HISTORY repeats itself all the time in Wall Street.Do you remember a story I told you about covering my shorts at the time Stratton had corn cornered?Well,another time I used practically the same tactics in the stock market.The stock was Tropical Trading.I have made money bulling it and also bearing it.It always was an active stock and a favourite with adventurous traders.The inside coterie has been accused time and again by the newspapers of being more concerned over the fluctuations in the stock than with encouraging permanent investment in it.The other day one of the ablest brokers I know asserted that not even Daniel Drew in Erie or H.O.Havemeyer in Sugar developed so perfect a method for milking the market for a stock as President Mulligan and his friends have done in Tropical Trading.Many times they have encouraged the bears to sell TT short and then have proceeded to squeeze them with business-like thoroughness.There was no more vindictiveness about the process than is felt by a hydraulic press—or no more squeamishness,either.
Of course,there have been people who have spoken about certain“unsavory incidents”in the market career of TT stock.But I dare say these critics were suffering from the squeezing.Why do the room traders,who have suffered so often from the loaded dice of the insiders,continue to go up against the game?Well,for one thing they like action and they certainly get it in Tropical Trading.No prolonged spells of dulness.No reasons asked or given.No time wasted.No patience strained by waiting for the tipped movement to begin.Always enough stock to go around—except when the short interest is big enough to make the scarcity worth while.One born every minute!
It so happened some time ago that I was in Florida on my usual winter vacation.I was fishing and enjoying myself with out any thought of the markets excepting when we received a batch of newspapers.One morning when the semi-weekly mail came in I looked at the stock quotations and saw that Tropical Trading was selling at 155.The last time I'd seen a quotation in it,I think,was around 140.My opinion was that we were going into a bear market and I was biding my time before going short of stocks.But there was no mad rush.That was why I was fishing and out of hearing of the ticker.I knew that I'd be back home when the real call came.In the meanwhile nothing that I did or failed to do would hurry matters a bit.
The behaviour of Tropical Trading was the outstanding feature of the market,according to the newspapers I got that morning.It served to crystallise my general bearishness because I thought it particularly asinine for the insiders to run up the price of TT in the face of the heaviness of the general list.There are times when the milking process must be suspended.What is abnormal is seldom a desirable factor in a trader's calculations and it looked to me as if the marking up of that stock were a capital blunder.Nobody can make blunders of that magnitude with impunity;not in the stock market.
After I got through reading the newspapers I went back to my fishing but I kept thinking of what the insiders in Tropical Trading were trying to do.That they were bound to fail was as certain as that a man is bound to smash himself if he jumps from the roof of a twenty-story building without a parachute.I couldn't think of anything else and finally I gave up trying to fish and sent off a telegram to my brokers to sell 2000 shares of TT at the market.After that I was able to go back to my fishing.I did pretty well.
That afternoon I received the reply to my telegram by special courier.My brothers reported that they had sold the 2000 shares of Tropical Trading at 153.So far so good.I was selling short on a declining market,which was as it should be.But I could not fish any more.I was too far away from a quotation board.I discovered this after I began to think of all the reasons why Tropical Trading should go down with the rest of the market instead of going up on inside manipulation.I therefore left my fishing camp and returned to Palm Beach;or,rather,to the direct wire to New York.
The moment I got to Palm Beach and saw what the misguided insiders were still trying to do,I let them have a second lot of 2000 TT.Back came the report and I sold another 2000 shares.The market behaved excellently.That is,it declined on my selling.Everything being satisfactory I went out and had a chair ride.But I wasn't happy.The more I thought the unhappier it made me to think that I hadn't sold more.So back I went to the broker's office and sold another 2000 shares.
I was happy only when I was selling that stock.Presently I was short 10,000 shares.Then I decided to return to New York.I had business to do now.My fishing I would do some other time.
When I arrived in New York I made it a point to get a line on the company's business,actual and prospective.What I learned strengthened my conviction that the insiders had been worse than reckless in jacking up the price at a time when such an advance was not justified either by the tone of the general market or by the company's earnings.
The rise,illogical and ill-timed though it was,had developed some public following and this doubtless encouraged the insiders to pursue their unwise tactics.Therefore I sold more stock.The insiders ceased their folly.So I tested the market again and again,in accordance with my trading methods,until finally I was short 30,000 shares of the stock of the Tropical Trading Company.By then the price was 133.
