1課
The U.S.Security strategy after the Cold War
--Interview with Former Secretary of National Defense, Dr. William Perry 訪美國(guó)前國(guó)防部長(zhǎng)威廉姆•佩里博士
MR. CHEN BOJIANG: As the Secretary of Defense, you raised the Prevent-Deter-Defeat Strategy1 as the U.S. security strategy after the Cold War. What is the main difference between this strategy and the Cold War strategy of deterrence? What were the main demands for the development of American armed forces in implementing the Prevent-Deter-Defeat Strategy?
DR. PERRY: I talked about Prevent-Deter-Defeat Strategy. The Cold War strategy was one of deterrence, in this case, the threat of the Soviet Union. And we built our nuclear forces and ground forces2 to deter the Soviet Union from using that threat. Whether or not they would have ever used it, we’ll never know now. But we did develop-and therefore we built these systems and made these deployments to deter them from using it. Today we do not see a threat to the survival of the United States. The Soviet Union is no more. Russia not only does not pose a threat but in fact they’re cooperating economically, militarily, and politically. We do not see them as a threat. We do not see China as a threat. We see both Russia and China as potential partners. So, today, we see no threats which require deterrence. The theory of preventive defense3 says however there are dangers in the world. The action which defense takes to forestall those dangers from becoming threats-I call preventive defense. We have a program in the United States called Nunn-Luger, named after two senators-in the Pentagon4 we call it the cooperative threat reduction program-we will cooperate with the Russians and Ukrainians and Kazahkstanis to reduce the nuclear weapon capability of all those countries as well as going on a parallel with the United States, and help the Russians put their residual nuclear weapons under better safeguard. When I was Secretary, I authorized $2 billion for the U.S. Defense Fund, to help the Russians and Kazahkstanis reduce their weapons of mass destruction-I consider that a very good investment. That is preventive in two senses: first of all, that promoted the evolution5 of Russia as an equal democracy with the United States, and secondly, it kept the residual nuclear weapons, and chemical weapons, I might say, under better control, so that they’re less likely to end up in the hands of a terrorist organization, which could have then become a threat to the United States. That’s preventing something from becoming a threat. Very different from the Cold War where we saw the threat-it already existed-and we applied deterrence. So, I think of three steps-programs that prevent this danger from becoming a threat-if these fail, then you need programs of deterrence-to stop that threat and if those fail, then you have to defeat the threats.
MR. CHEN: You pointed out that “the art of war requires secrecy and surprise and the art of peace requires openness and trust.” How can we encourage openness and trust between countries?
MR. PERRY: The key tenet of preventive defense is to develop a constructive engagement with China and with Russia. That would require openness. Openness is the key to promoting peace and security between our countries.
MR. CHEN: America has begun an in-depth discussion of the nation’s military needs for the next century. Last May and November, the Department of Defense issued the Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review6 and Defense Reform Initiative Report7. These reports raised the goals and measures of the development of national defense in the next century. What are your comments regarding these reports? How do you view the development of the international situation and U.S. military needs in the 21st century?
DR. PERRY: The Quadrennial Defense Review basically specifies the size and the structure of the American military forces to dealing with the kind of military problems we’ve talked about. First of all, there’s a certain amount of the defense research that should go to what I call preventive defense. Secondly, a very large part of the defense budget goes to dealing with regional threats-and examples used in the Quadrennial Defense Review were Desert Storm and the North Korean War-the two primary8 examples of where we faced the regional threat, And we have sized our conventional forces9, then to deal with a regional threat of that nature-so that we could win it quickly, decisively, and with minimal casualties. That’s sometimes called the 2MRC (Major Regional Contingency) strategy, but in this plan, it says you must have an adequate reserve force10 if you’re going to fight a war so that you’re not vulnerable to a second country taking advantage of you.
