羅斯福于1932年在聯(lián)邦俱樂部的演講

羅斯福于1932年在聯(lián)邦俱樂部的演講 英文版

Commonwealth Club Address

September 23, 1932

I count it a privilege to be invited to address the Commonwealth Club. It has stood in the life of this city and state, and it is perhaps accurate to add, the nation, as a group of citizen leaders interested in fundamental problems of government, and chiefly concerned with achievement of progress in government through non-partisan means. The privilege of addressing you, therefore, in the heat of a political campaign, is great. I want to respond to your courtesy in terms consistent with your policy.

I want to speak not of politics but of government. I want to speak not of parties, but of universal principles. They are not political, except in that larger sense in which a great American once expressed a definition of politics, that nothing in all of human life is foreign to the science of politics...

The issue of government has always been whether individual men and women will have to serve some system of government of economics, or whether a system of government and economics exists to serve individual men and women. This question has persistently dominated the discussion of government for many generations. On questions relating to these things men have differed, and for time immemorial it is probable that honest men will continue to differ.

The final word belongs to no man; yet we can still believe in change and in progress. Democracy, as a dear old friend of mine in Indian, Meredith Nicholson, has called it, is a quest, a never-ending seeking for better things, and in the seeking for these things and the striving for better things, and in the seeking for these things and the striving for them, there are many roads to follow. But, if we map the course of these roads, we find that there are only two general directions.

When we look about us, we are likely to forget how hard people have worked to win the privilege of government. The growth of the national governments of Europe was a struggle for the development of a centralized force in the nation, strong enough to impose peace upon ruling barons. In many instances the victory of the central government, the creation of a strong central government, was a haven of refuge to the individual. The people preferred the master far away to the exploitation and cruelty of the smaller master near at hand.

But the creators of national government were perforce ruthless men. They were often cruel in their methods, but they did strive steadily toward something that society needed and very much wanted, a strong central state, able to keep the peace, to stamp out civil war, to put the unruly nobleman in his place, and to permit the bulk of individuals to live safely. The man of ruthless force had his place in developing a pioneer country, just as he did in fixing the power of the central government in the development of nations. Society paid him well for his services and its development.

When the development among the nations of Europe, however, has been completed, ambition, and ruthlessness, having served its term tended to overstep its mark. There came a growing feeling that government was conducted for the benefit of a few who thrived unduly at the expense of all. The people sought a balancing—a limiting force. There came gradually, through town councils, trade guilds, national parliaments, by constitution and by popular participation and control, limitations on arbitrary power. Another factor that tended to limit the power of those who ruled, was the rise of the ethical conception that a ruler bore a responsibility for the welfare of his subjects.

The American colonies were born in this struggle. The American Revolution was a turning point in it. After the revolution the struggle continued and shaped itself in the public life of the country. There were those who because they had seen the confusion which attended the years of war for American independence surrendered to the belief that popular government was essentially dangerous and essentially unworkable. They were honest people, my friends, and we cannot deny that their experience had warranted some measure of fear. The most brilliant, honest and able exponent of this point of view was Hamilton. He was too impatient of slow moving methods. Fundamentally he believed that the safety of the republic lay in the autocratic strength of its government, that the destiny of individuals was to serve that government, and that fundamentally a great and strong group of central institutions, guided by a small group of able and public spirited citizens could best direct all government.

But Mr. Jefferson, in the summer of 1776, after drafting the Declaration of Independence turned his mind to the same problem and took a different view. He did not deceive himself with outward forms. Government to him was a means to an end, not an end in itself; it might be either a refuge and a help or a threat and a danger, depending on the circumstances. We find him carefully analyzing the society for which he was to organize a government. “We have no paupers. The great mass of our population is of laborers, our rich who cannot live without labor, either manual or professional, being few and of moderate wealth. Most of the laboring class possess property, cultivate their own lands, have families and from the demand for their labor, are enabled to exact from the rich and the competent such prices as enable them to feed abundantly, clothe above mere decency, to labor moderately and raise their families.”

These people, he considered, had two sets of rights, those of “personal competency” and those involved in acquiring and possessing property. By “personal competency” he meant the right of free thinking, freedom of forming and expressing opinions, and freedom of personal living each man according to his own lights. To insure the first set of rights, a government must so order its functions as not to interfere with the individual. But even Jefferson realized that the exercise of the property rights might so interfere with the rights of the individual that the government, without whose assistance the property rights could not exist, must intervene, not to destroy individualism but to protect it.

You are familiar with the great political duel which followed, and how Hamilton, and his friends, building towards a dominant centralized power were at length defeated in the great election of 1800, by Mr. Jefferson’s party. Out of that duel came the two parties, Republican and Democratic, as we know them today.

So began, in American political life, the new day, the day of the individual against the system, the day in which individualism was made the great watchword of American life. The happiest of economic conditions made that day long and splendid. On the Western frontier, land was substantially free. No one, who did not shirk the task of earning a living, was entirely without opportunity to do so. Depressions could, and did, come and go; but they could not alter the fundamental fact that most of the people lived partly by selling their labor and partly by extracting their livelihood from the soil, so that starvation and dislocation were practically impossible. At the very worst there was always the possibility of climbing into a covered wagon and moving west where the untilled prairies afforded a haven for men to whom the East did not provide a place. So great were our natural resources that we could offer this relief not only to our own people, but to the distressed of all of the world; we could invite immigration from Europe, and welcome it with open arms. Traditionally, when a depression came, a new section of land was opened in the West; and even our temporary misfortune served our manifest destiny.