I had been warned that the TT insiders knew the exact whereabouts of every stock certificate in the Street and the precise dimensions and identity of the short interest as well as other facts of tactical importance.They were able men and shrewd traders.Altogether it was a dangerous combination to go up against.But facts are facts and the strongest of all allies are conditions.
Of course,on the way down from 153 to 133 the short interest had grown and the public that buys on reactions began to argue as usual:That stock had been considered a good purchase at 153 and higher.Now 20 points lower,it was necessarily a much better purchase.Same stock;same dividend rate;same officers;same business.Great bargain!
The public's purchases reduced the floating supply and the insiders,knowing that a lot of room traders were short,thought the time propitious for a squeezing.The price was duly run up to 150.I daresay there was plenty of covering but I stayed pat.Why shouldn't I ?The insiders might know that a short line of 30,000 shares had not been taken in but why should that frighten me?The reasons that had impelled me to begin selling at 153 and keep at it on the way down to 133,not only still existed but were stronger than ever.The insiders might desire to force me to cover but they adduced no convincing arguments.Fundamental conditions were fighting for me.It was not difficult to be both fearless and patient.A speculator must have faith in himself and in his judgment.The late Dickson G.Watts,ex-President of the New York Cotton Exchange and famous author of“Speculation as a Fine Art,”says that courage in a speculator is merely confidence to act on the decision of his mind.With me,I cannot fear to be wrong because I never think I am wrong until I am proven wrong.In fact,I am uncomfortable unless I am capitalising my experience.The course of the market at a given time does not necessarily prove me wrong.It is the character of the advance—or of the decline—that determines for me the correctness or the fallacy of my market position.I can only rise by knowledge.If I fall it must be by my own blunders.
There was nothing in the character of the rally from 133 to 150 to frighten me into covering and presently the stock,as was to be expected,started down again.It broke 140 before the inside clique began to give it support.Their buying was coincident with a flood of bull rumors about the stock.The company,we heard,was making perfectly fabulous profits,and the earnings justified an increase in the regular dividend rate.Also,the short interest was said to be perfectly huge and the squeeze of the century was about to be inflicted on the bear party in general and in particular on a certain operator who was more than over-extended.I couldn't begin to tell you all I heard as they ran the price up ten points.
The manipulation did not seem particularly dangerous to me but when the price touched 149 I decided that it was not wise to let the Street accept as true all the bull statements that were floating around.Of course,there was nothing that I or any other rank outsider could say that would carry conviction either to the frightened shorts or to those credulous customers of commission houses that trade on hearsay tips.The most effective retort courteous is that which the tape alone can print.People will believe that when they will not believe an affidavit from any living man,much less one from a chap who is short 30,000 shares.So I used the same tactics that I did at the time of the Stratton corner in corn,when I sold oats to make the traders bearish on corn.Experience and memory again.
When the insiders jacked up the price of Tropical Trading with a view to frightening the shorts I didn't try to check the rise by selling that stock.I was already short 30,000 shares of it which was as big a percentage of the floating supply as I thought wise to be short of.I did not propose to put my head into the noose so obligingly held open for me—the second rally was really an urgent invitation.What I did when TT touched 149 was to sell about 10,000 shares of Equatorial Commercial Corporation.This company owned a large block of Tropical Trading.
Equatorial Commercial,which was not as active a stock as TT,broke badly on my selling,as I had foreseen;and,of course,my purpose was achieved.When the traders—and the customers of the commission houses who had listened to the uncontradicted bull dope on TT—saw that the rise in Tropical synchronised with heavy selling and a sharp break in Equatorial,they naturally concluded that the strength of TT was merely a smoke-screen—a manipulated advance obviously designed to facilitate inside liquidation in Equatorial Commercial,which was largest holder of TT stock.It must be both long stock and inside stock in Equatorial,because no outsider would dream of selling so much short stock at the very moment when Tropical Trading was so very strong.So they sold Tropical Trading and checked the rise in that stock,the insiders very properly not wishing to take all the stock that was pressed for sale.The moment the insiders took away their support the price of TT declined.The traders and principal commission houses now sold some Equatorial also and I took in my short line in that at a small profit.I hadn't sold it to make money out of the operation but to check the rise in TT.
