被科技“五惡人”統(tǒng)治，或許也沒(méi)那么壞？

The tech giants are too big. But what if that’s not so bad?

科技巨頭們太龐大了。但如果這并不是多大的壞事呢?

For a year and a half — and more urgently for much of the last month — I have warned of the growing economic, social and political power held by the five largest American tech companies: Apple, Amazon, Google, Facebook and Microsoft.

在過(guò)去的一年半里——過(guò)去一個(gè)月里格外緊迫——我對(duì)美國(guó)五大科技公司所擁有的日益增長(zhǎng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)、社會(huì)和政治力量發(fā)出了警告，這五家公司是：蘋果(Apple)、亞馬遜(Amazon)、谷歌(Google)、Facebook和微軟(Microsoft)。

Because these companies control the world’s most important tech platforms, from smartphones to app stores to the map of our social relationships, their power is growing closer to that of governments than of mere corporations. That was on stark display this week, when executives from two of the five, Facebook and Google, along with a struggling second-tier company, Twitter, testified before Congress about how their technology may have been used to influence the 2016 election.

由于這些公司控制著世界上最重要的科技平臺(tái)——從智能手機(jī)到應(yīng)用商店，再到我們的社交關(guān)系網(wǎng)——它們的力量越來(lái)越接近政府，而不是單純的企業(yè)。本周，這種情況明確顯現(xiàn)出來(lái)：五家公司中的兩家——Facebook和谷歌——以及正面臨困境的二線公司Twitter的高管們?cè)趪?guó)會(huì)作證，討論他們的技術(shù)在2016年大選中可能起到了怎樣的影響。

Yet ever since I started writing about what I call the Frightful Five, some have said my very premise is off base. I have argued that the companies’ size and influence pose a danger. But another argument suggests the opposite — that it’s better to be ruled by a handful of responsive companies capable of bowing to political and legal pressure. In other words, wouldn’t you rather deal with five horse-size Zucks than 100 duck-size technoforces?

不過(guò)，自從我開(kāi)始寫我所說(shuō)的“五惡人”(Frightful Five)以來(lái)，有些人說(shuō)我的假設(shè)沒(méi)有根據(jù)。我認(rèn)為這些公司的規(guī)模和影響力已構(gòu)成威脅。但另一種相反的觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為，由少數(shù)幾家能順應(yīng)政治和法律壓力的公司來(lái)統(tǒng)治還更好一些。換句話說(shuō)，與其應(yīng)付100個(gè)鴨子大小的技術(shù)公司，你難道不是更愿意應(yīng)付5個(gè)跟馬一樣大的扎克嗎?

The insatiable appetite of digital technology to alter everything in its path is among the most powerful forces shaping the world today. Given all the ways that tech can go wrong — as we are seeing in the Russia influence scandal — isn’t it better that we can blame, and demand fixes from, a handful of American executives when things do go haywire?

數(shù)字技術(shù)總是希望改變自己道路上遇到的一切，這種無(wú)休止的欲望是塑造當(dāng)今世界的最強(qiáng)大力量之一?？紤]到技術(shù)可能出錯(cuò)的所有方式——正如我們?cè)诙砹_斯影響丑聞中看到的那樣——當(dāng)事情失控時(shí)，我們可以指責(zé)并要求幾位美國(guó)高管解決問(wèn)題，這難道不是更好嗎?

That’s not ridiculous. Over the last few weeks, several scholars said there are good reasons to be sanguine about our new tech overlords. Below, I compiled their best arguments about the bright side of the Five.

這并不荒謬。在過(guò)去幾周里，有幾位學(xué)者表示，我們有充分的理由對(duì)我們的新技術(shù)霸主持樂(lè)觀態(tài)度。下面，我整理了他們就“五惡人”良性的一面給出的最佳論述。

The Five Can Be Governed

“五惡人”可以被管理

Tech is inherently messy. The greatest human inventions tend to change society in ways that are more profound than anyone ever guesses, including the people who created them. This has clearly been true for the technologies we use today, and will be even more true for the stuff we will get tomorrow. The internet, mobile phones, social networks and artificial intelligence will make a mess of the status quo — and it will be our job, as a society, to decide how to mitigate their downsides.