It was the middle of the 19th century that a new force was released and a new dream created. The force was what is called the industrial revolution, the advance of steam and machinery and the rise of the forerunners of the modern industrial plant. The dream was the dream of an economic machine, able to raise the standard of living for everyone; to bring luxury within the reach of the humblest; to annihilate distance by steam power and later by electricity, and to release everyone from the drudgery of the heaviest manual toil. It was to be expected that this would necessarily affect government. Heretofore, government had merely been called upon to produce conditions within which people could live happily, labor peacefully, and rest secure. Now it was called upon to aid in the consummation of this new dream. There was, however, a shadow over the dream. To be made real, it required use of the talents of men of tremendous will, and tremendous ambition, since by no other force could the problems of financing and engineering and new developments be brought to a consummation.

So manifests were the advantages of the machine age, however, that the United States fearlessly, cheerfully, and, I think, rightly, accepted the bitter with the sweet. It was thought that no price was too high to pay for the advantages which we could draw from a finished industrial system. The history of the last half century is accordingly in large measure a history of a group of financial Titans, whose methods were not scrutinized with too much care, and who were honored in proportion as they produced the results, irrespective of the means they used. The financiers who pushed the railroads to the Pacific were always ruthless, we have them today. It has been estimated that the American investor paid for the American railway system more than three times over in the process; but despite that fact the net advantage was to the United States. As long as we had free land; as long as population was growing by leaps and bounds; as long as our industrial plants were insufficient to supply our needs, society chose to give the ambitious man free play and unlimited reward provided only that he produced the economic plant so much desired.

During this period of expansion, there was equal opportunity for all and the business of government was not to interfere but to assist in the development of industry. This was done at the request of businessmen themselves. The tariff was originally imposed for the purpose of “fostering our infant industry”, a phrase I think the older among you will remember as a political issue not so long ago. The railroads were subsidized, sometimes by grants of money, oftener by grants of land; some of the most valuable oil lands in the United States were granted to assist the financing of the railroad which pushed through the Southwest. A nascent merchant marine was assisted by grants of money, or by mail subsidies, so that our steam shipping might ply the seven seas.

Some of my friends tell me that they do not want the Government in business. With this I agree; but I wonder whether they realize the implications of the past. For while it has been American doctrine that the government must not go into business in competition with private enterprises, still it has been traditional particularly in Republican administrations for business urgently to ask the government to put at private disposal all kinds of government assistance.

The same man who tells you that he does not want to see the government interfere in business—and he means it, and has plenty of good reasons for saying so—is the first to go to Washington and ask the government for a prohibitory tariff on his product. When things get just bad enough—as they did two years ago—he will go with equal speed to the United States government and ask for a loan; and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is the outcome of it. Each group has sought protection from the government for its own special interest, without realizing that the function of government must be to favor no small group at the expense of its duty to protect the rights of personal freedom and of private property of all its citizens.

In retrospect we can now see that the turn of the tide came with the turn of the century. We were reaching our last frontier; there was no more free land and our industrial combinations had become great uncontrolled and irresponsible units of power within the state. Clear-sighted men saw with fear the danger that opportunity would no longer be equal; that the growing corporation, like the feudal baron of old, might threaten the economic freedom of individuals to earn a living. In that hour, our antitrust laws were born. The cry was raised against the great corporations. Theodore Roosevelt, the first great Republican progressive, fought a Presidential campaign on the issue of “trust busting” and talked freely about malefactors of great wealth. If the government had a policy it was rather to turn the clock back, to destroy the large combinations and to return to the time when every man owned his individual small business.

This was impossible; Theodore Roosevelt, abandoning the idea of “trust busting”, was forced to work out a difference between “good” trusts and “bad” trusts. The Supreme Court set forth the famous “rule of reason” by which it seems to have meant that a concentration of industrial power was permissible if the method by which it got its power, and the use it made of that power, was reasonable.

Woodrow Wilson, elected in 1912, saw the situation more clearly. Where Jefferson had feared the encroachment of political power on the lives of individuals, Wilson knew that the new power was financial. He say, in the highly centralized economic system, the depot of the twentieth century, on whom great masses of individuals relied for their safety and their livelihood, and whose irresponsibility and greed (if it were not controlled) would reduce them to starvation and penury. The concentration of financial power had not proceeded so far in 1912 as it has today; but it had grown far enough for Mr. Wilson to realize fully its implications. It is interesting, now, to read his speeches.

What is called “radical” today (and I have reason to know whereof I speak) is mild compared to the campaign of Mr. Wilson. “No man can deny,” he said, “that the lines of endeavor have more and more narrowed and stiffened; no man who knows anything about the development of industry in this country can have failed to observe that the larger kinds of credit are more and more difficult to obtain unless you obtain them upon terms of uniting your efforts with those who already control the industry of the country, and nobody can fail to observe that every man who tries to set himself up in competition with any process of manufacture which has taken place under the control of large combinations of capital will presently find himself either squeezed out or obliged to sell and allow himself to be absorbed.”

Had there been no World War—had Mr. Wilson been able to devote eight years to domestic instead of to international affairs—we might have had a wholly different situation at the present time. However, the then distant roar of European cannon, growing ever louder, forced him to abandon the study of this issue. The problem he saw so clearly is left with us as a legacy; and no one of us on either side of the political controversy can deny that it is a matter of grave concern to the government.

A glance at the situation today only too clearly indicates that equality of opportunity as we have knew it no longer exists. Our industrial plant is built; the problem just now is whether under existing conditions it is not overbuilt. Our last frontier has long since been reached, and there is practically no more free land. More than half of our people do not live on the farms or on lands and cannot derive a living by cultivating their own property. There is no safety valve in the form of a Western prairie to which those thrown out of work by the Eastern economic machines can go for a new start. We are not able to invite the immigration from Europe to share our endless plenty. We are now providing a drab living for our own people.

Our system of constantly rising tariffs has at last reacted against us to the point of closing our Canadian frontier on the north, our European markets on the east, many of our Latin American markets to the south, and a goodly proportion of our Pacific markets on the west, through the retaliatory tariffs of those countries. It has forced many of our great industrial institutions who exported their surplus production to such countries, to establish plants in such countries within the tariff walls. This has resulted in the reduction of the operation of their American plants, and opportunity for employment.