Time and again the Tropical Trading insiders and their hard-working publicity man flooded the Street with all manner of bull items and tried to put up the price.And every time they did I sold Equatorial Commercial short and covered it with TT reacted and carried E C with it.It took the wind out of the manipulators' sails.The price of TT finally went down to 125 and the short interest really grew so big that the insiders were enabled to run it up 20 or 25 points.This time it was a legitimate enough drive against an over-extended short interest;but while I foresaw the rally I did not cover,not wishing to lose my position.Before Equatorial Commercial could advance in sympathy with the rise in TT I sold a raft of it short—with the usual results.This gave the lie to the bull talk in TT which had got quite boisterous after the latest sensational rise.
By this time the general market had grown quite weak.As I told you,it was the conviction that we were in a bear market that started me selling TT short in the fishing-camp in Florida.I was short of quite a few other stocks but TT was my pet.Finally,general conditions proved too much for the inside clique to defy and TT hit the toboggan slide.It went below 120 for the first time in years;then below 110;below par;and still I did not cover.One day when the entire market was extremely weak Tropical Trading broke 90 and on the demoralization I covered.Same old reason!I had the opportunity—the big market and the weakness and the excess of sellers over buyers.I may tell you,even at the risk of appearing to be monotonously bragging of my cleverness,that I took in my 30,000 shares of TT at practically the lowest prices of the movement.But I wasn't thinking of covering at the bottom.I was intent on turning my paper profits into cash without losing much of the profit in the changing.
I stood pat throughout because I knew my position was sound.I wasn't bucking the trend of the market or going against basic conditions but the reverse,and that was what made me so sure of the failure of an over-confident inside clique.What they tried to do others had tried before and it had always failed.The frequent rallies,even when I knew as well as anybody that they were due,could not frighten me.I knew I'd do much better in the end by staying pat than by trying to cover to put out a new short line at a higher price.By sticking to the position that I felt was right I made over a million dollars.I was not indebted to hunches or to skilful tape reading or to stubborn courage.It was a dividend declared by my faith in my judgment and not by my cleverness or by my vanity.Knowledge is power and power need not fear lies—not even when the tape prints them.The retraction follows pretty quickly.
A year later,TT was jacked up again to 150 and hung around there for a couple of weeks.The entire market was entitled to a good reaction for it had risen uninterruptedly and it did not bull any longer.I know because I tested it.Now,the group to which TT belonged had been suffering from very poor business and I couldn't see anything to bull those stocks on anyhow,even if the rest of the market were due for a rise,which it wasn't.So I began to sell Tropical Trading.I intended to put out 10,000 shares in all.The price broke on my selling.I couldn't see that there was any support whatever.Then suddenly,the character of the buying changed.
I am not trying to make myself out a wizard when I assure you that I could tell the moment support came in.It instantly struck me that if the insiders in that stock,who never felt a moral obligation to keep the price up,were now buying the stock in the face of a declining general market there must be a reason.They were not ignorant asses nor philanthropists nor yet bankers concerned with keeping the price up to sell more securities over the counter.The price rose notwithstanding my selling and the selling of others.At 153 I covered my 10,000 shares and at 156 I actually went long because by that time the tape told me the line of least resistance was upward.I was bearish on the general market but I was confronted by a trading condition in a certain stock and not by a speculative theory in general.The price went out of sight,above 200.It was the sensation of the year.I was flattered by reports spoken and printed that I had been squeezed out of eight or nine millions of dollars.As a matter of fact,instead of being short I was long of TT all the way up.In fact,I held on a little too long and let some of my paper profits get away.Do you wish to know why I did?Because I thought the TT insiders would naturally do what I would have done had I been in their place.But that was something I had no business to think because my business is to trade—that is,to stick to the facts before me and not to what I think other people ought to do.