搗亂是科技的本性。人類最偉大的發(fā)明往往會(huì)以一種出乎所有人意料的方式改變社會(huì)，包括創(chuàng)造它們的人。我們今天使用的技術(shù)顯然就是這樣，我們明天會(huì)得到的技術(shù)更是如此?；ヂ?lián)網(wǎng)、手機(jī)、社交網(wǎng)絡(luò)和人工智能將會(huì)把現(xiàn)狀弄得一團(tuán)糟——作為一個(gè)社會(huì)，我們的工作將是決定如何減輕它們的負(fù)面影響。

One benefit of having five giant companies in charge of today’s tech infrastructure is that they provide a convenient focus for addressing those problems.

由五家大型公司掌控如今的技術(shù)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施有一個(gè)好處，那就是，它們?yōu)榻鉀Q這些問(wèn)題提供了一個(gè)方便的重點(diǎn)。

Consider Russian propaganda. People have worried about the internet’s capacity to foster echo chambers and conspiracy theories almost since it began; in fact, in several cases over the last two decades — from 9/11 to the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth to birtherism — the internet did play a key role in the propagation of misinformation. But because those rumors and half-truths spread in a digital media landscape that was not owned and operated by giant companies — one in which information was passed along through a Wild West of email, discussion boards and blogs — it was never conceivable to limit that era’s equivalent of fake news.

以俄羅斯的政治宣傳為例。幾乎從一開(kāi)始，人們就為互聯(lián)網(wǎng)培育回音室和陰謀論的能力感到擔(dān)憂，事實(shí)上，在過(guò)去20年的幾個(gè)案例中——從9·11到快艇老兵尋求真相組織(Swift Boat Veterans for Truth)，再到“奧巴馬身世論”——互聯(lián)網(wǎng)確實(shí)在傳播錯(cuò)誤信息方面發(fā)揮了關(guān)鍵作用。但是，由于傳播這些謠言和半真半假消息的數(shù)字媒體平臺(tái)并非由這些巨頭擁有并運(yùn)營(yíng)——有一條信息是在電子郵件、論壇和博客構(gòu)成的蠻荒世界里傳播的——所以人們從未想過(guò)限制那個(gè)時(shí)代的假新聞。

Today, it suddenly is. Because Facebook, Google and Twitter play such a central role in modern communication, they can be hauled before Congress and either regulated or shamed into addressing the problems unleashed by the technology they control.

今天，這種限制突然成為可能。由于Facebook、谷歌和Twitter在現(xiàn)代通信中扮演著如此重要的角色，它們可以被帶到國(guó)會(huì)，迫于監(jiān)管規(guī)定或出于羞辱，解決它們控制的技術(shù)所帶來(lái)的問(wèn)題。

This does not mean they will succeed in fixing every problem their tech creates — and in some cases their fixes may well raise other problems, like questions about their power over freedom of expression. But at least they can try to address the wide variety of externalities posed by tech, which may have been impossible for an internet more fragmented by smaller firms.

這并不意味著，它們能成功地解決它們的技術(shù)帶來(lái)的所有問(wèn)題——在某些情況下，它們解決問(wèn)題的同時(shí)可能引發(fā)其他問(wèn)題，比如對(duì)它們限制言論自由的質(zhì)疑。但它們至少可以嘗試解決技術(shù)帶來(lái)的各種各樣的外部問(wèn)題，在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)由更小的公司瓜分的時(shí)代，這幾乎是不可能的。

“This is new stuff everybody is dealing with — it’s not easy,” said Rob Atkinson, president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, a think tank, and co-author of “Big Is Beautiful,” a coming book that extols the social and economic virtues of big companies. (The foundation is funded, in part, by donations from tech companies.) “So when you discover a problem, scale makes that easier. You’ve got one or two big firms, and they have a lot of public pressure to be a responsible actor.”