Just as freedom to farm has ceased, so also the opportunity in business has narrowed. It still is true that men can start small enterprises, trusting to native shrewdness and ability to keep abreast of competitors; but area after area has been preempted altogether by the great corporations, and even in the fields which still have no great concerns, the small man starts with a handicap. The unfeeling statistics of the past three decades show that the independent business man is running a losing race. Perhaps he is forced to the wall; perhaps he cannot command credit; perhaps he is “squeezed out,” in Mr. Wilson’s words, by highly organized corporate competitors, as your corner grocery man can tell you.

Recently a careful study was made of the concentration of business in the United States. It showed that our economic life was dominated by some six hundred odd corporations who controlled two-thirds of American industry. Ten million small business men divided the other third. More striking still, it appeared that if the process of concentration goes on at the same rate, at the end of another century we shall have all American industry controlled by a dozen corporations, and run by perhaps a hundred men. Put plainly, we are steering a steady course toward economic oligarchy, if we are not there already.

Clearly, all this calls for a re-appraisal of values. A mere builder of more industrial plants, a creator of more railroad systems, and organizer of more corporations, is as likely to be a danger as a help. The day of the great promoter or the financial Titan, to whom we granted anything if only he would build, or develop, is over. Our task now is not discovery or exploitation of natural resources, or necessarily producing more goods. It is the soberer, less dramatic business of administering resources and plants already in hand, of seeking to reestablish foreign markets for our surplus production, of meeting the problem of under consumption, of adjusting production to consumption, of distributing wealth and products more equitably, of adapting existing economic organizations to the service of the people. The day of enlightened administration has come.

Just as in older times the central government was first a haven of refuge, and then a threat, so now in a closer economic system the central and ambitious financial unit is no longer a servant of national desire, but a danger. I would draw the parallel one step farther. We did not think because national government had become a threat in the 18th century that therefore we should abandon the principle of national government. Nor today should we abandon the principle of strong economic units called corporations, merely because their power is susceptible of easy abuse. In other times we dealt with the problem of an unduly ambitious central government by modifying it gradually into a constitutional democratic government. So today we are modifying and controlling our economic units.

As I see it, the task of government in its relation to business is to assist the development of an economic declaration of rights, an economic constitutional order. This is the common task of statesman and business man. It is the minimum requirement of a more permanently safe order of things.

Every man has a right to life; and this means that he has also a right to make a comfortable living. He may by sloth or crime decline to exercise that right; but it may not be denied him. We have no actual famine or death; our industrial and agricultural mechanism can produce enough and to spare. Our government formal and informal, political and economic, owes to every one an avenue to possess himself of a portion of that plenty sufficient for his needs, through his own work.

Every man has a right to his own property; which means a right to be assured, to the fullest extent attainable, in the safety of his savings. By no other means can men carry the burdens of those parts of life which, in the nature of things afford no chance of labor; childhood, sickness, old age. In all thought of property, this right is paramount; all other property rights must yield to it. If, in accord with this principle, we must restrict the operations of the speculator, the manipulator, even the financier, I believe we must accept the restriction as needful, not to hamper individualism but to protect it.

These two requirements must be satisfied, in the main, by the individuals who claim and hold control of the great industrial and financial combinations which dominate so large a pert of our industrial life. They have undertaken to be, not business men, but princes—princes of property. I am not prepared to say that the system which produces them is wrong. I am very clear that they must fearlessly and competently assume the responsibility which goes with the power. So many enlightened business men know this that the statement would be little more that a platitude, were it not for an added implication.

This implication is, briefly, that the responsible heads of finance and industry instead of acting each for himself, must work together to achieve the common end. They must, where necessary, sacrifice this or that private advantage; and in reciprocal self-denial must seek a general advantage. It is here that formal government—political government, if you choose, comes in. Whenever in the pursuit of this objective the lone wolf, the unethical competitor, the reckless promoter, the Ishmael or Insull whose hand is against every man’s, declines to join in achieving and end recognized as being for the public welfare, and threatens to drag the industry back to a state of anarchy, the government may properly be asked to apply restraint. Likewise, should the group ever use its collective power contrary to public welfare, the government must be swift to enter and protect the public interest.

The government should assume the function of economic regulation only as a last resort, to be tried only when private initiative, inspired by high responsibility, with such assistance and balance as government can give, has finally failed. As yet there has been no final failure, because there has been no attempt, and I decline to assume that this nation is unable to meet the situation.

The final term of the high contract was for liberty and the pursuit of happiness. We have learnt a great deal of both in the past century. We know that individual liberty and individual happiness mean nothing unless both are ordered in the sense that one man’s meat is not another man’s poison. We know that the old “rights of personal competency”—the right to read, to think, to speak to choose and live a mode of life, must be respected at all hazards. We know that liberty to do anything which deprives others of those elemental rights is outside the protection of any compact; and that government in this regard is the maintenance of a balance, within which every individual may have a place if he will take it; in which every individual may find safety if he wishes it; in which every individual may attain such power as his ability permits, consistent with his assuming the accompanying responsibility...

Faith in America, faith in our tradition of personal responsibility, faith in our institutions, faith in ourselves demands that we recognize the new terms of the old social contract. We shall fulfill them, as we fulfilled the obligation of the apparent Utopia which Jefferson imagined for us in 1776, and which Jefferson, Roosevelt and Wilson sought to bring to realization. We must do so, lest a rising tide of misery engendered by our common failure, engulf us all. But failure is not an American habit; and in the strength of great hope we must all shoulder our common load.