華爾街上歷史總在重演。你是否記得我曾講起過(guò)的一個(gè)故事,說(shuō)的是當(dāng)年斯特雷登在拋空玉米的時(shí)候,我怎樣去回補(bǔ)空頭。有一次,我在股市上也用過(guò)類似的辦法。這只股票是熱帶貿(mào)易公司的股票,不管我賣出還是買進(jìn)都賺到過(guò)錢。熱帶貿(mào)易公司股票的市場(chǎng)交易一直比較活躍,那些喜歡賭一把的股民最喜歡這只股票。報(bào)紙一再指責(zé)內(nèi)線集團(tuán),說(shuō)他們比較關(guān)心股價(jià)的波動(dòng),比較不鼓勵(lì)長(zhǎng)期投資這只股票。一天,我認(rèn)識(shí)的一個(gè)高水平營(yíng)業(yè)員說(shuō),就算丹尼爾·德魯在伊利公司股票或者哈弗梅爾在美國(guó)糖業(yè)公司的股票上,都沒(méi)有熱帶貿(mào)易公司總裁穆里根和他的朋友們?cè)谠摴镜墓善鄙夏菢?,使用那么完美的辦法,賺取了那么多的錢。他們鼓動(dòng)空頭們放空熱帶貿(mào)易股票,再迅速而直接地把他們軋空??疹^們?cè)谶@樣的軋空過(guò)程中感覺(jué)到的恐懼,不比被水壓機(jī)壓迫身體感覺(jué)到的恐懼少,他們一點(diǎn)兒都不裝模作樣。
當(dāng)然了,也確實(shí)有人說(shuō)過(guò),在熱帶貿(mào)易公司股票的交易過(guò)程中,出現(xiàn)過(guò)很多名聲不好的事情,可我也敢斷定,這么說(shuō)的那些人曾經(jīng)都有過(guò)被軋空的經(jīng)歷。既然場(chǎng)內(nèi)交易的人經(jīng)常會(huì)被公司內(nèi)部的人耍弄,那他們?yōu)槭裁催€要玩這個(gè)游戲呢?嗯,至少有一個(gè)原因,那就是他們都喜歡比較活躍的市場(chǎng)。熱帶貿(mào)易公司的股票確實(shí)比較活躍,不存在價(jià)格持續(xù)不變動(dòng)的情況。不需要打聽或者說(shuō)明原因,沒(méi)必要浪費(fèi)時(shí)間,也不必緊張,只要耐心等著行情記錄中股價(jià)的波動(dòng)。除非空頭部位能夠厲害到讓股票變得很少、很貴,不然總會(huì)有大量股票在交易。這是一只隨時(shí)都可能令人振奮的股票。
這件事發(fā)生在不久之前,我那時(shí)候與以往一樣,在佛羅里達(dá)州度假。我在釣魚,過(guò)得非常愉快。除了每過(guò)幾天會(huì)收到一堆報(bào)紙外,完全不去考慮與交易市場(chǎng)有關(guān)的事。一天早上,是每周送兩次郵件的時(shí)候,我看了股票價(jià)格,發(fā)現(xiàn)熱帶貿(mào)易公司股價(jià)為155美元。而上次我看到的時(shí)候它大概是140美元。我覺(jué)得很快就面臨空頭市場(chǎng),我在伺機(jī)而動(dòng),準(zhǔn)備賣空股票??晌也槐啬敲疵χベu,這也是我為什么只釣魚而不管股市行情的原因。我一旦看到真正的機(jī)會(huì),必定會(huì)去利用。同時(shí),無(wú)論我做事與否,都不會(huì)著急地去趕時(shí)間。
從我那天上午收到的報(bào)紙看,熱帶貿(mào)易公司出現(xiàn)的情況在市場(chǎng)中并不多見,這事讓我對(duì)股市綜合行情的看淡想法變得更加具體了,因?yàn)槲矣X(jué)得在股市行情不太好的時(shí)候,公司內(nèi)部的人去拉抬股價(jià),是非常愚笨的做法。有時(shí),公司內(nèi)部必須要停止從市場(chǎng)中榨取利潤(rùn)。按照股民們的思維,那些不正常的事情,他們都很討厭。而我覺(jué)得,拉抬這只股票的價(jià)格,是種錯(cuò)誤做法。沒(méi)有人能犯這么大的錯(cuò)而不用付出代價(jià),在股市中不會(huì)的。
