參議院認(rèn)為酷刑無(wú)助于追殺本·拉登

參議院認(rèn)為酷刑無(wú)助于追殺本·拉登

WASHINGTON — Months before the operation that killed Osama bin Laden in 2011, the Central Intelligence Agency secretly prepared a public-relations plan that would stress that information gathered from its disputed interrogation program had played a critical role in the hunt. Starting the day after the raid, agency officials in classified briefings made that point to Congress.

華盛頓——在2011年開(kāi)展行動(dòng)殺死奧薩馬·本·拉登(Osama bin Laden)的幾個(gè)月前，美國(guó)中央情報(bào)局(Central Intelligence Agency，簡(jiǎn)稱CIA)秘密籌備了一套公關(guān)方案，打算強(qiáng)調(diào)通過(guò)有爭(zhēng)議的審訊操作獲取的情報(bào)，在追捕過(guò)程中發(fā)揮了關(guān)鍵作用。從突襲行動(dòng)后的第二天起，CIA官員就開(kāi)始在秘密匯報(bào)時(shí)向國(guó)會(huì)這樣陳述。

But in page after page of previously classified evidence, the Senate Intelligence Committee report on C.I.A. torture, released Tuesday, rejects the notion that torturing detainees contributed to finding Bin Laden — a conclusion that was also strongly implied in “Zero Dark Thirty,” the popular 2012 movie about the hunt for the Qaeda leader.

但參議院情報(bào)委員會(huì)(Senate Intelligence Committee)周二發(fā)布的一份關(guān)于CIA刑訊逼供的報(bào)告，卻通過(guò)一頁(yè)頁(yè)之前屬于機(jī)密的證據(jù)，駁斥了拷打在押人員對(duì)追查本·拉登下落做出了貢獻(xiàn)的說(shuō)法。2012年頗受歡迎的電影《刺殺本·拉登》(Zero Dark Thirty)也強(qiáng)烈地暗示了這一結(jié)論。該影片講述的是追捕這名基地組織領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的故事。

“The vast majority of the intelligence” about the Qaeda courier who led the agency to Bin Laden “was originally acquired from sources unrelated to the C.I.A.’s detention and interrogation program, and the most accurate information acquired from a C.I.A. detainee was provided prior to the C.I.A. subjecting the detainee to the C.I.A.’s enhanced interrogation techniques,” the Senate report said.

參議院的報(bào)告稱，有關(guān)基地組織那名信使的“絕大部分情報(bào)最初的來(lái)源，都和CIA的羈押和審訊項(xiàng)目無(wú)關(guān)，并且在CIA對(duì)一名囚犯使用加強(qiáng)型審訊技巧之前，對(duì)方就已供出了最精確的信息”。正是那名信使指引CIA找到了本·拉登。

It added that most of “the documents, statements and testimony” from the C.I.A. regarding a connection between the torture of detainees and the Bin Laden hunt were “inaccurate and incongruent with C.I.A. records.”

報(bào)告接著表示，CIA為證明拷打囚犯和追捕本·拉登之間的聯(lián)系而提供的大部分“文件、聲明和證詞”都“不準(zhǔn)確，且與CIA的記錄不符”。

On Tuesday, the C.I.A. disputed the committee’s portrayal that it had been misleading and disingenuous about the role of that program in the hunt for Bin Laden.

該委員會(huì)認(rèn)為，對(duì)于相關(guān)計(jì)劃在追捕本·拉登的過(guò)程中所起的作用，CIA的表述有誤導(dǎo)性，而且并不誠(chéng)實(shí)。CIA在周二進(jìn)行了反駁。

The crucial breakthrough in the hunt was the identification of the courier, known as Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, who was the terrorist leader’s link to the outside world from his secret compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. His significance gradually came into sharper focus.

追捕過(guò)程中的重大突破，是確認(rèn)了名為阿布·艾哈邁德·科威提(Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti)的那名信使的身份，他是身在巴基斯坦阿伯塔巴德那處秘密院落的本·拉登與外部世界之間的聯(lián)系。他的重要性逐漸得到了顯現(xiàn)。

But the Senate report shows that the C.I.A. was already actively collecting information about him earlier than was previously known and long before it had obtained any intelligence about him from detainees in its custody.

但參議院的報(bào)告顯示，CIA開(kāi)始積極收集科威提相關(guān)情報(bào)的時(shí)間，早于之前知道的時(shí)間。還沒(méi)有從在押人員那里取得任何情報(bào)之前，就已經(jīng)開(kāi)始了。

The United States had started wiretapping a phone number associated with Mr. Kuwaiti by late 2001, and as early as 2002, the C.I.A. had obtained from other sources — including reports from allies based on detainees in their custody — the courier’s alias and the fact that he was one of Bin Laden’s few close associates and “traveled frequently” to meet with him. It also had data on his age, physical appearance and family connections, as well as a recording of his voice — all of which proved crucial to finding him.