羅斯福于1932年在聯(lián)邦俱樂部的演講 中文版

聯(lián)邦俱樂部演說

1932年9月23日

能在聯(lián)邦俱樂部發(fā)言，我感到十分榮幸。聯(lián)邦俱樂部對(duì)這個(gè)城市、對(duì)這個(gè)州影響巨大，或者更確切地說，對(duì)美國(guó)影響巨大。聯(lián)邦俱樂部作為一個(gè)公民領(lǐng)袖組織，對(duì)政體的根本問題感興趣，特別關(guān)注以無(wú)黨派方式取得的政體進(jìn)步。能在競(jìng)選活動(dòng)最激烈的時(shí)候，有幸為你們做這次演講真是令人激動(dòng)。為了報(bào)答你們的好意，我會(huì)與你們保持原則上的一致。

我不想談?wù)味務(wù)務(wù)w，也不談?wù)h而要說說普遍原則。這些與政治無(wú)關(guān)，盡管一位美國(guó)偉人曾經(jīng)給政治下的定義是從廣義上講一切人類生活皆與政治科學(xué)有關(guān)。

政體問題通常就是個(gè)人是否不得不服從某種經(jīng)濟(jì)體制，或者某種政治經(jīng)濟(jì)體制的存在是否服務(wù)于個(gè)人。這個(gè)問題是長(zhǎng)久以來(lái)討論政體問題的核心所在。一直以來(lái)人們圍繞政體問題，有過許多不同的見解。而且坦率的人們很有可能還是一如既往地堅(jiān)持自己的觀點(diǎn)。

沒有人對(duì)此有最后發(fā)言權(quán)，但我們?nèi)匀粓?jiān)信會(huì)有所改變，有所進(jìn)步。正如我一位親愛的印度老友梅雷蒂斯尼克爾森說的，民主是一種渴求，一種對(duì)更好事物的不斷尋求。在找尋這些并努力去獲取更好事物的過程中，有很多路可走。但是，如果我們描繪出這些路的方向，我們會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)大致只有兩個(gè)方向。

當(dāng)我們環(huán)顧自己周圍，可能會(huì)忘了人民付出了多少努力去獲得政府特權(quán)。歐洲各國(guó)政府的發(fā)展就是國(guó)家不斷加強(qiáng)中央集權(quán)的斗爭(zhēng)過程。在許多情況下，中央政府的成功或者說一個(gè)強(qiáng)大中央政府的建立對(duì)個(gè)人而言是一個(gè)庇護(hù)所。人民寧可選擇一個(gè)遠(yuǎn)在天邊的主人，也不愿意承受近在咫尺的主人的剝削和凌虐。

然而國(guó)家政府的創(chuàng)建者必定是無(wú)情的。他們通常手段殘酷，但的的確確是在不斷地為社會(huì)所需以及迫切所需而奮斗。一個(gè)強(qiáng)大的中央政府能夠維護(hù)社會(huì)穩(wěn)定、避免內(nèi)戰(zhàn)，讓蠻橫的貴族安分守己，還能讓大多數(shù)人過上安定的生活。在一個(gè)先驅(qū)國(guó)家的發(fā)展中，鐵血手腕之人不可或缺，正如國(guó)家發(fā)展期間他在鞏固中央政府權(quán)力上所做的一切。社會(huì)對(duì)他的付出回報(bào)甚多，同時(shí)社會(huì)也得以發(fā)展。

然而當(dāng)歐洲各國(guó)的發(fā)展完善后，野心和冷酷往往早已超過了可以承受的常態(tài)。那時(shí)人們?cè)絹?lái)越覺得政府是為了一小撮人的利益服務(wù)，這些人可以為了暴富而犧牲一切。民眾開始尋求一種平衡的、有限度的權(quán)力。之后他們漸漸地通過鎮(zhèn)議會(huì)、同業(yè)公會(huì)、國(guó)民議會(huì)，用憲法和民眾參與和控制的手段來(lái)對(duì)強(qiáng)權(quán)加以限制。另一個(gè)往往能限制統(tǒng)治者權(quán)力的因素是道德觀念的興起，道德觀念認(rèn)為一個(gè)統(tǒng)治者應(yīng)該對(duì)其國(guó)民的福利待遇承擔(dān)責(zé)任。

北美殖民地就是在這種抗?fàn)幹姓Q生的。其中，美國(guó)獨(dú)立戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)是個(gè)轉(zhuǎn)折點(diǎn)，但這之后抗?fàn)幍靡匝永m(xù)，并對(duì)國(guó)家公眾生活產(chǎn)生重大影響。有一些參加了多年獨(dú)立戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的人因?yàn)樵?jīng)目睹了混亂的狀態(tài)，所以相信一個(gè)民選政府必然是危險(xiǎn)的而且是不可行的。朋友們，他們是坦誠(chéng)的。我們得承認(rèn)他們肯定經(jīng)歷了許多可怕的事情。漢密爾頓是這種思想最卓越、最真實(shí)也是最能干的倡導(dǎo)者。他對(duì)行動(dòng)緩慢的做法很反感。他從根本上堅(jiān)信共和國(guó)的安定在于政府本身專政的力量，認(rèn)為個(gè)人注定要為政府服務(wù)，而且小部分能干且有公眾意識(shí)的公民可以領(lǐng)導(dǎo)一系列強(qiáng)大的中央機(jī)構(gòu)，而這些機(jī)構(gòu)可以很好地履行各項(xiàng)政府職能。