看完報(bào)紙后,我又去釣魚,同時(shí)我也一直在想熱帶貿(mào)易公司內(nèi)部有什么打算。我覺(jué)得他們必?cái)o(wú)疑,這就如同一個(gè)人從20層樓上跳下,卻沒(méi)有帶著降落傘一樣,粉身碎骨是一定的。我沒(méi)心思去想別的事情,最后只得放棄了釣魚,向我的一位經(jīng)紀(jì)人發(fā)了一封電報(bào),授權(quán)他按照市價(jià)賣掉2000股的熱帶貿(mào)易。這么做完后,我才安心去釣魚。我的成績(jī)很不錯(cuò)。
下午的時(shí)候,我收到了回復(fù)電報(bào)。經(jīng)紀(jì)人說(shuō),他們按照153美元的股價(jià),替我賣了2000股熱帶貿(mào)易。此時(shí),一切都很順利。在股市下跌時(shí)放空,這是理所當(dāng)然的??晌以俨荒芾^續(xù)釣魚了,離股市價(jià)格顯示牌太遠(yuǎn)了。之所以這么覺(jué)得,是因?yàn)槲倚枰C合考慮所有的因素,來(lái)為熱帶貿(mào)易為什么會(huì)跟著綜合股市一起下跌,卻沒(méi)有因?yàn)楣緝?nèi)部的炒作而逆行上漲找原因。所以我從釣魚場(chǎng)返回棕櫚灘,這樣就可以直接與紐約通話了。
到了棕櫚灘,我發(fā)現(xiàn)他們公司的內(nèi)部人士還在繼續(xù)做著抬高股價(jià)的錯(cuò)事,于是我就放空,又賣了2000股。等拿到單子后,我接著賣了2000股。市場(chǎng)情況也特別好,因?yàn)槲业馁u出,股價(jià)在下跌,所有的表現(xiàn)我都很滿意,于是出門去歡快一下,可我也并不特別開心,我在想自己為什么沒(méi)有賣出更多,因此我又返回交易廳,再次賣掉了2000股。
只有往外賣這只股票時(shí),我才能感到舒坦。不久,我就又賣了1萬(wàn)股,然后做出了回紐約的決定。釣魚暫且擱在一邊,我還有其他事情需要處理。
到紐約后,我開始盡力去了解熱帶貿(mào)易公司的詳情,包括現(xiàn)狀和未來(lái)發(fā)展。了解得越多,越讓我的信念牢固,我確定他們內(nèi)部的做法不只是莽撞而已,比這樣還糟糕,他們竟然在股市和公司盈余都不利于他們的時(shí)候操控抬高股價(jià)。
這樣形成的一點(diǎn)兒漲勢(shì)既不是時(shí)候也不合理,可那些普通的股民,卻跟著買進(jìn),而這個(gè)小表現(xiàn)也鼓舞了公司內(nèi)部人,他們繼續(xù)做著愚蠢的舉動(dòng)。所以我放空更多,內(nèi)線集團(tuán)停止了拉抬,我按照自己的方式,多次試探,最終一共放空了熱帶貿(mào)易的3萬(wàn)股,此時(shí)的股價(jià)是133美元。
有人勸我說(shuō),熱帶貿(mào)易公司內(nèi)部清楚每只股票的下落,而且還知道是誰(shuí)在做著多大的放空部位,以及其他很重要的信息。他們很有能耐,又很精明,反正與他們對(duì)著干是非常危險(xiǎn)的做法??墒聦?shí)就是如此,你最可靠得力的戰(zhàn)友是股市行情走向。
當(dāng)然,從153跌至133時(shí),空頭部位增加,那些在回調(diào)的時(shí)候買進(jìn)的普通股民與以往一樣,說(shuō)當(dāng)熱帶貿(mào)易高于153時(shí),人們都覺(jué)得很值得買進(jìn),現(xiàn)在跌了20個(gè)點(diǎn),那就肯定是更值得買了。股票還是那個(gè)股票,利率也沒(méi)變,經(jīng)營(yíng)者和業(yè)務(wù)都是一樣的,這可真是來(lái)之不易的大便宜?。?/p>