“這是每個(gè)人都在應(yīng)對(duì)的新事物——它并不容易，”信息技術(shù)創(chuàng)新基金會(huì)(Information Technology and Innovation Foundation)的總裁羅布·阿特金森(Rob Atkinson)說(shuō)。該智庫(kù)即將出版自己參與撰寫的一本贊揚(yáng)大公司社會(huì)和經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值的書(shū)，名為《大即是美》(Big is Beautiful)(該基金會(huì)的部分資金來(lái)自科技公司捐助)。“所以，當(dāng)你發(fā)現(xiàn)一個(gè)問(wèn)題時(shí)，規(guī)模會(huì)讓它變得更容易解決。如果有一兩家大公司，它們面臨很大的公眾壓力，就會(huì)負(fù)起責(zé)任。”

The Five Hate One Another’s Guts

五惡人強(qiáng)烈厭惡彼此

Over the last few weeks, many people at large tech companies have repeatedly responded to my questions about the dangers posed by big tech with a funny argument: Yes, they would say, the other tech giants really are worrisome — so why was I including their company in that group?

過(guò)去幾個(gè)星期里，面對(duì)我提出的關(guān)于高科技巨擘會(huì)帶來(lái)威脅的問(wèn)題，很多身在大科技公司的人做出了一種有趣的回應(yīng)：是的，他們會(huì)說(shuō)，其他科技巨頭真的令人擔(dān)憂——不過(guò)我為什么要把他們的公司放在這個(gè)群體里?

It was an odd line. As an outsider to these companies, I tend to worry about the collective power of the Five, especially the way they have managed to control the fortunes of innovative start-ups. But none of the Five see themselves as part of a group — each of them worries about the threat posed by start-ups and by the other four giants, which means that none feels it has the luxury to slow down in creating the best new stuff.

這話挺怪的。作為身在這些公司之外的人，我往往會(huì)擔(dān)心五惡人聯(lián)合起來(lái)的力量，尤其是他們會(huì)設(shè)法控制有創(chuàng)新力的初創(chuàng)企業(yè)的未來(lái)。但五惡人中沒(méi)有誰(shuí)覺(jué)得自己是這個(gè)群體的一員——它們每一個(gè)都憂心于初創(chuàng)企業(yè)和其他四大巨頭帶來(lái)的威脅，這意味著，放慢腳步去創(chuàng)造新東西，對(duì)所有人都是一件太過(guò)奢侈的事。

This dynamic — where each company competes mightily against the others — suggests some reason for optimism, said Michael Lind, who wrote “Big Is Beautiful” with Mr. Atkinson. “As long as their innovation rents are recycled into research and development that leads to new products, then what’s to complain about?”

與阿特金森合著《大即是美》的邁克爾·林德(Michael Lind)說(shuō)，這種每家公司都在奮力與其他公司一爭(zhēng)高下的態(tài)勢(shì)，讓我們有理由保持樂(lè)觀。“只要他們的‘創(chuàng)新租金’被重新投入到會(huì)帶來(lái)新產(chǎn)品的研發(fā)工作中去，那還有什么可抱怨的?”

You can see this in their product road maps. None of the Five has slowed down investing intended to further expand its area of control — for instance, Google keeps investing in search, Facebook is still spending heavily to create new social-networking features, and Amazon remains relentless in creating new ways to let people shop.

你透過(guò)它們的產(chǎn)品規(guī)劃可以看出這一點(diǎn)。五惡人中，沒(méi)有哪一家放慢了旨在拓展對(duì)本領(lǐng)域控制力的投資——例如，谷歌持續(xù)投資于搜索業(yè)務(wù)，F(xiàn)acebook仍在為新社交網(wǎng)絡(luò)功能投入巨資，亞馬遜仍在孜孜不倦地創(chuàng)造讓人購(gòu)物的新方法。

At the same time, they are all locked in intense battles for new markets and technologies. And not only do they keep creating new tech, but they are coming at it in diverse ways — with different business models, different philosophies and different sets of ethics.