但在1776年的夏天，在起草《獨(dú)立宣言》后，杰斐遜先生想到了同樣的問題，卻持有不同的觀點(diǎn)。他不喜歡自欺欺人。對(duì)他而言，政府是達(dá)到目標(biāo)的一種方法而非目標(biāo)本身。在不同情況下，政府可以是一個(gè)避風(fēng)港、一種援助，也可能成為一種威脅和危險(xiǎn)。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)他對(duì)要組建政府的這個(gè)社會(huì)做了仔細(xì)的分析:“我們沒有窮人。我們?nèi)丝谥械拇蟛糠质莿趧?dòng)力。無(wú)論是那些極少部分的富人還是中產(chǎn)階級(jí)，他們?cè)隗w力勞動(dòng)和腦力勞動(dòng)上都依賴勞動(dòng)力。大部分的勞動(dòng)階級(jí)擁有財(cái)產(chǎn)，耕種自己的田地，有家庭。富人和雇主需要?jiǎng)诹?，這樣勞動(dòng)者就能向他們索取報(bào)酬來(lái)吃飽穿暖，做適量工作來(lái)養(yǎng)活全家。”

杰斐遜認(rèn)為這些人有兩項(xiàng)權(quán)利，一個(gè)關(guān)于“個(gè)人權(quán)利”，另一個(gè)涉及財(cái)產(chǎn)的獲得和擁有。個(gè)人權(quán)利在他看來(lái)是指一個(gè)人有權(quán)自由思想，自由提出和表達(dá)看法以及根據(jù)個(gè)人能力自由生存。為了保障人們的第一類權(quán)利，政府必須嚴(yán)格履行其職能以免干涉到個(gè)人。然而杰斐遜也認(rèn)識(shí)到財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)的行使可能會(huì)阻礙到個(gè)人的一些權(quán)力。這樣一來(lái)，政府就必須干預(yù)，這并不是要破壞個(gè)人主義，而是一種保護(hù)。沒有政府的協(xié)助，財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)無(wú)法存在。

你們對(duì)此后的那場(chǎng)激烈的政治斗爭(zhēng)應(yīng)該不會(huì)陌生，期望建立一個(gè)高度集權(quán)政府的漢密爾頓和他的朋友們，最后在1800年的大選中被杰斐遜帶領(lǐng)的政黨擊敗。在那次政治斗爭(zhēng)之后出現(xiàn)了兩個(gè)政黨，就是我們今天所知道的共和黨和民主黨。

從此開啟了美國(guó)政治生活的新時(shí)代，在這個(gè)時(shí)代個(gè)人與制度相抗衡，個(gè)人主義成為美國(guó)人生活中最響亮的口號(hào)。最佳的經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境使那個(gè)時(shí)代持久而且輝煌。在西部邊遠(yuǎn)地區(qū)，土地是完全自由的。如果不是刻意要逃避謀生，沒有人會(huì)活不下去。經(jīng)濟(jì)蕭條可能也的確是來(lái)了又走了，但并不能改變基本現(xiàn)狀：大部分人一半靠出賣勞動(dòng)力，一半靠種地謀生。這樣的話，幾乎不可能出現(xiàn)饑餓和混亂。到了最糟糕的時(shí)候，人們就會(huì)坐上有篷馬車前往西部，那里有未開墾的大草原，可以提供給人們東部所沒有的港灣。我們的自然資源如此豐富，不僅可以提供救濟(jì)給國(guó)人，也可以給全世界受苦的人們。我們可以邀請(qǐng)歐洲的移民并張開雙臂歡迎他們的到來(lái)。就傳統(tǒng)而言，當(dāng)蕭條時(shí)期來(lái)臨，在西部就會(huì)有一部分新的土地開放。即使暫時(shí)的災(zāi)難也能滿足我們擴(kuò)張美國(guó)在北美洲領(lǐng)土的需要。

就在十九世紀(jì)中葉，出現(xiàn)了一股新勢(shì)力，人們創(chuàng)造了一個(gè)新夢(mèng)想。那股新勢(shì)力就是現(xiàn)在所說的工業(yè)革命，蒸汽動(dòng)力和機(jī)械動(dòng)力開始發(fā)展，出現(xiàn)了現(xiàn)代工業(yè)工廠的前身。夢(mèng)想有一個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)機(jī)器，能夠提高每個(gè)人的生活水平，讓最貧窮的人們也能享受奢侈，通過蒸汽動(dòng)力和之后的電力來(lái)徹底消除地域上的距離，使每個(gè)人都能從報(bào)酬最低、最辛苦的體力勞動(dòng)中解脫出來(lái)。人們預(yù)料到這不可避免地會(huì)影響到政府。在此之前，人們只是要求政府創(chuàng)造條件讓人們開心地生活，平靜地勞作，安穩(wěn)地休息。而現(xiàn)在人們還要求政府協(xié)助實(shí)現(xiàn)他們的新夢(mèng)想。但是，這個(gè)夢(mèng)想被蒙上了一層陰影。要實(shí)現(xiàn)它需要意志力強(qiáng)大和雄心勃勃的人們發(fā)揮他們的才能，因?yàn)槠渌α慷紵o(wú)法讓財(cái)政、工程以及新的發(fā)展問題得以圓滿解決。

然而，盡管機(jī)器時(shí)代的優(yōu)勢(shì)非常明顯，我認(rèn)為美國(guó)還是大膽地、愉快地、肯定地接受了這種苦樂參半。人們認(rèn)為一個(gè)完善的工業(yè)體系帶來(lái)的好處是無(wú)價(jià)的。因此，過去半個(gè)世紀(jì)的歷史很大程度上是屬于一群經(jīng)濟(jì)巨頭的。人們沒有仔細(xì)探究他們的方法。同時(shí)，不管他們用何種方式，他們都因自己做出的成果獲得了相應(yīng)的榮譽(yù)。那些建造了太平洋鐵路的金融家們都是殘酷無(wú)情的。我們現(xiàn)在仍然可以看到這樣的人。據(jù)估計(jì)，美國(guó)投資者在美國(guó)鐵路系統(tǒng)建設(shè)過程中多花了三倍多的錢，但是事實(shí)上美國(guó)確實(shí)享受到了鐵路網(wǎng)線帶來(lái)的好處。只要我們有自由空曠的土地，只要人口數(shù)量突飛猛進(jìn)地增長(zhǎng)，只要我們的工業(yè)工廠不能滿足我們的需求，社會(huì)就會(huì)讓野心勃勃的人們盡情發(fā)揮并給予無(wú)條件的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)，只要他們能建造出人們所迫切需要的經(jīng)濟(jì)工廠。