人們的買進(jìn),讓在外流通的股票供應(yīng)變少了,公司內(nèi)部知道有很多的場(chǎng)內(nèi)營(yíng)業(yè)員賣掉了這只股,覺(jué)得軋空的時(shí)機(jī)到了,于是巧妙地把股價(jià)拉抬到150美元。我能肯定,很多人都在回補(bǔ),可我就是紋絲不動(dòng),我為什么要不安呢??jī)?nèi)部人或許清楚還有3萬(wàn)股沒(méi)有回補(bǔ),可這也沒(méi)理由讓我害怕。我在153美元開始放空,一直到133美元,促使我一路放空的原因還在,而且比之前更加充分。公司內(nèi)部可能想逼我回補(bǔ),可他們沒(méi)有讓我看到更加有說(shuō)服力的因素。股市的基本狀況在替我擋箭。要本著耐心和勇氣應(yīng)對(duì)并不是難事,投機(jī)必須要對(duì)自己和自己的判斷充滿信心。狄克森·華慈,這位已故的紐約棉花交易所前主席、《投機(jī)藝術(shù)》的知名作者曾經(jīng)說(shuō)過(guò):“能夠很自信地按照自己的決定展開行動(dòng),這就是投機(jī)人的勇氣?!蔽也缓ε伦约簳?huì)出錯(cuò),因?yàn)槌鞘聦?shí)證明我的確錯(cuò)了,不然我不會(huì)覺(jué)得自己有錯(cuò)。其實(shí),我只有好好使用自己的經(jīng)驗(yàn),才能夠心安理得。在有段時(shí)間,市場(chǎng)不一定會(huì)驗(yàn)證出我犯的錯(cuò),而只有股票漲跌的情況能驗(yàn)證我的部位的對(duì)錯(cuò)。我只能夠憑借著自己掌握的知識(shí)取勝,如果我失敗了,也必定是我的錯(cuò)誤造成的。
從133漲到150美元的過(guò)程中,什么情況都不會(huì)嚇著我,讓我回補(bǔ)。沒(méi)過(guò)多久,這只股票就跟我預(yù)估的一樣再次下跌了。跌破了140美元后,公司內(nèi)部才開始應(yīng)對(duì),散播了很多跟這只股票相關(guān)的利多謠言,說(shuō)這只股票還會(huì)上漲,同時(shí)他們也在買進(jìn)。據(jù)說(shuō)這家公司賺了巨額利潤(rùn),那些利潤(rùn)足夠讓他們提高固定利率,而且空頭部位好像也很大,這場(chǎng)世紀(jì)性的軋空馬上開始打擊普通空頭了,放空特別嚴(yán)重的交易人更會(huì)受到特別嚴(yán)重的打擊。當(dāng)他們將股價(jià)抬高了10個(gè)點(diǎn)的時(shí)候,我都說(shuō)不清聽到了多少相關(guān)的謠言了。
對(duì)我個(gè)人來(lái)說(shuō),這場(chǎng)操控沒(méi)太大的危險(xiǎn),可在股價(jià)到149美元的時(shí)候,我就確定,華爾街對(duì)所有有關(guān)那只股票利多的謠言都信以為真了,傳播開來(lái),對(duì)我來(lái)說(shuō)并不合適。當(dāng)然,我或者任何其他外人的話,都不值得那些失措的空頭去相信,也不會(huì)讓交易所那些靠聽信內(nèi)幕消息的無(wú)知輕信者相信。效果最好的反擊手段,只有股市大盤才能講得出來(lái),而且只有它才能那樣講。誰(shuí)都相信股市大盤,而不輕信任何喘氣的人所說(shuō)的話,更不會(huì)相信我這個(gè)賣了3萬(wàn)股的空頭說(shuō)的話。因此,我用上了在斯特雷登軋空玉米時(shí)采取的方式,賣掉燕麥,讓交易者們看空玉米,這還是我的經(jīng)驗(yàn)和記憶在發(fā)揮作用。
公司內(nèi)部抬高股價(jià)嚇唬那些空頭時(shí),我并沒(méi)有用賣出這只股票的方式設(shè)法阻止股價(jià)上漲。我已經(jīng)賣了3萬(wàn)股,在外面流通的股數(shù)里占比已經(jīng)很大了,如果再賣就不是明智之舉了。他們這么熱心地設(shè)好圈套,就等著我把頭伸進(jìn)去。股價(jià)第二次反彈,的確就是他們多么想讓我入套的表現(xiàn),我不會(huì)自討苦吃。當(dāng)熱帶貿(mào)易到了149美元時(shí),我要做的是賣出1萬(wàn)左右赤道商業(yè)公司的股票。熱帶貿(mào)易公司在這家的持股非常大。
