金融世界 第十五講

金融世界 第十五講
上一講中我們?yōu)槟榻B了 floating exchange rates 和 fixed exchange rates，浮動(dòng)匯率與固定匯率。澳廣金融節(jié)目主持人巴里克拉克介紹說(shuō)，二十世紀(jì)的固定匯率制不僅未能保持匯率的穩(wěn)定，而且還為投機(jī)者提供了機(jī)會(huì)。
但是實(shí)行浮動(dòng)匯率制也同樣有它的不利之處。不斷變化的匯率為工商業(yè)的運(yùn)作帶來(lái)許多不確定因素。
不過(guò)，澳洲廣播電臺(tái)金融節(jié)目主持人巴里克拉克繼續(xù)介紹說(shuō)，各國(guó)的中央銀行或儲(chǔ)備銀行大都會(huì)在關(guān)鍵時(shí)刻對(duì)市場(chǎng)進(jìn)行干預(yù)，以減緩貨幣匯率的劇烈動(dòng)蕩。
巴里克拉克在他的講話中提到了這樣一些詞匯：
1 Reserve Bank 儲(chǔ)備銀行
2 cushion 緩沖墊，減震器
3 intervene 干預(yù)
4 contention 辯論
5 on balance 總的來(lái)說(shuō)
6overshooting 過(guò)火，過(guò)激
下面我們聽(tīng)一遍巴里克拉克的談話及中文翻譯：
The Reserve Bank tries to play a role in providing a comfort cushion by intervening from time to time in the foreign exchange market with a view to limiting its more extreme fluctuations.
Whether the central bank should be doing this, and whether it actually can influence exchange rates in the face of market forces, are matters of some contention.
From its own analysis, the Reserve Bank is persuaded that, on balance, it plays a useful role in limiting overshooting in the market.
巴里克拉克說(shuō)，儲(chǔ)備銀行試圖在減緩市場(chǎng)沖擊力方面發(fā)揮作用，對(duì)外匯市場(chǎng)不時(shí)進(jìn)行干預(yù)，目的是要限制它更劇烈的動(dòng)蕩。
中央銀行是否應(yīng)當(dāng)采取這樣的行動(dòng)，以及它在面對(duì)市場(chǎng)力量時(shí)是否真能對(duì)匯率發(fā)揮影響，是需要繼續(xù)討論的問(wèn)題。
儲(chǔ)備銀行通過(guò)它自己的分析，確信它總的來(lái)說(shuō)在限制市場(chǎng)的過(guò)激行為方面能夠發(fā)揮有益的作用。
下面我們?cè)俾?tīng)一遍巴里克拉克的這段談話。(略)
剛才我們談到了中央銀行對(duì)外匯兌換市場(chǎng)的干預(yù)。許多經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家對(duì)中央銀行進(jìn)行干預(yù)的效果持懷疑態(tài)度。美國(guó)斯坦福大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教授安妮克魯格就是其中之一。她說(shuō)：
The first question is: can a central bank out-guess the market in temp3s of where the underlying market forces are taking the exchange rate? More interventiongs than not, I think, historically, have been when the central bank has been betting against the market. You may recall in 1992 when you had the upheavals in the European currencies, where there were a lot of bets against the markets and a lot of money was lost on the part of a lot of countries, including the Bank of England. So that basically, there's a real risk in central bank intervention.
安妮克魯格教授說(shuō)，首先的問(wèn)題是，中央銀行是否能夠猜中潛在的市場(chǎng)勢(shì)力會(huì)把市場(chǎng)匯率帶向何處。我認(rèn)為從歷史上來(lái)看，多數(shù)市場(chǎng)的干預(yù)都是中央銀行逆市場(chǎng)走向下的賭注?？梢曰叵胍幌?992年歐洲貨幣的那場(chǎng)大動(dòng)蕩。當(dāng)時(shí)許多人都逆市場(chǎng)而動(dòng)，投下大批賭注，很多國(guó)家都損失了大筆的資金，包括英格蘭銀行在內(nèi)。因此基本上來(lái)說(shuō)，中央銀行的干預(yù)確實(shí)存在著危險(xiǎn)。
I think central bank intervention is dangerous. They're betting on one side of the market and then that gives speculators a one-sided bet, because they know that they can't really lose by going on the other side.
我認(rèn)為中央銀行的干預(yù)是危險(xiǎn)的。它們就市場(chǎng)的一方打賭，這就給了投機(jī)者向另一方下賭注的機(jī)會(huì)。因?yàn)橥稒C(jī)者知道投向另一方就肯定不會(huì)輸。