在擴(kuò)張的這段時(shí)期內(nèi)，每個(gè)人都享有平等的機(jī)會(huì)，政府的職能不是干預(yù)而是支持工業(yè)的發(fā)展。這也是商人們自己的要求。最初，征收關(guān)稅是為了“培養(yǎng)我們的新生工業(yè)”。我想，你們中的年長(zhǎng)者聽到這個(gè)說法，會(huì)感覺就像發(fā)生在不久前的一樁政治事件。鐵路有時(shí)由現(xiàn)金資助，更多情況下采取土地補(bǔ)償。美國(guó)的一些最有價(jià)值的儲(chǔ)有石油的土地被作為建造穿越西南部鐵路的補(bǔ)償。一個(gè)新建的商船隊(duì)由現(xiàn)金或者郵政補(bǔ)助金資助，這樣我們的蒸汽船就能往來(lái)于七大洋了。

我的一些朋友告訴我他們不愿意政府介入商業(yè)活動(dòng)。這一點(diǎn)我同意，但我不清楚他們知不知道歷史給我們的昭示。曾經(jīng)有段時(shí)間，政府一定不能介入商業(yè)活動(dòng)與私人企業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)成為美國(guó)教條。特別是在共和黨政府中，人們?nèi)匀黄惹幸笳桓蓴_企業(yè)自由決斷，而僅在商業(yè)方面提供各項(xiàng)協(xié)助。

還是那個(gè)人，他告訴你他不想看見政府插手商業(yè)——他是當(dāng)真的，也有充分的理由這樣說——卻第一個(gè)去華盛頓，并要求政府禁止給他的商品上關(guān)稅的人。當(dāng)事情如同兩年前那樣變得非常糟糕的時(shí)候，他又以同樣的速度到美國(guó)政府要求貸款，而復(fù)興銀行公司就這樣應(yīng)運(yùn)而生了。每個(gè)集團(tuán)都為了自己的個(gè)別利益尋求政府保護(hù)，卻沒有認(rèn)識(shí)到政府不能因照顧少數(shù)團(tuán)體而以未盡到保護(hù)個(gè)人自由和所有公民私有財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)的責(zé)任作為代價(jià)。

追溯過去我們可以看到，隨著世紀(jì)的交替形勢(shì)也在轉(zhuǎn)變。我們正向最后一塊邊遠(yuǎn)地區(qū)靠近。再?zèng)]有自由的土地了，我們的聯(lián)合企業(yè)已嚴(yán)重失控，在州內(nèi)成了不負(fù)責(zé)任的權(quán)勢(shì)部門。聰明的人看到了失去平等機(jī)會(huì)的危機(jī)，害怕一個(gè)發(fā)展中的公司會(huì)像一位封建老男爵那樣，威脅到個(gè)人謀生的經(jīng)濟(jì)自由。就在那個(gè)重要時(shí)刻，我們的反壟斷法出臺(tái)了。反對(duì)大型企業(yè)的呼聲高漲。第一位偉大的共和黨進(jìn)步主義人物西奧多·羅斯福發(fā)起了以“取締壟斷”為主題的總統(tǒng)競(jìng)選，并縱談巨富的作惡者。如果政府可以采取政策，人們更情愿摧毀強(qiáng)大的商業(yè)聯(lián)合，回到過去每個(gè)人都擁有自己小企業(yè)的時(shí)代。

但這是不可能的。西奧多·羅斯福放棄了“取締壟斷”的想法，只能提出區(qū)別“好的”托拉斯和“壞的”托拉斯。最高法院提出了著名的“理性原則”，這樣似乎就意味著如果企業(yè)獲取權(quán)力的方式以及對(duì)這個(gè)權(quán)力的使用是合理的，那么工業(yè)集權(quán)是允許的。

1912年當(dāng)選總統(tǒng)的伍德羅·威爾遜更能看清形勢(shì)。杰斐遜曾擔(dān)心政權(quán)會(huì)侵害到個(gè)人生活，威爾遜則知道那個(gè)新權(quán)是關(guān)于經(jīng)濟(jì)的。他說，在高度集中的經(jīng)濟(jì)體系中，二十世紀(jì)的儲(chǔ)備庫(kù)會(huì)保證民眾的安全與生存。但如果沒有得到控制，那些不負(fù)責(zé)任和貪婪的人會(huì)讓民眾陷入饑餓與赤貧中。財(cái)政集權(quán)到1912年為止和現(xiàn)在相比沒有任何進(jìn)步。但它的發(fā)展足以讓威爾遜先生充分意識(shí)到它的潛在影響?，F(xiàn)在看他的演講稿覺得很有意思。

今天所謂的“激進(jìn)分子”(我有理由知道我講的是什么)同威爾遜的競(jìng)選運(yùn)動(dòng)比起來(lái)還是溫和的。他說：“沒有人可以否認(rèn)努力的方向變得越來(lái)越窄、越來(lái)越僵化。了解這個(gè)國(guó)家工業(yè)發(fā)展的人都知道，除非你與那些已經(jīng)控制國(guó)家工業(yè)的人聯(lián)手，否則大型貸款越來(lái)越難獲得。大家都知道任何一個(gè)人，若指望通過生產(chǎn)任何東西來(lái)提升競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力，而又碰上強(qiáng)大的資本聯(lián)合體的控制，不久就會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)自己要么被排擠，要么被迫出售企業(yè)然后被人吞并。”