赤道商業(yè)公司股票沒(méi)熱帶貿(mào)易公司那么活躍,果然不出我所料,我拋售后價(jià)格大跌,我自然實(shí)現(xiàn)了目的。包括交易廳里那些指望熱帶貿(mào)易公司的多頭消息能夠暢通無(wú)阻的人們?cè)趦?nèi)的所有交易分子看到這樣的現(xiàn)狀,自然就覺(jué)得赤道商業(yè)在熱帶貿(mào)易上漲的時(shí)候下跌,肯定是有問(wèn)題,絕對(duì)的操控炒作,是為了讓公司內(nèi)部的人出售赤道商業(yè)公司的股票,而這樣大量的操作肯定是赤道商業(yè)公司內(nèi)部人手里的股票在交易,除此之外沒(méi)有誰(shuí)會(huì)在熱帶貿(mào)易股票漲勢(shì)正迅猛的時(shí)候,賣掉這么多的股票。所以,人們跟著賣出熱帶貿(mào)易股票,這就遏止了它的上漲勢(shì)頭,公司內(nèi)部根本不會(huì)去支撐那么多搶著賣出股票的人們?cè)斐傻木置?,他們沒(méi)有了支撐,股價(jià)立馬下跌。股民和一些大型的交易所也賣了一些赤道商業(yè)公司的股票,我回補(bǔ)了赤道商業(yè)的空頭,賺了一點(diǎn)兒小錢。我賣出的時(shí)候想的不是賺錢,而是打擊熱帶貿(mào)易股票的上漲勢(shì)頭。
熱帶貿(mào)易公司內(nèi)部和公關(guān)人員持續(xù)在華爾街上散播各種該股票要上漲的消息,想把股價(jià)拉起來(lái)。他們一這么做,我就放空赤道商業(yè)股票,并且在赤道商業(yè)回調(diào)、熱帶貿(mào)易股價(jià)下跌時(shí),回補(bǔ)赤道商業(yè)的空頭部位。這樣就有力地打擊了他們內(nèi)部集團(tuán)的操作。熱帶貿(mào)易的股價(jià)最終跌到了125美元,放空部位非常大,公司內(nèi)部能將股價(jià)上拉20至25個(gè)點(diǎn),由于空頭確實(shí)很大,這樣的漲勢(shì)很合理。只是,我預(yù)測(cè)到了這樣的小反彈,但卻沒(méi)去回補(bǔ),我不想失去自己的頭寸。赤道商業(yè)配合熱帶貿(mào)易上漲的時(shí)候,我又賣出了一大把赤道商業(yè)股,取得的效果也與前面一樣,讓人們看清了熱帶貿(mào)易利多消息的真面目——這只股票經(jīng)過(guò)猛烈上漲后,多頭消息又充斥坊間了。
此時(shí),股市大盤回歸疲軟,正如我之前所講,我是相信即將要進(jìn)入熊市了,才在佛羅里達(dá)釣魚的時(shí)候就開始往外放空。至于其他股票,我也賣出了不少,不過(guò)熱帶貿(mào)易是我的最愛(ài)。整體股市在最后變得不堪重負(fù),熱帶貿(mào)易內(nèi)部也沒(méi)辦法再抵擋,于是股價(jià)大跌。這是它多年以來(lái)首次跌破120美元,然后又跌到了110美元以下,最后跌破面值,而我還是沒(méi)有回補(bǔ)。有一天,市場(chǎng)非常疲弱,熱帶貿(mào)易跌破了90美元。我憑借與以往一樣的理由,在市場(chǎng)的混亂中回補(bǔ)了。我抓住了機(jī)會(huì)——市場(chǎng)交易量巨大,行情不好,拋售市場(chǎng)比買進(jìn)市場(chǎng)大很多。就算被你認(rèn)為是沒(méi)意思的自吹自擂,我也要告訴你,我基本上在跌到最低點(diǎn)的時(shí)候,回補(bǔ)了我的3萬(wàn)股。只是,我之前沒(méi)想過(guò)要在跌勢(shì)最低時(shí)回補(bǔ),只是想把賬面上的利潤(rùn)套現(xiàn),在套現(xiàn)過(guò)程中不失去太多的利潤(rùn)。
