歐洲一體化將錯(cuò)過一個(gè)罕見的機(jī)遇？
經(jīng)濟(jì)在增長(zhǎng);失業(yè)率在下降。巴黎提出了一堆重振歐盟(EU)的想法。在柏林，對(duì)法國(guó)總統(tǒng)埃馬紐埃爾•馬克龍(Emmanuel Macron)遠(yuǎn)大抱負(fù)的公開禮貌回應(yīng)，很難掩蓋德國(guó)日益收緊支票簿的事實(shí)。人們不禁在想，歐洲一體化事業(yè)是否即將錯(cuò)過一個(gè)罕見的機(jī)遇?
For several years, Germany bemoaned the absence of a serious partner in Paris — a politician in the Elysée ready to modernise the French economy and restore the Franco-German dynamic to EU politics. If only, German policymakers lamented, the burden of European leadership could again be shared.
德國(guó)多年來抱怨在法國(guó)政府中找不到一個(gè)正經(jīng)的合作伙伴，即愛麗舍宮中沒有一位有如下決心的政治家：讓法國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)現(xiàn)代化、并恢復(fù)法國(guó)在歐盟政治中與德國(guó)對(duì)等的地位。德國(guó)政策制定者哀嘆道，要是領(lǐng)導(dǎo)歐洲的重?fù)?dān)再次有人來分擔(dān)就好了。
Angela Merkel’s government has got what it asked for. And more. Mr Macron’s passionate Europeanism is fused with the realism that says that France must put its own economic house in order. The months since the presidential election have seen the budget deficit cut, labour laws liberalised and taxes reduced. Mr Macron is paying for his seat at the table.
安格拉•默克爾(Angela Merkel)政府的這個(gè)愿望得到了滿足——可以說得到了超額滿足。馬克龍炙熱的歐洲主義融合了現(xiàn)實(shí)主義，后者告訴他：法國(guó)必須理順自己的經(jīng)濟(jì)。自大選以來的幾個(gè)月里，法國(guó)削減了預(yù)算赤字、放松了勞工法并削減了稅賦。馬克龍正在為獲得自己的話語權(quán)付出實(shí)實(shí)在在的努力。
For Europe, the timing is as good as it is likely to get. The need for Europe to reinvent itself — for reforms to align the EU’s capacity with today’s challenges — for once coincides with the opportunity.
對(duì)歐洲一體化事業(yè)來說，時(shí)機(jī)再好不過了。歐洲重塑自身的需求——通過改革讓自身能力能夠應(yīng)對(duì)當(dāng)今挑戰(zhàn)——總算與機(jī)遇相吻合了。
Some problems may not go away soon — the slide to illiberalism in parts of eastern Europe, the collision between Spain and Catalan separatists. But the cloud of perpetual crisis has lifted. Economic confidence in the eurozone is at its highest since 2001, the migration crisis has abated and populism mostly has been temporarily checked.
一些問題可能不會(huì)很快消失——東歐某些地方出現(xiàn)反自由主義的倒退，西班牙政府與加泰羅尼亞分裂主義者杠上了。但持久性危機(jī)的陰云已經(jīng)散去。歐元區(qū)的經(jīng)濟(jì)信心處于2001年以來的最高水平，移民危機(jī)緩解，民粹主義也基本上暫時(shí)得到遏制。
The challenges speak for themselves. The eurozone has been patched up, but the monetary union lacks strong economic foundations. The monopolistic power of American technology behemoths calls for an EU-wide sharpening of competition and tax rules. The 2015 refugee crisis exposed the weakness of the Union’s external frontier and tensions between national immigration rules and the Schengen open borders regime. Populism has exposed real grievances among the left-behinds.
挑戰(zhàn)不言而喻。歐元區(qū)的窟窿得到了修補(bǔ)，但這個(gè)貨幣聯(lián)盟缺乏堅(jiān)實(shí)的經(jīng)濟(jì)基礎(chǔ)。美國(guó)科技巨頭的壟斷力量，要求在整個(gè)歐盟范圍內(nèi)出臺(tái)更為嚴(yán)厲的反壟斷和稅收法規(guī)。2015年難民危機(jī)暴露出兩點(diǎn)：歐盟外部邊界的脆弱、成員國(guó)自己的移民法規(guī)與申根開放邊境制度之間的矛盾。民粹主義暴露出被落在后面的人們發(fā)自內(nèi)心的不滿。
Framed with the outsize confidence of a politician who had just upended the political order of France’s Fifth Republic, the vivid colours of Mr Macron’s project were always going to clash with the greys of Berlin. What I see now, however, are German politicians falling into a trap that the Brits never stepped out from during four decades of EU membership. Europe, in this self-defeating mindset, is a series of zero-sum transactions — entries on a bean-counter’s balance sheet, rather than the backbone of the continent’s peace and prosperity.
作為一名剛剛顛覆了法蘭西第五共和國(guó)政治秩序的政治家，馬克龍眼下信心爆棚，他描繪的多彩圖景與柏林的灰色現(xiàn)實(shí)發(fā)生碰撞是不可避免的。然而，我現(xiàn)在看到的是，德國(guó)政治家正在踏入一個(gè)陷阱，這個(gè)陷阱正是英國(guó)在身為歐盟成員國(guó)的40年時(shí)間里始終未能掙脫的。以這種自己害自己的心態(tài)來看，歐洲一體化是一系列零和交易——是一個(gè)“鐵公雞”在資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表上記錄的一筆筆賬，而非支撐歐洲大陸和平和繁榮的支柱。
The Germany of not so long ago took a broader view. Not from altruism but for good reasons of selfish national interest. The Federal Republic’s economic welfare and physical security, not to say the reunification of the two Germanies, has all along rested on the three pillars of the postwar European order. Now they are being called into question.