如果沒有世界大戰(zhàn)，假如威爾遜花八年的時(shí)間投身到國(guó)內(nèi)事務(wù)而非國(guó)際事務(wù)的話，我們可能有著截然不同的現(xiàn)狀。但是，那時(shí)從歐洲傳來(lái)的大炮轟鳴正愈發(fā)響亮，迫使他放棄研究這個(gè)問題。他把看清了的問題作為遺產(chǎn)留給了我們。站在政治爭(zhēng)議兩邊的所有人都不能否認(rèn)這是一個(gè)政府要高度關(guān)注的問題。

對(duì)現(xiàn)狀的一瞥只是很清楚地表明，我們所知道的機(jī)會(huì)均等已不復(fù)存在。我們建造了工廠，現(xiàn)在的問題就是在現(xiàn)有條件下是否建造得過多。我們最后一片開發(fā)地區(qū)很早被開發(fā)，基本上沒有自由土地了。我們超過一半的人不住在農(nóng)場(chǎng)或田地，也不能靠耕種自己的土地來(lái)謀生。因東部經(jīng)濟(jì)集團(tuán)而失業(yè)的人原先可以靠西部草原展開新生活，現(xiàn)在這種方式也已經(jīng)不可靠了。我們不能邀請(qǐng)歐洲的移民來(lái)同我們分享無(wú)限的資源了?，F(xiàn)在我們供給國(guó)民的是單調(diào)灰暗的生活。

奉行不斷增加關(guān)稅的機(jī)制最后在我們自己身上起到了反作用，以至于一些國(guó)家以報(bào)復(fù)性的關(guān)稅關(guān)閉了我們北部的加拿大邊界線、東部的歐洲市場(chǎng)、許多南部的拉丁美洲市場(chǎng)和西部相當(dāng)一部分的太平洋市場(chǎng)。迫于壓力，我們的許多向這些地區(qū)輸出剩余產(chǎn)品的大型工業(yè)集團(tuán)不得不在這些國(guó)家里，在關(guān)稅壁壘中建立工廠。這就導(dǎo)致了企業(yè)對(duì)美國(guó)本土工廠的控制力度減弱，國(guó)內(nèi)就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)也相對(duì)減少。

正如不能再自由地去建農(nóng)場(chǎng)，商業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)也在變少。確實(shí)，人們憑著天生的精明和與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者共舞的能力，可以建立起小型企業(yè)。但一個(gè)又一個(gè)領(lǐng)域已經(jīng)完全被大型企業(yè)搶占先機(jī)，甚至在還未被廣泛關(guān)注的領(lǐng)域，建立小企業(yè)也步履維艱。過去三十年的數(shù)據(jù)無(wú)情地顯示出私人企業(yè)家注定要失敗。也許是他被逼入絕境，也許他無(wú)法獲得貸款，又或者用威爾遜先生的話說是被組織嚴(yán)密的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)企業(yè)淘汰了，就像街角的雜貨店店員說的。

最近，一項(xiàng)關(guān)于商業(yè)的調(diào)查研究在美國(guó)展開。此項(xiàng)調(diào)查表明我們的經(jīng)濟(jì)生活由大約六百多個(gè)公司掌控，這些公司控制了美國(guó)工業(yè)的三分之二。1000萬(wàn)個(gè)小企業(yè)分占了剩余的三分之一。更令人吃驚的是，似乎如果集中的進(jìn)程以這樣的速度繼續(xù)發(fā)展下去的話，在下個(gè)世紀(jì)末我們美國(guó)工業(yè)可能就由十來(lái)個(gè)公司控制，也許由百余人掌控。坦率地說，盡管我們現(xiàn)在還不是一個(gè)由經(jīng)濟(jì)寡頭統(tǒng)治的國(guó)家，但我們正穩(wěn)步朝著這樣的方向前進(jìn)。

顯然，這一切都需要對(duì)價(jià)值觀重新審視。更多大型工廠的建造者、更為龐大的鐵道系統(tǒng)的創(chuàng)建者或更多公司的組織者，可能會(huì)有幫助但也可能是種危險(xiǎn)。我們?cè)?jīng)承諾只要那些了不起的籌辦人或金融巨頭創(chuàng)建或發(fā)展工業(yè)，我們就給予他們一切方便。這樣的時(shí)代已經(jīng)過去了。我們現(xiàn)在的任務(wù)不是發(fā)現(xiàn)或開發(fā)自然資源，也不需要生產(chǎn)更多的東西。我們要做更冷靜而又不那么巨大的舉措。我們要管理手頭上已有的資源和工廠，要為我們的過剩產(chǎn)品重建海外市場(chǎng)，正視消費(fèi)不足的問題，根據(jù)消費(fèi)調(diào)整生產(chǎn)，更公正地分配財(cái)富和產(chǎn)品，讓現(xiàn)有的經(jīng)濟(jì)組織為人們服務(wù)。一個(gè)開明治國(guó)的時(shí)代已經(jīng)到來(lái)。

正如早期，中央政府先是避難所，然后成了威脅。如今在一個(gè)更為緊密的經(jīng)濟(jì)體系中，集中的野心勃勃的金融機(jī)構(gòu)不再是實(shí)現(xiàn)民族夙愿的公仆，而是一個(gè)危險(xiǎn)因素。我想更進(jìn)一步做個(gè)比較。我們不認(rèn)為，因?yàn)閲?guó)家政府在十八世紀(jì)變成了威脅，我們就應(yīng)該放棄規(guī)范那些國(guó)家政府規(guī)范?，F(xiàn)在我們也不該丟棄被稱為公司的強(qiáng)大經(jīng)濟(jì)集團(tuán)的條款，實(shí)在是因?yàn)樗鼈兊臋?quán)力太容易被濫用了。從前，我們?cè)谔幚磉^分野心勃勃的中央政府的問題時(shí)，是逐漸將政府改造成為一個(gè)民主憲政的政府。因此現(xiàn)在我們正修正和控制我們的經(jīng)濟(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)。