在2001年末之前，美國(guó)就已經(jīng)開(kāi)始竊聽(tīng)與科威提相關(guān)的一個(gè)電話號(hào)碼了。并且早在2002年，CIA就通過(guò)其他來(lái)源——包括各盟國(guó)根據(jù)其關(guān)押囚犯的口供撰寫(xiě)的報(bào)告——得知了這名信使的化名，也得知了他是本·拉登少數(shù)幾名親信之一，且“頻繁前去”與他會(huì)面。CIA還掌握了有關(guān)他的年齡、體貌特征、家庭關(guān)系的數(shù)據(jù)，并且還有他的錄音。所有這些信息，后來(lái)都對(duì)查清他的下落起到了關(guān)鍵作用。

It was in 2004 that the C.I.A. came to realize that it should focus on finding Mr. Kuwaiti as part of the hunt for Bin Laden, after it interrogated a Qaeda operative, Hassan Ghul, who had been captured in Iraqi Kurdistan. The report concludes that Mr. Ghul provided “the most accurate” intelligence that the agency produced about Mr. Kuwaiti’s role and ties to Bin Laden.

到2004年，審問(wèn)過(guò)在伊拉克庫(kù)爾德斯坦俘獲的基地組織人員哈桑·古爾(Hassan Ghul)后，CIA意識(shí)到應(yīng)該集中精力捉拿科威提，將其作為追捕本·拉登的一部分。報(bào)告斷定，CIA得到的有關(guān)科威提的角色，以及他與本·拉登之間關(guān)系的“最精確”情報(bào)，便是由古爾提供的。

But the report emphasizes that Mr. Ghul provided all the important information about the courier before he was subjected to any torture techniques and spoke freely to his interrogators. During that two-day period in January 2004, it said, the C.I.A. produced 21 intelligence reports from Mr. Ghul, who one officer said “sang like a Tweety Bird.”

但該報(bào)告強(qiáng)調(diào)，在CIA對(duì)他采取任何拷問(wèn)技巧之前，古爾就已自愿向?qū)徲嵢藛T交代了有關(guān)那名信使的所有重要信息。報(bào)告稱，2004年1月進(jìn)行的為期兩天的審訊期間，CIA根據(jù)古爾的供述撰寫(xiě)了21份情報(bào)報(bào)告。一名CIA特工形容，古爾的招供“就像翠迪鳥(niǎo)唱歌一樣”。

“He opened up right away and was cooperative from the outset,” the officer added.

“他馬上就開(kāi)口了，從一開(kāi)始就很配合，”這名特工接著說(shuō)。

In those initial interrogations, Mr. Ghul portrayed Mr. Kuwaiti as Bin Laden’s “closest assistant” and said he was always with him, identifying him as a likely courier who ran messages between Bin Laden and other leaders of Al Qaeda. He listed him as one of three people most likely to be with Bin Laden, who he speculated was living in a house in Pakistan, with Mr. Kuwaiti handling his needs.

在最初那些審訊中，古爾說(shuō)科威提是本·拉登“最親密的助手”，并稱本·拉登總是和科威提在一起，并指出科威提可能充當(dāng)信使，負(fù)責(zé)在本·拉登和基地組織的其他頭目之間傳遞信息。他把古爾列為最有可能和本·拉登在一起的三個(gè)人之一，并猜測(cè)本·拉登生活在巴基斯坦的某棟房屋里，科威提負(fù)責(zé)為其采辦必需品。

Nevertheless, the C.I.A. then decided to torture Mr. Ghul to see if he would say more. He was transferred to a “black site” prison, where he was shaved, placed in a “hanging” stress position, and subjected to 59 hours of sleep deprivation, after which he began hallucinating; his back and abdomen began spasming; his arms, legs and feet began experiencing “mild paralysis”; and he began having “premature” heart beats. During and after that treatment, he provided “no actionable threat information” that resulted in the capture of any leaders of Al Qaeda, the report said.