與此同時(shí)，為了獲取新市場(chǎng)、新技術(shù)，它們?nèi)纪渡碛诩ち业膽?zhàn)斗。另外，它們不僅不斷創(chuàng)造新技術(shù)，還有著多種多樣的追尋方式——因循不同的商業(yè)模式、不同的哲學(xué)、不同的倫理。

“So, why pre-emptively say that maybe we’ll be harmed in the future — that in 2030 they’ll jack up their prices or something?” Mr. Lind asked. “Well, deal with that as it comes.”

“那么，為什么要早早下結(jié)論說(shuō)，我們?cè)谖磥?lái)或許會(huì)受到傷害，說(shuō)它們到2030年會(huì)抬高價(jià)格之類的?”林德問(wèn)道。“兵來(lái)將擋，水來(lái)土掩嘛。”

The Five Are American Grown

五惡人是美國(guó)的產(chǎn)物

The Five achieved their dominance because they operate in areas that provide massive returns to scale. Thanks to economic dynamics like network effects — where a product, like Facebook, gets more useful as more people use it — it was perhaps inevitable that we would see the rise of a handful of large companies take control of much of the modern tech business.

五惡人之所以能取得主導(dǎo)地位，是因?yàn)樗鼈兯\(yùn)營(yíng)的領(lǐng)域能產(chǎn)生相稱的巨大回報(bào)。由于一些經(jīng)濟(jì)動(dòng)態(tài)的存在，比如網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)——Facebook之類的產(chǎn)品會(huì)因?yàn)橛懈嘤脩舳兊酶杏?mdash;—少數(shù)大公司崛起并控制相當(dāng)一部分的現(xiàn)代科技產(chǎn)業(yè)，或許是無(wú)可避免的。

But it wasn’t inevitable that these companies would be based in and controlled from the United States. And it’s not obvious that will remain the case — the top tech companies of tomorrow might easily be Chinese, or Indian or Russian or European. But for now, that means we are dealing with companies that feel constrained by American laws and values.

但有一點(diǎn)并非必然：這些公司以美國(guó)為大本營(yíng)，控制者也在美國(guó)。尚不清楚這種情況是否會(huì)持續(xù)下去——未來(lái)的頂級(jí)科技公司也許很可能是中國(guó)公司，或印度、俄羅斯、歐洲的公司。但眼下，這意味著與我們打交道的是受制于美國(guó)法律和價(jià)值觀的公司。

Yes, this is jingoistic; the idea of a handful of American tech giants controlling much of society has helped push regulators internationally to try to limit their power. But we would almost certainly do the same if a bunch of foreign companies attempted to take over our economy. At least it’s our own giants that we have to fear.

沒(méi)錯(cuò)，這帶有沙文主義色彩;在某種程度上，少數(shù)美國(guó)科技巨頭對(duì)社會(huì)具有很大控制力的觀點(diǎn)，已促使世界各地的監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)設(shè)法限制它們的力量。但如果一些外國(guó)公司企圖接管我們的經(jīng)濟(jì)，我們幾乎肯定會(huì)采取同樣的舉措。至少，我們現(xiàn)在不得不害怕的是我們自己的巨頭。

I don’t mean this list to get the Five off the hook. How we deal with their efforts to capture more power over the economy and our society is perhaps the next great question facing America. But this is a complex problem precisely because there are both advantages and disadvantages to their size.

我列出這些并不是表示應(yīng)該放過(guò)五惡人。它們想要獲得對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會(huì)的更多控制，對(duì)此我們?cè)撟骱畏磻?yīng)，或許是美國(guó)要面臨的下一個(gè)大問(wèn)題。但這是一個(gè)復(fù)雜的問(wèn)題，因?yàn)樗鼈兊囊?guī)模既有好處，也有害處。

As I said, tech is messy. 正如之前所說(shuō)，科技是會(huì)搗亂的。