美國(guó)政要第17課

所屬教程:美國(guó)政要

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Modern Joint Operations
--Interview with the Professor of National Defense University，Col.Thomas E.Smith 訪美國(guó)國(guó)防大學(xué)教授托馬斯•史密斯上校
MR.CHEN BOJIANG: What is the defining concept or the exact meaning of Joint Operation1? What is the difference between Joint Operation and Multi Services and Arms Cooperation2?
COL. SMITH: To me the big difference is that in true joint operations we're talking about an integration of capabilities and it's not simply several services participating. The participation must be more than that. It must involve integration of the capabilities to take advantage of3 the synergistic4 effect that you achieve by combining capabilities. By the same token5, those who urge some caution about jointness-- that jointness is not always the answer to every circumstance, that perhaps you can try to achieve too much jointness at the expense of your capabilities as individual services. This certainly needs a lot more exploration6 .The basic functions of services are relatively traditional functions. We have had some discussions in our classes about whether these functions should be consistent or whether they need to change. It seems to most people that those are fairly consistent functions. And so the question is whether with new technology application, those functions can be done in a way that is different enough to make them distinctly different from what we are used to or have been used to in the past.
MR. CHEN: How will the legacy7 systems be dealt with during the process of achieving Joint capabilities? Is it possible to improve them and employ them in new and different ways?
COL. SMITH: Well, yes. I think it is. I think that legacy systems will first of all remain important although in some cases become less important, but it is always a mix of old and new systems. And it is very difficult, if not impossible, to change a military completely without dealing with legacy systems. Nor would you want to do that, I would argue. Some people have used the analogy8 of the tip of the spear as being the high-tech9, most capable force，but many other forces remain as part of the spear，still useful in many other operations. There are probably two thoughts here--one that there are types of operations for which legacy systems are still very useful--whether they be operations other than war, smaller conflicts, or fighting against a less capable enemy. And then the other piece is that many of those systems can still play a very useful role even with your higher-tech forces. For example, to some, the army's efforts to digitize the current force can be seen as essentially applying new technologies to old systems. But perhaps it is a way to transition some of those legacy systems with new ideas into newer systems in the future. But obviously they still can remain extremely useful in the interim.
MR. CHEN: In future Joint Operations，how will former operational arts such as Centers of Gravity10 and Decisive Points11, Simultaneity and Depth12, Timing and Tempo13, and so forth, change?
COL.SMITH:I think that most of those concepts first of all will still be extremely valid14, but in fact there may be some changes in centers of gravity--perhaps some of the centers of gravity may be different. And there might be, back to the information operations, different ways of attacking those centers of gravity, Timing and tempo are terms that we use frequently and we think are very important in the sense of 15 relative advantage of one side over the other. As for tempo of operations, normally the faster you can conduct simultaneous and coherent operations, the better, although there are those who caution that faster is not always better. There may be times when operation tempo is too fast. One example is whether it is too fast for political decision makers to ensure that the military instrument is being used effectively to achieve political objectives, and not simply to destroy things or to conduct warfare for warfare's sake16. And at the same time, from a military standpoint17, there may be reasonable limitations on how fast operations could be done and how comprehensive those operations can be in a theater of warfare18.The point I'm making is there still may have to be some sequential19 aspects of an operation，that you can't do everything at once everywhere. So I think there's much to be explored in those areas. And I'm an advocate of experimentation and war-gaming and exercises to try to understand how the operational art might be changing based on new concepts and new technology.
MR. CHEN: How do you view the complexity of command and control in joint operation? Along with the development of information technology，it is likely that command and control will become both centralized20 and decentralized21.How can centralized and decentralized command and control be effectively combined in practice?
COL. SMITH: We imply that there will be a significant increase in centralization necessary to conduct long-range strikes with a system of systems. By the same token，we are saying that potentially the smaller，fast moving forces will have to be decentralized to a significant degree in order for them to accomplish their missions very quickly and perhaps get out of an area if they need to do that. So there might be, as the question seems to indicate, some almost contradictory22 aspects. I think that is really one of the central issues for command and control，and I think we're going to have to somehow strike a balance between the two in the sense that there are practical limitations to the effectiveness of centralization, for example, in terms of having a system that controls where fighters are going to go and which platform fires and at what time. There will need to be a certain amount of that in order to get fire on target quick enough and to hit the target, and there's no way to really totally automate that--to take the man out of the loop, as some people say, and still provide the kind of effectiveness that the people on the ground will need. Again, an area that I would say needs some experimentation and practice to really see what the technology will permit23. And I think it goes back to the man in the loop, in terms of how people can then deal with what the technology potentially has the capability of doing.