WORDS AND EXPRESSIONS詞匯提示：
1.The Prevent-Deter-Defeat Strategy 預(yù)防--威懾--擊敗戰(zhàn)略
2.ground forces 地面部隊(duì)
3.preventive defense 預(yù)先防御
4.Pentagon [] 五角大樓(美國(guó)防部所在地)
5.evolution [] 演變
6.the Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review《四年防務(wù)審查報(bào)告》
7.Defense Reform Initiative Report《國(guó)防防改革倡議報(bào)告》
8.primary [] 主要的
9.conventional forces 常規(guī)部隊(duì)
10.reserve force 預(yù)備役部隊(duì)
QUESTONS AFTER LISTENING 聽(tīng)后答題:
1.What strategy did Perry raise when he was the Secretary of Defense?
A.Prevent Strategy.
B.Deter Strategy.
C.Defeat Strategy.
D.Prevent-Deter-Defeat Strategy.
2.Which country was seen as a threat to the survival of the United States in the Cold War?
A.China. B.Soviet Union.
C.Cuba. D.North Korea.
3.How did the U.S. deter its adversary from using the threat?
A.To build nuclear forces.
B.To develop ground forces.
C.To build ground forces.
D.To build nuclear forces and ground forces.
4.Perry sees Russia as
A.A threat. B.A friend.
C.A partner. D.An adversary.
5.Perry’s theory of preventive defense says that
A.There are no dangers in the world.
B.There are no enemies in the world.
C.There are dangers in the world.
D.There are instabilities in the world.
6.What is the key tenet of preventive defense?
A.To develop new weapons.
B.To develop a constructive engagement with China and with Russia.
C.To strengthen alliances.
D.To maintain military presence.
7. What is the key to promote peace and security between two countries in Perry’s view?
A.Openness. B.Cooperation.
C.Dialogue. D.The summit meeting.
8. What did the Department of Defense issue last May and November?
A.The Report of National Security Strategy.
B.The Report of Military Strategy.
C.The Report of East Asia Security Strategy.
D.The Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review and Defense Reform Initiative Report.
9. What did the Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review basically specify?
A.The size of the American military forces.
B.The structure of the American military forces.
C.The task of the American military forces.
D.The size and structure of the American military forces.
10. What is the 2MRC strategy?
A.2 Major Regional Contingency.
B.2 Major Regional Conflicts.
C.2 Major Regional Conferences.
D.2 Major Regional Countries.
【參考譯文】
冷戰(zhàn)后美國(guó)的安全戰(zhàn)略
陳伯江:在您擔(dān)任國(guó)防部長(zhǎng)期間, 曾提出把“預(yù)防-威懾-擊敗”作為冷戰(zhàn)后美國(guó)的安全戰(zhàn)略。這一戰(zhàn)略與冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)期美國(guó)奉行的威懾戰(zhàn)略的主要區(qū)別是什么？實(shí)行“預(yù)防-威懾-擊敗”戰(zhàn)略對(duì)美國(guó)軍事力量的發(fā)展的主要要求是什么？