就在不久前，德國(guó)還是視野寬闊的——不是出于利他主義，而是出于一些純粹考慮本國(guó)利益的充分理由。德意志聯(lián)邦共和國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)福祉和國(guó)土安全——更不用說兩德的統(tǒng)一——全都有賴于戰(zhàn)后歐洲秩序的三個(gè)支柱。現(xiàn)在，這幾個(gè)支柱正受到質(zhì)疑。
The EU was at once the instrument of reconciliation with France and the answer to the fabled German question — how to accommodate a nation too big for its own continent and yet too small for the world. More than incidentally, it also supplied the marketplace for resurgent German industry. The Nato alliance added an essential security guarantee in the form of the US presence on the continent; and the Helsinki accords of 1975 put to rest the quarrels over borders long at the heart of European wars.
歐盟既是與法國(guó)實(shí)現(xiàn)和解的工具，又是如下這個(gè)著名德國(guó)問題的答案：如何容納一個(gè)對(duì)歐洲來說太大、對(duì)世界而言又太小的國(guó)家?歐盟也為復(fù)興的德國(guó)工業(yè)提供了市場(chǎng)，這不僅僅是偶然。通過讓美國(guó)參與歐洲的防衛(wèi)，北約(NATO)帶來了重要的安全保障;而1975年的《赫爾辛基協(xié)議》(Helsinki)結(jié)束了長(zhǎng)期處于歐洲戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)核心的一些邊界糾紛。
Events are chipping away at each of the three. Donald Trump’s elevation to the White House puts a question mark over how long the US will remain a European power. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine scorns the terms of Helsinki. For its part, the EU is losing Britain — an awkward partner maybe, but a European power for all that.
這三個(gè)支柱正在受到一系列事件的削弱。唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)當(dāng)選為美國(guó)總統(tǒng)，讓美國(guó)還會(huì)在歐洲呆多久成了未知數(shù)。俄羅斯吞并克里米亞并入侵烏克蘭東部，踐踏了《赫爾辛基協(xié)議》達(dá)成的條件。歐盟本身失去了英國(guó)——盡管英國(guó)對(duì)歐盟事業(yè)一直不能算熱心，但它畢竟是一個(gè)歐洲強(qiáng)國(guó)。
When Berlin’s policymakers dismiss Mr Macron’s plans for a eurozone budget as no more than a call for additional cash transfers from German taxpayers, they turn away from this broader understanding of the national interest. When politicians say the answer to eurozone strains is for others to behave more like, well, Germany, you wonder whether we are on the road from a European Germany to a German Europe.
當(dāng)柏林政策制定者把馬克龍的歐元區(qū)預(yù)算計(jì)劃視為只不過是要求德國(guó)納稅人掏更多錢的計(jì)劃時(shí)，他們就放棄了對(duì)國(guó)家利益更高瞻遠(yuǎn)矚的那種理解。當(dāng)政客們表示解決歐元區(qū)危機(jī)的辦法是讓其他國(guó)家學(xué)習(xí)德國(guó)的行事方式時(shí)，人們不禁納悶，我們是否正在走上一條從屬于歐洲的德國(guó)轉(zhuǎn)向?qū)儆诘聡?guó)的歐洲的道路?
The game is not lost. If one effect of the success in the election of the xenophobic Alternative for Germany was to shift politics in a nationalist direction, another was to persuade mainstream politicians that Germany badly needs a new deal to underpin Schengen. Reform of Schengen in return for strengthening the eurozone?
這盤棋并沒有輸。如果說排外的德國(guó)新選擇黨(Alternative for Germany)在選舉中的勝利的一個(gè)影響是讓政治轉(zhuǎn)向民族主義方向，那另一個(gè)影響就是說服主流政治家，德國(guó)亟需一份新協(xié)議來支持申根。是不是應(yīng)該為加強(qiáng)歐元區(qū)而改革申根協(xié)議?
The chancellor’s allies say she is constrained for the moment by the sensitive coalition negotiations with the more Eurosceptic Free Democrats. Ms Merkel will never be an instinctive European, but she understands the geopolitics that root Germany’s interests in the architecture of European integration.
默克爾的盟友們表示，她正在與立場(chǎng)更偏向“疑歐”的自由民主黨(Free Democrat)進(jìn)行敏感的結(jié)盟談判，這讓她眼下束手束腳。默克爾永遠(yuǎn)不會(huì)本能地支持歐洲一體化，但是她理解讓德國(guó)利益扎根于歐洲一體化架構(gòu)中的地緣政治。
Others will tell you that France and Germany always start from very different places. French enthusiasm and German scepticism mark a natural division of labour. What matters is they then show the political will to strike a balance. Maybe. In Mr Macron France has a leader with the courage to speak for a stronger Europe. He is waiting for an answer from Berlin.
其他人將會(huì)告訴你，法德一開始總是分歧很大。法國(guó)的熱情和德國(guó)的多疑代表著一種天然的“勞動(dòng)分工”。重要的是，他們之后拿出達(dá)成妥協(xié)的政治意愿?；蛟S如此。法國(guó)如今有了一個(gè)有勇氣主張加強(qiáng)歐洲一體化的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人——馬克龍，他正在等待柏林的答復(fù)。
The writer at present is a Richard von Weizsäcker Fellow of the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin
本文作者目前是柏林羅伯特•博世基金會(huì)(Robert Bosch Academy)理查德•馮•魏茨澤克(Richard von Weizsäcker)研究員
[email protected] 譯者/裴伴