Practice Listening to words詞匯聽(tīng)力練習(xí)：
1.Joint Operation 聯(lián)合作戰(zhàn)
2.Multi-Services and Arms Cooperation 多軍兵種協(xié)同作戰(zhàn)
3.take advantage of 利用
4.synergistic [] adj協(xié)同的，協(xié)同作用
5.by the same token 同樣的
6.exploration［］n. 探索
7.legacy［］n. 遺產(chǎn)
legacy systems 現(xiàn)有（或陳舊）系統(tǒng)
8.analogy［］類(lèi)推
9.high-tech 高技術(shù)
10.Centers of Gravity （作戰(zhàn)藝術(shù)中的）重心
11.Decisive Points （作戰(zhàn)藝術(shù)中的）決定點(diǎn)
12.Simultaneity and Depth （作戰(zhàn)藝術(shù)中的）同時(shí)和縱深
13.Timing and Tempo （作戰(zhàn)藝術(shù)中的）時(shí)機(jī)和節(jié)奏
14.valid [] adj. 有效的
15.in the sense of 在……意義上
16.sake [] n. 緣故
17.standpoint [] n. 立場(chǎng)，觀點(diǎn)
18.theater of warfare 戰(zhàn)區(qū)作戰(zhàn)
19.sequential [] adj.連續(xù)的，順序的
20.centralize [] vi. 集中
21.decentralize [] n. 分散
22.contradictory [] adj. 矛盾的
23.permit [] vt. 允許

【參考譯文】
現(xiàn)代聯(lián)合作戰(zhàn)
陳伯江:什么是聯(lián)合作戰(zhàn)的定義或確切含義?聯(lián)合作戰(zhàn)與多軍兵種協(xié)同作戰(zhàn)的區(qū)別是什么?
史密斯:在我看來(lái)，二者最大的不同，在于我們所說(shuō)的真正意義上的聯(lián)合作戰(zhàn)，指的是各種作戰(zhàn)能力的一體化，而不僅僅是幾個(gè)軍種的簡(jiǎn)單參與。聯(lián)合作戰(zhàn)中各軍種參與的程度要比協(xié)同作戰(zhàn)大得多。它必須實(shí)現(xiàn)多種作戰(zhàn)能力的一體化，以便充分利用各種能力相結(jié)合產(chǎn)生的增效?；谕瑯拥睦碛桑行┤藢?duì)聯(lián)合作戰(zhàn)問(wèn)題提出了強(qiáng)烈的質(zhì)疑，認(rèn)為這種聯(lián)合并非總是解決一切問(wèn)題的靈丹妙藥;認(rèn)為只有以犧牲單個(gè)軍種的作戰(zhàn)能力為代價(jià)，才能取得充分的聯(lián)合作戰(zhàn)能力。對(duì)這些問(wèn)題確實(shí)需要進(jìn)行更多地探索。各軍種的基本功能相對(duì)來(lái)說(shuō)都是傳統(tǒng)的功能。我們已在教學(xué)時(shí)對(duì)這些功能究竟是應(yīng)繼續(xù)下去還是需作改變進(jìn)行了討論。多數(shù)人認(rèn)為各軍種的基本功能應(yīng)當(dāng)繼續(xù)保持。于是上述問(wèn)題就變?yōu)?由于新技術(shù)的運(yùn)用，能否以不同的方式實(shí)現(xiàn)這些功能，新的方式與我們現(xiàn)用的或過(guò)去已用的方式有明顯的不同。
陳:在實(shí)現(xiàn)聯(lián)合作戰(zhàn)能力的過(guò)程中，如何對(duì)待現(xiàn)有的武器系統(tǒng)?是否有可能改進(jìn)它們和以新的、不同的方式運(yùn)用它們?
史密斯:是的，我想是這樣。首先我認(rèn)為現(xiàn)有的武器系統(tǒng)仍將是重要的，盡管在某些情況下重要程度有所下降。但通?？偸切隆⒗衔淦飨到y(tǒng)混合使用。完全更新軍隊(duì)的武器系統(tǒng)而淘汰舊系統(tǒng)，如果不是不可能的話(huà)，也是非常困難的。我敢說(shuō)人們也不想那樣做。有些人把高技術(shù)和戰(zhàn)斗力強(qiáng)的部隊(duì)比作“刀尖”，但其它許多部隊(duì)仍然是“刀”的組成部分，在許多作戰(zhàn)中仍然有用。這大概可從兩個(gè)方面來(lái)加以認(rèn)識(shí)，一是，現(xiàn)有武器系統(tǒng)在許多類(lèi)型的作戰(zhàn)中——無(wú)論是非戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)行動(dòng)，還是更小的沖突，或者是與戰(zhàn)斗力較差的敵人作戰(zhàn)——仍然是有用的;二是，既使在裝備了更高技術(shù)的部隊(duì)中，許多現(xiàn)有武器系統(tǒng)仍能發(fā)揮重要作用。例如，有人認(rèn)為，陸軍使現(xiàn)有部隊(duì)數(shù)字化的一些嘗試，基本上屬于把新技術(shù)運(yùn)用于老系統(tǒng)。也許將來(lái)將陳舊系統(tǒng)轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)楦碌南到y(tǒng)會(huì)有新的辦法。很明顯，在過(guò)渡期間陳舊武器系統(tǒng)仍是非常有用的。
陳:在未來(lái)的聯(lián)合作戰(zhàn)中，以往的作戰(zhàn)藝術(shù)如“重心”和“決定點(diǎn)”、“同時(shí)”和“縱深”、“時(shí)機(jī)”和“節(jié)奏”等等，將如何變化?