盡管如此，CIA后來(lái)還是決定對(duì)古爾使用酷刑，看他能不能再說(shuō)出什么來(lái)。他被轉(zhuǎn)移到了一個(gè)“地下”監(jiān)獄，在那里，他被剃掉了毛發(fā)，保持“懸吊”的不適姿態(tài)，59個(gè)小時(shí)不能睡覺(jué)，此后，他開(kāi)始出現(xiàn)幻覺(jué);后背和腹部開(kāi)始抽搐;胳膊、腿部和腳經(jīng)歷了“輕度癱瘓”;他還出現(xiàn)了“心臟早搏”。報(bào)告稱，在用刑期間和用刑之后，古爾都沒(méi)有提供導(dǎo)致基地組織的任何領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人被抓的“有實(shí)用價(jià)值的線索”。

In its statement pushing back on the report, the C.I.A. insisted another detainee, Ammar Al Baluchi, had been “the first to reveal” Mr. Kuwaiti was a courier, after Mr. Baluchi’s arrest and subjection to “enhanced” interrogation techniques in May 2003.

在反駁這份報(bào)告的聲明中，CIA堅(jiān)持說(shuō)，另一名叫做阿馬爾·巴盧希(Ammar Al Baluchi)的囚犯，才是“第一個(gè)揭發(fā)了”科威提是本·拉登信使的人，而這發(fā)生在巴盧希2003年5月被逮捕并遭受“加強(qiáng)型”審訊技巧之后。

But the Senate report shows that Mr. Baluchi’s claim was not recognized as a breakthrough, in part because he recanted what he had said under torture. The report also notes that to make its claim about the significance of Mr. Baluchi’s information, the agency “ignores” detailed information in its records from 2002, from several detainees in the custody of other governments, “suggesting al-Kuwaiti may have served as a courier” for Bin Laden.

但參議院的報(bào)告顯示，巴盧希的說(shuō)法沒(méi)有被視作重大進(jìn)展，一個(gè)原因是，他后來(lái)否認(rèn)了酷刑之下的口供。報(bào)告還指出，為了突出巴盧希提供的情報(bào)的重要性，CIA對(duì)該局2002年的記錄中體現(xiàn)的情報(bào)細(xì)節(jié)“視而不見(jiàn)”。這些情報(bào)來(lái)自其他國(guó)家收押的幾名囚犯，“表明科威提可能是本·拉登的信使”。

The C.I.A.’s statement also said that Mr. Ghul had provided “more concrete and less speculative” information that Mr. Kuwaiti was a courier after Mr. Ghul was subjected to its “enhanced” interrogation techniques. The Senate report called the agency’s rebuttal “incorrect,” citing contemporaneous C.I.A. reports.

CIA的聲明還說(shuō)，在受到“加強(qiáng)型”審訊技巧之后，古爾提供了“更為具體，且不那么可疑”的信息，稱科威提是本·拉登的信使。參議院的報(bào)告中引述CIA同一時(shí)期的其他一些報(bào)告，指出CIA的反駁“不正確”。

The C.I.A.’s records also show that detainees subjected to the torture techniques “provided fabricated, inconsistent and generally unreliable information” about the courier throughout their detention, the report said.

參議院的報(bào)告稱，CIA的記錄還顯示，在被關(guān)押期間，受到酷刑的犯人在本·拉登信使的問(wèn)題上“提供了憑空捏造、前后不一，而且基本上不可靠的信息。”

The C.I.A. countered that statements by two other detainees playing down the importance of Mr. Kuwaiti were significant corroboration that he was a secret worth protecting. The Senate report showed that the agency pressed both detainees about the courier in the summer of 2005 and thought both were lying.

CIA反駁稱，另外兩名囚犯淡化科威提重要性的口供有力地證明了，科威提是一個(gè)值得保護(hù)的神秘角色。參議院的報(bào)告顯示，CIA在2005年夏天迫使這兩名囚犯說(shuō)出了關(guān)于本·拉登信使的消息，但后來(lái)認(rèn)為兩人都在說(shuō)謊。

But the Senate report suggested that the agency had already sharpened its focus on Mr. Kuwaiti by the time of those denials. On Sept. 1, 2005, an internal agency bulletin on the hunt for Bin Laden reported that the search for his couriers was going nowhere because detainees were being unhelpful, adding, “We nonetheless continue the hunt for Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti.”

不過(guò)，參議院的報(bào)告顯示，在否認(rèn)上述口供之前，CIA已經(jīng)把更多注意力放在了科威提身上。2005年9月1日，關(guān)于追查本·拉登的內(nèi)部公告稱，尋找本·拉登信使的行動(dòng)沒(méi)有取得進(jìn)展，因?yàn)榍舴傅目诠](méi)有幫助。公告中接著說(shuō)，“我們?nèi)匀粫?huì)繼續(xù)尋找阿布·艾哈邁德·科威提。”