整個(gè)過(guò)程我都把控得很平穩(wěn),我清楚自己的頭寸正確。我沒(méi)有與市場(chǎng)走向相抗衡,沒(méi)有違背股市基本行情,而是順應(yīng)了市場(chǎng),正因?yàn)檫@個(gè)原因,我才非常確定,內(nèi)線集團(tuán)一定會(huì)潰敗。他們想做以前其他人試驗(yàn)過(guò)的事情,而這樣注定會(huì)一敗涂地。就算我像其他人那樣,知道習(xí)慣性的反彈馬上要到了,也沒(méi)有被唬住。我清楚,只要能夠忍耐得住,結(jié)果必然比想辦法去回補(bǔ),再在價(jià)格較高時(shí)放空要好很多。我堅(jiān)守了自認(rèn)為對(duì)的頭寸,賺了100多萬(wàn)。之所以有這個(gè)結(jié)果,并非與第六感有關(guān),也不是因?yàn)槲矣卸嗝磪柡Φ慕獗P技巧或者愚勇,而是源自我的自信心,我不是靠聰明或虛榮去賺錢的。知識(shí)給了我力量,有了力量就不會(huì)怕那些謊言,即使它們清晰地出現(xiàn)在報(bào)價(jià)牌上,也只會(huì)曇花一現(xiàn)。
過(guò)了一年,熱帶貿(mào)易股票又漲到了150美元,而且盤踞了好幾周時(shí)間,整體市場(chǎng)也因?yàn)槌掷m(xù)的漲勢(shì)大幅回調(diào),這時(shí)的市場(chǎng)已經(jīng)不是多頭了。我清楚這點(diǎn),因?yàn)槲乙呀?jīng)投石問(wèn)路了。熱帶貿(mào)易公司所屬集團(tuán)的發(fā)展情勢(shì)很不好,我不知道它們?cè)趺床拍茏尮善鄙蠞q,就算大盤上漲,也沒(méi)辦法,更何況大盤沒(méi)一點(diǎn)兒跡象表明要上漲。于是,我就開始拋售熱帶貿(mào)易公司股票,準(zhǔn)備放空1萬(wàn)股。我的這個(gè)做法,讓股價(jià)又下跌了。我沒(méi)發(fā)現(xiàn)有任何支撐。然后,買盤的性質(zhì)突然就發(fā)生了變化。
我說(shuō)自己能夠在支撐出現(xiàn)時(shí)看出來(lái),不是說(shuō)自己多么厲害。我忽然覺(jué)得,在大盤下跌的時(shí)候,公司內(nèi)部大量買進(jìn),里面一定是有原因的。這些人不會(huì)感覺(jué)到道德上應(yīng)該具備什么樣的義務(wù),來(lái)維持住股價(jià)。他們不是沒(méi)用的蠢貨,不是慈善家,也不是想拉高股價(jià)以便在柜臺(tái)多賣些股票的承銷銀行家。我和很多人都放空了,但熱帶貿(mào)易的股價(jià)還是在持續(xù)上漲。股價(jià)在153美元時(shí),我回補(bǔ)了2萬(wàn)股空頭;漲到156美元時(shí),我已經(jīng)翻空為多了。因?yàn)?,我看到的這個(gè)時(shí)候的股市行情最小阻力線是上漲的。我不看好整個(gè)股市,可這是一只股票的實(shí)際交易情勢(shì),而不是一般的投機(jī)理論。它漲勢(shì)兇猛,達(dá)到了200美元之上,成了這一年最引人關(guān)注的股票。廣播報(bào)紙都報(bào)道說(shuō),我在被軋空的過(guò)程中損失了八九百萬(wàn)美元。但其實(shí),我不但沒(méi)做空,還已經(jīng)在做多了。我持股的時(shí)間稍微長(zhǎng)了些,因此損失了一點(diǎn)兒賬面利潤(rùn)。你想不想知道我這么做的緣由?因?yàn)槲蚁耄绻沂菬釒зQ(mào)易公司內(nèi)部人士的話,我當(dāng)然會(huì)做該做的事情,可這樣的事我不去想它,我做的是投機(jī)交易,就要照著眼前的事實(shí)來(lái)做,而不能理所當(dāng)然地依靠我自以為別人應(yīng)當(dāng)做的事情去操作。
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