史密斯:首先，我認(rèn)為以往的作戰(zhàn)概念大多數(shù)仍將適用。“重心”的概念可能會(huì)有一些變化，即有些“重心”可能與過(guò)去不同。仍以信息作戰(zhàn)來(lái)說(shuō)，打擊“重心”的方式可能會(huì)有不同。“時(shí)機(jī)”和“節(jié)奏”是我們經(jīng)常使用的術(shù)語(yǔ)，在形成一方對(duì)于另一方的優(yōu)勢(shì)時(shí)非常重要。就作戰(zhàn)的節(jié)奏而論，你能同時(shí)和緊湊地進(jìn)行作戰(zhàn)，越快越好。盡管有人認(rèn)為并非總是越快越好。有時(shí)作戰(zhàn)速度可能會(huì)太快。一個(gè)例子是作戰(zhàn)速度太快以致政治決策者無(wú)法確定軍事手段是否已有效地用來(lái)達(dá)成政治目標(biāo)，而不只是簡(jiǎn)單地用來(lái)進(jìn)行毀滅或?yàn)榇蛘潭蛘獭Ｅc此同時(shí)，從軍事的角度來(lái)說(shuō)，可在戰(zhàn)區(qū)作戰(zhàn)的速度能有多快，范圍能有多廣泛，也可能有一些適當(dāng)?shù)南拗?。我的意思是作?zhàn)仍可能順序展開(kāi)，你不可能立刻在所有地方做所有事情。因此，我認(rèn)為在這些領(lǐng)域有許多問(wèn)題需要探索。我積極主張通過(guò)試驗(yàn)、作戰(zhàn)模擬和演習(xí)，努力弄清以往的戰(zhàn)役法在新作戰(zhàn)概念和新技術(shù)基礎(chǔ)上會(huì)發(fā)生什么變化。
陳:你怎樣看待聯(lián)合作戰(zhàn)中指揮與控制問(wèn)題的復(fù)雜性?隨著信息技術(shù)的發(fā)展，指揮與控制好像將要向集中和分散兩個(gè)方面發(fā)展，在實(shí)踐中怎樣使指揮控制的集中與分散有效地結(jié)合起來(lái)?
史密斯:我們的意思是，對(duì)于實(shí)施“系統(tǒng)集成”的遠(yuǎn)距離打擊來(lái)說(shuō)，更需要增加指揮與控制的集中程度。此外，我們也認(rèn)為更小型、更快速的機(jī)動(dòng)部隊(duì)的指揮與控制要大大分散，使他們能夠很快地完成任務(wù)，也許是很快地離開(kāi)一個(gè)區(qū)域，如果他們需要那樣做的話(huà)。因此，正如這一問(wèn)題所表明的，這里可能存在著一些相互矛盾的方面。我認(rèn)為這確實(shí)是指揮與控制的一個(gè)核心問(wèn)題。而且我認(rèn)為我們必須設(shè)法在集中指揮與控制的有效性存在著實(shí)際限制的情況下（例如，要有一個(gè)系統(tǒng)來(lái)控制戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)向哪里飛和哪一個(gè)作戰(zhàn)平臺(tái)發(fā)射以及何時(shí)發(fā)射），求得集中與分散兩者之間的平衡。為了足夠快地向目標(biāo)開(kāi)火并擊毀目標(biāo)，將需要一定數(shù)量的系統(tǒng)。但真正全部實(shí)現(xiàn)自動(dòng)化（像某些人說(shuō)的人離開(kāi)指揮鏈）是不可能的。仍將需要地面上的人來(lái)提供那種集中指揮與控制的有效性。我想重申的一點(diǎn)是，我們需要一些試驗(yàn)和實(shí)踐來(lái)確實(shí)弄清哪些技術(shù)適用于這一領(lǐng)域。并且我認(rèn)為，就人們?cè)鯓硬拍苷业侥切撛诘募夹g(shù)具有做這些的能力而言，它又重新回到指揮與控制鏈中的人上來(lái)。