正像我所看到的，在政府與商務(wù)的關(guān)系方面，政府的任務(wù)是要協(xié)助“經(jīng)濟(jì)權(quán)力法案”和“經(jīng)濟(jì)憲法秩序”的發(fā)展。這是政治家和商人共同的任務(wù)，是保持一個(gè)更加持久安全的秩序的基本條件。

每個(gè)人都有生存的權(quán)力，這也同樣意味著他有權(quán)利過舒適的生活?？赡芤?yàn)閼卸杌蚍缸铮芙^行使這項(xiàng)權(quán)力，但他的這項(xiàng)權(quán)力不會(huì)被剝奪。沒有人真的因?yàn)轲嚮幕蝠囸I而死去。我們的工業(yè)和農(nóng)業(yè)機(jī)器可以生產(chǎn)足夠多的東西，并用以分配。我們的政府不管是正式的或是不正式的，政治上或是經(jīng)濟(jì)上，都會(huì)給予每個(gè)人一個(gè)途徑，讓他通過自己的勞動(dòng)去獲取能充分滿足自己需要的一份。

每個(gè)人對(duì)自己的財(cái)產(chǎn)都有所有權(quán)，意思是有權(quán)盡可能地保證每個(gè)人的儲(chǔ)蓄安全。在孩童、生病和老年這些人生階段，絕不應(yīng)該讓人們有負(fù)擔(dān)，因?yàn)槟切r(shí)間是肯定沒有工作機(jī)會(huì)的。在財(cái)產(chǎn)所有權(quán)中，這項(xiàng)權(quán)利占首位。其他的財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)都要服從于它。如果基于這個(gè)原則，我們必須約束投機(jī)者、操縱者甚至金融家的行為。我堅(jiān)信我們必須相信約束是必要的，但不是去束縛個(gè)人主義而是要保護(hù)它。

那些獲得并掌控大型工業(yè)和金融聯(lián)合機(jī)構(gòu)的人們必須基本上滿足這兩個(gè)要求。那些聯(lián)合體支配著我們工業(yè)生活的絕大部分。他們承諾不僅僅做商人而要成為巨頭——財(cái)富巨頭。我不情愿說制造出他們的這個(gè)體制是錯(cuò)的。我很清楚他們必須大膽地完全承擔(dān)與他們權(quán)力相當(dāng)?shù)呢?zé)任。許多精明的商人都很清楚這一點(diǎn)，如果不是還另有其含義的話，這樣說簡(jiǎn)直就成了陳詞濫調(diào)。

這個(gè)含義簡(jiǎn)單說來(lái)就是有責(zé)任的金融和工業(yè)巨頭必須同心協(xié)力實(shí)現(xiàn)共同的目標(biāo)，而不是自顧自。他們必須在需要的時(shí)刻犧牲這樣或那樣的個(gè)人利益。在自己利益不能實(shí)現(xiàn)的時(shí)候必須尋求大眾利益。如果你選擇的話，那么正式政府——政治政府就會(huì)參與。在追求這個(gè)目標(biāo)時(shí)，孤立無(wú)援的人、不道德的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者、魯莽的發(fā)起人、與眾人背道而馳的社會(huì)公敵或是英薩爾，都拒絕參與公共福利的實(shí)現(xiàn)，并威脅要把工業(yè)帶回?zé)o政府狀態(tài)，那樣政府可能會(huì)實(shí)施約束措施。同樣的，如果集團(tuán)要使用集體權(quán)力反對(duì)公共福利，那么政府必會(huì)立刻介入并保護(hù)公眾利益。

政府應(yīng)該具有經(jīng)濟(jì)調(diào)節(jié)的職能，但只能作為最后的訴諸對(duì)象。只有當(dāng)個(gè)人主動(dòng)性被高度責(zé)任心激勵(lì)，也有政府的協(xié)助和協(xié)調(diào)，但最終仍失敗時(shí)，政府才應(yīng)該嘗試使用經(jīng)濟(jì)調(diào)節(jié)手段。至今，沒有最終的失敗，因?yàn)闆]有人嘗試。我絕不相信這個(gè)國(guó)家會(huì)無(wú)力應(yīng)對(duì)形勢(shì)。

人類最高的目標(biāo)是對(duì)自由和幸福的追求。過去一個(gè)世紀(jì)以來(lái)，我們非常了解這兩方面的追求。我們知道，如果一個(gè)人的幸福是建立在另一個(gè)人的痛苦之上，那么個(gè)人自由和個(gè)人幸福毫無(wú)意義。我們知道以前的“個(gè)人能力的權(quán)利”是指有權(quán)閱讀、思考、說話、選擇生活模式，這種權(quán)利不管怎樣都必須得到尊重。我們知道，任何一個(gè)條約都不保護(hù)剝奪了他人的基本權(quán)利去自由行事的權(quán)利。我們還知道在這方面政府起到維持平衡的作用：每個(gè)人都有立足之地，如果他愿意接受;每個(gè)人都能得到安全感，只要他希望;每個(gè)人都能得到權(quán)力，只要他有這樣的能力，同樣也伴隨著因此而產(chǎn)生的義務(wù)。

相信美國(guó)，相信個(gè)人責(zé)任的傳統(tǒng)，相信我們的制度，相信我們自己，這需要我們辨清過時(shí)的社會(huì)契約中的新條款。我們必將實(shí)現(xiàn)它們，正如我們實(shí)現(xiàn)了表面上的烏托邦。那是1776年杰斐遜為我們?cè)O(shè)想的，也是杰斐遜、羅斯福和威爾遜尋求實(shí)現(xiàn)的。我們必須這樣做，以免我們共同失敗所導(dǎo)致的苦難的潮水不斷高漲，將我們都吞沒。但是失敗不是美國(guó)的習(xí)慣。在巨大希望的力量下，我們必須一起承擔(dān)我們共同的重任。