佩里：我談到過(guò)“預(yù)防-威懾-擊敗”戰(zhàn)略。冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)期美國(guó)在面對(duì)蘇聯(lián)威脅的情況下采用了威懾戰(zhàn)略，我們建立了核力量和地面力量用于威懾蘇聯(lián)，使之不能使用那種威脅對(duì)付我們。我們永遠(yuǎn)無(wú)法知道如果我們不實(shí)施威懾，他們是否會(huì)用那種威脅。但我們確實(shí)發(fā)展并建立了這些系統(tǒng)，并且部署它們用于威懾蘇聯(lián)，使之不敢使用他們的威脅。今天我們看不到這種對(duì)美國(guó)生存的威脅。蘇聯(lián)已不復(fù)存在。俄羅斯不僅不是威脅，而且事實(shí)上他們?cè)诮?jīng)濟(jì)上、軍事上、政治上都在與我們合作。我們不再視其為威脅。我們也不把中國(guó)看作威脅。我們把俄羅斯和中國(guó)都看作潛在的伙伴。所以，今天我們看不到那種需要威懾的威脅。預(yù)先防御的理論認(rèn)為，世界上總還存在著危險(xiǎn)。我把采取防御行動(dòng)、先發(fā)制人以免這些危險(xiǎn)變?yōu)橥{稱(chēng)之為預(yù)先防御。在美國(guó)，我們有一個(gè)以?xún)晌粎⒆h員的名字命名的納恩――盧格計(jì)劃。在五角大樓，我們稱(chēng)之為“合作減少威脅”計(jì)劃。按照這個(gè)計(jì)劃，我們與俄羅斯、烏克蘭和哈薩克斯坦就與美國(guó)平行進(jìn)行的減少所有這些國(guó)家的核武器能力進(jìn)行合作，并且?guī)椭砹_斯更加安全地保存剩余的核武器。在我任國(guó)防部長(zhǎng)時(shí)，我曾為美國(guó)防務(wù)基金撥款２０億美元，用于幫助俄斯和哈薩克斯坦減少其大規(guī)模殺傷武器。我認(rèn)為那是一項(xiàng)很好的投資。其預(yù)先防范的意義體現(xiàn)在兩個(gè)方面：首先，促進(jìn)了俄羅斯進(jìn)行與美國(guó)同樣的民主變革；其次，保持剩余的核武器和化學(xué)武器處于良好的控制之下，以使它們不致落入恐怖主義組織之手而變成對(duì)美國(guó)的威脅。這樣就避免了某些因素變?yōu)橥{。今天的威脅與冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)期有很大的不同，那時(shí)威脅的確存在，我們也運(yùn)用了威懾。因此，我想到了三個(gè)步驟：首先是防止危險(xiǎn)變成威脅的措施；如果措施失效了，那么你需要實(shí)施威懾以制止威脅；如果威懾?zé)o效，那么你就必須擊敗 些威脅。
陳：我注意到您曾在一篇文章中指出：“戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的藝術(shù)需要秘密和突然，而和平的藝術(shù)需要開(kāi)放和信任”，怎樣才能促進(jìn)國(guó)家間的開(kāi)放和信任？
佩里：預(yù)先防御的核心思想是發(fā)展與中國(guó)和俄羅斯的建設(shè)性接觸。這將需要開(kāi)放。開(kāi)放是促進(jìn)國(guó)家間和平與安全的關(guān)鍵。
陳：我注意到美國(guó)已經(jīng)開(kāi)始有關(guān)下個(gè)世紀(jì)國(guó)家軍事需要的深入討論。去年５月和１１月，國(guó)防部先后發(fā)表了《四年防務(wù)審查報(bào)告》和《國(guó)防改革倡議報(bào)告》。上述報(bào)告提出了美國(guó)下個(gè)世紀(jì)國(guó)防發(fā)展的目標(biāo)和措施，您對(duì)此有何評(píng)論？您怎樣看待國(guó)際形勢(shì)的發(fā)展和２１世紀(jì)美國(guó)的安全需要？
佩里：《四年防務(wù)審查報(bào)告》基本上說(shuō)明了為了對(duì)會(huì)付我們上面所談到的那些軍事問(wèn)題所需要的美國(guó)軍事力量的規(guī)模和結(jié)構(gòu)。首先，是要把一定的防務(wù)研究投入到我們所說(shuō)的預(yù)先防御。其次，防務(wù)預(yù)算的很大一部分將用于處理地區(qū)威脅?！端哪攴绖?wù)審查報(bào)告》所用的例子是“沙漠風(fēng)暴行動(dòng)”和北朝鮮戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，這是我們面臨的地區(qū)威脅的兩個(gè)主要方面。我們已經(jīng)確定了常規(guī)部隊(duì)的規(guī)模，以便對(duì)付帶有那種特點(diǎn)的地區(qū)威脅，從而使我們能以最少的傷亡快速贏得決定性的勝利。這也就是所謂的打贏“兩場(chǎng)幾乎同時(shí)發(fā)生的大規(guī)模地區(qū)沖突”的戰(zhàn)略?！端哪攴绖?wù)審查報(bào)告》還提出了必須有一友足夠的預(yù)備役部隊(duì)。這樣你在進(jìn)行一場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的時(shí)候，就不會(huì)因第二個(gè)國(guó)家的乘機(jī)攻擊而措手不及。
KEYS TO THE QUESTIONS 參考答案：
１.d 2.b 3.d 4.c 5.c 6.b 7.a 8.d 9.d 10.a
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